VIEW[Z]

VIenna English Working paperS

Volume 3 Number 1 July, 1994

Contents

Letter from the Editors

Here we are with VIEWS into its third year, alive and kicking!

This number is very different from the previous one in at least two respects: First, it is predominantly synchronic (and regular readers will be surprised to find not one single paper on OE -ian*!) and second, it is more Vienna-based in terms of where the contributions were produced – though no less international!*

This issue provides a rich variety of topics and 'modes': philological – intertextual, functional – programmatic, pragmatic – empirical, educational – speculative. *– We'll leave you to work out which is which.*

The real innovation in VIEWS 3/1 is the write-up of the Round Table on Functional Linguistics *which took place in our department when three prominent students of the field happened to be there at the same time.* Functional *is a term which has become very popular, and is sometimes (or often?) used in rather cavalier a fashion, as you will no doubt agree. Taking the bull by the horns, we are therefore particularly proud to present you here with a rather comprehensive – and hopefully not uncontroversial – discussion of functionalism and what it might possibly be.*

Finally, we should like to remind you again of the intended interactive nature of VIEWS: the 'synchronists' among us have been following with envy the lively debate that has developed in the 'diachronic camp' – so how about getting some interaction going among/with our 'synchronic' and 'applied' readers and contributors as well? You will find plenty to react to in this issue, so why not give us <u>your</u> VIEWS on the Round Table, or to Kryk-Kastovsky's or Seidlhofer's papers? So, here once more our address (mind the new fax number):

VIEWS
c/o Institut für Anglistik & Amerikanistik der Universität Wien
Universitätsstraße 7
A-1010; Austria

fax **(intern.) 43 1 40 60 444**

e-*mail* **A7541DAC @ AWIUNI11.EDVZ.UNIVIE.AC.AT**

The Editors

Note to contibutors:

Your contributions should reach us on computer disks (or via e-mail) in any standard IBM compatible word processing format (MS Word, Word for Windows, Wordperfect [for Windows], Word Star, R.T.F., ASCII ...) together with a printout showing character format, special symbols, formulae, tables etc.

Round table on functional linguistics, 1st April 1993, University of Vienna°

Participants

Jan Firbas, Univ. of Brno
Henry G. Widdowson, Univ. of London & Univ. of Essex
Robert A. de Beaugrande, Univ. of Vienna

Introduction by the host, Prof. H. Schendl (Univ. of Vienna)

Ich möchte Sie sehr herzlich begrüßen, wir freuen uns sehr, daß trotz der sehr kurzen Verständigungszeit so viele von Ihnen gekommen sind. Ich werde sicher nicht lange reden, obwohl über unsere drei *speakers* sehr viel gesagt werden könnte. Ich möchte nur ein paar einführende Worte dazu sagen:

Ich glaube, daß es bei diesem Thema wirklich überflüssig ist, Herrn Professor Firbas vorzustellen. Jeder, der von der Prager Schule oder vom Begriff der Funktionalen Satzperspektive je gehört hat, kann gar nicht umhin, immer wieder auf den Namen Jan Firbas zu stoßen; zuletzt 1992, als sein Buch *Functional sentence perspective in written and spoken communication* bei Cambridge University Press erschienen ist.

Kollege Widdowson, der vergangenes Semester hier in Wien lehrte und somit allen persönlich bekannt sein dürfte, hat gerade in den späten siebziger Jahren den funktionalen Ansatz ganz entscheidend geprägt.

Kollege Beaugrande arbeitet derzeit an einer kognitiv fundierten Functional Grammar of English.

Die gleichzeitige Anwesenheit dieser drei Kollegen in Wien ist wohl eine einmalige Gelegenheit für einen *Round Table on Functional Linguistics*. Dabei möchte ich nicht verschweigen, daß die Idee von Doktor Seidlhofer stammt, der ich für ihre Initiative danken möchte.

Well, the participants have decided on the following procedure: the Round Table will be in English, each of the speakers will start by giving a statement of about ten minutes first, starting with Professor Firbas, who will include some brief historical information on the development of Functionalism. Then Professor Beaugrande will, I think, enlarge on some of these aspects, followed by Professor Widdowson's presentation. Finally Professor Beaugrande will present his latest research in the field.

Thank you all very much for coming. May I ask Professor Firbas to start.

Prof. J. Firbas

I should like to say a few words about my approach to language. I approach a language, or languages, or language in general, both as a learner and as a scholar.

First a word on the learner. As a Czech, I speak a language that is spoken only by a comparatively small community. Speakers of Czech are heavily outnumbered by those who do not speak the language. This is certainly not disproved by the possibility that when an Austrian football team plays a Czech football team, roughly half the Austrians may have Czech names and roughly half the Czechs German names. Czech is simply not a world language. If a Czech wishes to communicate with a non-Czech, (s)he has to learn a foreign language or foreign languages. In this way, I have become a learner and of course realize that there is no end to learning. As a learner, I am frequently faced with the problem of finding linguistic means that would adequately satisfy my communicative needs; in other words, I am frequently faced with the problem of finding linguistic means that in the act of communication would adequately serve my communicative purpose. In order to be able to apply the linguistic means in an adequate way, I must know how they operate in the act of communication. This is certainly a problem worth investigating. This brings me to my endeavours as a scholar.

It is a commonplace nowadays that in studying a language, we cannot sever it from its function or functions. Nevertheless, it is a commonplace that must be taken very seriously. I should like to make two points in this connection. First, let me turn my attention to the very act of communication, or rather the moment at which a sentence is uttered and/or perceived. As early as 1884, Henri Weil wrote the following words: 'Car dans la parole, ce qu'il y a de plus essentiel, c'est le moment de la conception et de l'énonciation; c'est dans ce moment que se trouve toute la vie de la parole, avant ce moment elle n'existait pas; après, elle est morte' (Weil 1884: 27). The English translation runs: 'For in speech - or in the spoken language - the most important thing is the instant of conception and utterance. Into this instance is compressed all the life of speech: before it, speech had no existence: after it speech is dead' (Weil 1887: 30). In a way, this dictum may sound a little exaggerated, but I wholeheartedly agree that the moment of utterance and/or perception of a sentence is a phenomenon of paramount importance. It is at the moment of utterance and/or perception that the sentence serves a particular communicative purpose and hence functions in a definite perspective. It is not without interest to note that Mathesius, who knew Weil's work, coined the felicitous term 'aktuální členění větní yětné' ('aktual' noe chlenenie predlozheniya', 'aktuelle Satzgliederung', 'la division actuelle de la phrase'). As English 'actual' is not an exact

equivalent of Czech ‘aktuální’, another term had to be found for English. I accepted Professor Josef Vachek’s suggestion and started using the term ‘functional sentence perspective’ (FSP; Firbas 1957). The term is based on Mathesius’ term ‘Satzperspektive’. Vachek’s suggestion has added the qualification ‘functional’. This is the way the term ‘functional sentence perspective’ (FSP) has found its way into the literature. For years I have been endeavouring to study the factors and the signals which operate at the moment of utterance and/or perception and which orient, in other words, perspective, the sentence towards the element that conveys the high point of the message, i.e. the rheme proper of the sentence.

Weil’s *dictum* brings me to the second point I should like to make. As I see it, I find Weil’s dictum applicable both to the written and to the spoken language. After all, Weil made his statement while comparing the word orders of ancient Latin and Greek with those of modern French and German. Accepting the dictum, I do not interpret the term ‘speech’ in the sense of de Saussure’s ‘parole’. After all, Weil’s book on word order was published about half a century before the appearance of de Saussure’s *Course*. The factors determining the functional perspective of a sentence, as well as the signals yielded by these factors, operate in an interplay. A special place within this interplay is occupied by the contextual factor, which through the immediately relevant context, verbal and situational, plays the dominating role in effecting the embedding of the sentence into the flow of communication. Now, participating in fulfilling the communicative purpose, a linguistic element of any rank performs a specific function. This function cannot be determined if the element is examined in isolation and if its relations to the concurring elements are disregarded. This points to the systemic character of languge. I agree with Vachek and others that language is a system. In fact, I go the length of agreeing with Vachek that language is a system of systems. However, I also agree with him (and Daneš) that language is not a closed system, but a system that has its centre and its periphery.

It follows that the approach I subscribe to is functional and systemic, systemic in the sense of Prague linguistic structuralism.

Prof. R. de Beaugrande

I came into this area when I was facing a practical problem. I was working on a theory of translation and I didn’t find American linguistics especially helpful. I began collecting Czechoslovakian research papers, and I noticed that Western linguists were very curious about FSP but knew little about it. Even though a good deal of the studies were written by scholars of English and Anglo-Saxon in very good English, they were published in sources that were

extremely difficult for Westerners to get to for political reasons in those days, mostly just was Slavic Institutes or the occasional *Ost-Europa Haus*.

I did find the work extremely useful, when I finally got to Czechoslovakia in 1987, the researchers presented me with much of their work, back issues, some dating as far as the 1920s, say of *Travaux Linguistiques de Prague, Brno Studies in English,* and *Sbornik praci filosoficke fakulty brnenske university*. So I sat down to read them all, and I wrote a paper for the Academy of Sciences on 'The heritage of Functional Sentence Perspective' in *Linguistica Pragiensa*, (vol. 34/1-2, 1992, 2-26 and 55-86), in which I attempted to show in retrospect how much we owe to this work.

In 1926, Mathesius said that we have the opportunity to approach language by starting with the form and going to the function, or start with the function and go to the form. In the West, given the way science was done in those days and is often still done today, the main idea has been to start with the form and maybe go to the function later. We have here two academic ideologies:

(Fig. 1)



In the one we could - unpolemically and descriptively - call 'formalism', the basic fact of language is form and function is one corner of that, e.g. when Chomsky put forth his formal grammar and leave out functions by claiming that 'the rules of stylistic reordering are very different from grammatical transformations', the latter being 'much more deeply embedded in the grammatical system' and using 'markers drawn from a fixed, universal language-independent set', while 'stylistic' ones are 'peripheral', apply to 'performance', and 'have no apparent bearing' 'on the theory of grammatical structure' (*Aspects*, 127, 222f).

In the ideology we could call 'functionalism', the basic fact of language is function, which ought to be obvious in a commonsensical way, and there are only some formal aspects in the phenomena.

As Ales Svoboda pointed out to me, a large number of the FSP people were Anglo-Saxon scholars; when they looked at Anglo-Saxon word order, it had for Czechs a rather familiar feel to it, much more than modern English. And to study word order in Anglo-Saxon, they enquired how Anglo-Saxon speakers decide what sort of patterns they want, and they found a principle similar to Czech, in which it is impossible to formulate a sentence without taking

functional sentence perspective into consideration. Modern English – due to by the introduction of widespread literacy particularly in the 18th century – was 'frozen' – this is my own hypothesis – in the transition from being an inflected language, as was Middle English still, and of course Anglo-Saxon, over to being a genuinely isolating language in the sense that Mandarin Chinese is. It got frozen in the middle and ended up with formal substrate (what's called in physics a 'frozen island' in an otherwise fluid system).

These 'frozen islands' of syntactic patterns offered the Western formalists the main encouragement for their formalist approach. But the longer you look at the older forms of English the more you're convinced that English is a highly functional language; it would not have occurred to an Anglo-Saxon to write a 'formalist grammar'. One paper in particular went to the heart of the matter; when I went back and read it again, I realized it said a lot more than I had thought, namely Daneš's 'Three-Level Approach to Syntax' (*Travaux Linguistiques de Prague* 1, 1964: 225-40). To bring home the point, I drew a contrasting chart here.

(Fig. 2)



(a) Formalist levels (b) Functionalist levels

In the dominant Western scheme (you'll find this in Bloomfield's *Language*), phonemes are the smallest units of sound, and morphemes are combinations of phonemes, the lexemes are the words, combinations of morphemes, and then you have the phrases which were called 'syntagmemes'. In the formalist scheme, the layers are related in terms of size and constituency, each one is a piece of the other. In the functionalist scheme, the front-end of language is not phonemes but intonation, recalling here that most of the important early functional work was done by people like Bolinger, Daneš, Firth, Halliday, and the Sinclair group, who were scholars of intonation or prosody: they had to adopt a functionalist approach. The grammar does the main work of organizing the language, so, it includes morphology, syntax, semantics, and many functional issues that would go under stylistics. The discourse, rather than being the largest unit, is the entire system, where the contributions of the subsystems are all put together. In contrast to the formalist system, the relation is not in size; intonation is a factor of the whole text, grammar is a factor of the whole text, so you're not getting bigger pieces as you go on, but aspects that are functionally integrated. Daneš pointed out in his paper on 'The three levels'

that the one level is a means for the other level, which seem to me to lie the heart of the functionalist, the Prague approach. Daneš's system (see Figure) covers the 'organization of the utterance', the 'semantic structure of the utterance', and the 'grammatical structure of the utterance', and what he meant by 'grammatical structure' turns out to be this rich kind of 'functional grammar' that is coming into style today.

(Figs. 3 & 4)

organization of utterance
semantic structure of sentence
grammatical structure of sentence

Fig. 3: Daneš's 3 levels

SENTENCE
individual utterance event
minimal communicative unit of the language
abstract structure within the grammatical system

Fig. 4: Daneš's levels of organization

If you look at the sentence from a functional viewpoint, as an 'individual utterance event', where pragmatics, communicative semantic structures, syntax, they're all put together, and it's their interaction that's interesting. In a formalist scheme you have simple components with complex interactions, e.g., once you've got the whole phonology set up, you ask how it might interact with morphology. But that picture makes the interactions impossibly complex. Say, you have a whole syntax set up and then you put the semantics on top of it, and if you've tried to write all the rules you know how difficult that is. A functional approach has the components be more complex by introducing functions, and has the interactions then be more direct and simple.

We are at a watershed now. The reason why modern linguistics has become functional is because we have discovered we don't have the constraints to write a description of any language based on form alone. There is no formal grammar of any natural language because there cannot be; all you can attempt to do is rewrite functional information in a formalist way. In the late seventies people would ask me: 'if this is FSP, how do we formalize it?' How do you write the transformational rules to capture all this, but without speakers, without contexts, in a sense, to 'de-functionalize' it? Since the 1980s, ironically, some linguists, particularly in America, are now applying the name 'functional' to formalist models to sell them better, to get on the new wave, giving us half-hearted, nebulous formalizations of the functional approach. And we must take care to distinguish these from the central functionalist approach as it came to us from the Prague school.

Prof. H.G. Widdowson

I think my perspective on sentences will be slightly different, functionally, from that of my colleagues. What I would like to do is to distinguish a number of different senses in which one can talk about functions, because I suppose I'm thinking of this particularly from the point of view of language pedagogy, and there's a good deal of confusion as to what a function is. And I think what we've been hearing about is one way in which one might define the idea of function. I'd like to distinguish three ways, and I think each of them has its legitimacy, and it's really a matter of recognizing the nature of descriptions in relation to these three kinds of functions, and what these descriptions can legitimately claim and what they cannot claim. So I think it's really not so much that one approach to the description of language replaces another, but that we need to be clear as to what the legitimacy of the claims is that are made. All descriptions of language tend to claim to be comprehensive and this in a sense is one of the difficulties.

One sense of function, let me call it the systemic, is what I take it Jan Firbas was talking about. The Prague School and his own work brings out a relationship, a combination indeed, of the functional and the systemic, and I think that sense of function is indeed a systemic sense. And that sense is still alive and well and living in descriptive linguistics. By it I mean that one is talking about the code-internal relations which linguistic forms as items contract with each other. So here we are talking about system, or systems, as Jan said, systems within which one finds terms, which by virtue of the fact that they are in systems, function in contrast with each other. And that is, if you like, a systemic function. So one could look at systemic relations in grammar. Indeed in Halliday's original conceptions grammar was a systemic grammar in precisely that sense. And one can talk about sense relations in lexis, and here we are talking about the internal functioning of forms in relation to each other. One of the disadvantages, and this I think is what Robert is pointing out, is that this kind of description is closed off so to speak from the outside world. You can talk about these formal relations as abstract objects, or abstract items, and apart from the fact that you make a neat model of them, there is no motivation for them in respect to what the language is supposed to do in the world outside.

So then we get a second, I think really quite distinctive notion of function, and this let me call for the nonce, a semiotic function. And this is where Halliday, for example, moves from a systemic grammar to a functional grammar. The name changes because the notion of function alters. Here we are talking not so much about linguistic forms as items, but about linguistic forms as signs, signs of something. Of what? Signs of something in the world OUTSIDE language, and the concern here is how the abstract systems that might

be described, are in some way motivated by the social needs for language. We are talking here, I think, about the way in which language formalizes or formulates social semiotic meaning. Halliday, famously, starts his linguistic descriptions almost always by asking the question 'Why is language as it is?'. And his answer is that language is as it is, is formed as it is, its systems are as they are, because they are developed to meet the communicative requirements of language. Hence, we have these three types of system in a Hallidayan grammar, in a functional grammar in this sense, each system reflecting a basic communicative or semiotic function. So you have the ideational function, and there you have systems which he calls transitivity systems of the grammar. We have the interpersonal function. If you're going to have a language, you are going to use it to talk to other people, interpersonally, so then you have systems which reflect that function, and these systems are the mood systems as he calls them. And then you have the textual function, and that is particularly of course what the Prague School has been most concerned with, which is, as he described it, the function of language to make links with itself, and there are systems for that also and these are the theme systems. One of the advantages of looking at language in this way is that you provide a semiotic function outside language itself as motivation for the formal systems which you then define. The description is motivated by the need for an explanation. Instead of saying, language, that's how it is, these forms which you will study in isolation and separated from what purpose they might have, you provide some sort of an explanation for these systems in reference to the functions that they've evolved to serve. It's a sociological explanation, if you like. A semiotic explanation. Halliday is not the only one who deals in explanations, the much-maligned Chomsky also has an explanation. And it's important to recognize that he too, in this sense, sees the grammar in functional terms, but very different terms, because for him, grammar is as it is because for him, it reflects universal cognitive processes or innate endowment or whatever. He, too, is looking for an explanation, but his explanation of form is not a sociological but a psychological one, not a communicative one but a cognitive one. So, I would like to suggest as a second notion, or second way of thinking of function: as an explanation of form in terms of the social semiotic, and this is very much Halliday's functional grammar.

There is however a third sense of function, and I think it is frequently confused with the second, and this brings in what Jan Firbas has referred to as the 'contextual factor'. Here I'm referring to the function of language in the context of its occurrence, the pragmatic function. And - in a sense - it is not a function of language, but a function of people's use of language - it is how people realize its communicative potential. Halliday refers to descriptions of language as descriptions of meaning potential, but how this potential is actually

realized in the achievement of meaning in context is another matter. This seems to me to be not a matter of simply seeing how features of a language occur in context, one is looking here at the way in which code and context interrelate, how each one, each side so to speak, modifies the other - it's a kind of reciprocal interaction. And I think that in semiotic terms, one is thinking of the functioning of the linguistic sign, not as a semantic symbol, but as a pragmatic index, that is to say, one is looking at what the contextual constraints are on how people mean, how people use the resources of their language to engage with each other in particular occurrences of use. It's a matter not of correlating the linguistic forms with the features of the context, but how the context leads people to convert and in some sense to subvert the linguistic system in order to achieve the meanings they want.

Now having distinguished these three, quite distinctive functions, I should like to suggest that the real problem in all language description is how these three can be meaningfully interrelated. Of course, one would like to include them all in a vast comprehensive scheme. But what in effect happens, I think, is that we go for one rather than the other, and you get movements whereby one kind of function is emphasized at the expense of the others, and another kind of function is emphasized at the expense of the others and so on, which I think is in many ways regrettable. I think one has to recognize that there are these three and it is a perfectly legitimate and honest endeavor to concentrate your attention on one rather than the other two. The problems arise when you make claims that in dealing with one function you're in some sense including all the others.

I'd like to make just three brief observations about the third of these functions, the pragmatic. They are deliberately controversial.

The first observation is that context and code operate on each other. Context works in very mysterious ways. In the way we make language function pragmatically, we operate on a least effort principle, so that there are occasions where the amount of language we need to achieve our contextual meaning is minimal. Although, as Robert has said, there are no strict levels, so to speak, in pragmatic functioning, nevertheless, one does see, in discussions of discourse analysis, a description of discourse as above the sentence. And FSP of course is concerned with sentence perspective. But a great deal of language of course operates below the sentence and one has, for instance, one word texts, very commonly. They are texts, they are single word texts. We don't communicate by sentences. In fact, I would argue that the sentence is not a unit of communication at all. Utterances are what we use in communication, written or spoken and utterances can be very minimal. Why? Because they are compensated for or they act upon the context in all kinds of strange and mysterious ways. This is why, it seems to me, we are concerned not with how

you identify linguistic forms occurring in context but how you work out the relationship between code and context in the achievement of meaning. We are talking about the realization of meaning and not simply the replication of it as if it were ready-made in the language system itself.

The second point I'd like to make is I think that the pragmatic function in languages calls for a really quite radical reconsideration of the relationship between lexis and grammar. With other functions of language, systemic and semiotic, lexis is seen to be at the service of syntax. And this also true pedagogically, that an approach to language which is modelled on formal descriptions or systemic functions, tends to simply use lexis to embody syntactic structures, and the lexis itself is thought to be at the service therefore of the syntax, to demonstrate, to illustrate it, to show how it works. It seems to me that in the pragmatic functions of language use there is an argument for reversing that. To say that what in effect happens is that one uses more or less ready-made lexical expressions and one then regulates these by reference to grammar so that they key-in to a particular context. That is to say, it is not a matter of generating sentences from scratch, but of invoking more or less ready-made idiomatic stretches. I think there is a good deal of language that is memorized in this sense and that the syntax services these chunks and fine tunes them for contextual use. If one is really thinking about description of language as communication, or the teaching of language as communication, there is therefore it seems to me a case for starting with lexis and demonstrating how grammar is used to mediate the relationship between lexis, not just individual words but lexical chunks, idiomatic stretches, how grammar is used to mediate between the lexis and the context. That of course means that grammar is at the service of lexis, and that if one is really interested in the description of pragmatic functions, that is where you start, and not the other way around.

The third observation I'd like to make is a specifically pedagogic one and it has to do with functions, as they appear in notions and functions in communicative language teaching. Now I mention this perhaps simply as a tailpiece because I find the confusion between ideas of function very apparent here. If you look at a notional functional syllabus, you'll see that notions are defined in terms of semiotic function and functions in terms of pragmatic function. So that what you tend to see is people assuming that notions were handled, as it were, apparently by the grammar and that functions were pragmatic things that you had to achieve in context. In fact, what I would like to suggest is that *notion* in the sense of achieving referential meaning is as much a pragmatic function as is the achievement of illocutionary meaning. So in reference to a notional functional syllabus, I think we need to define notions and functions as both of a semiotic type and of a pragmatic type, but we can't

have it both ways, or at least if we do, then we are likely to be led into confusion.

My contribution is an attempt perhaps to oversimplify, by taking a number of perhaps simple-minded bearings on the whole notion of function. I think we need to distinguish between these three kinds of function, we need to accept that each has its legitimacy, that the problem is the relationship between them, and I don't think myself it is helpful to attempt to be comprehensive in relation to all of them, within one, unitary model, though we shall of course keep on trying.

Prof. R. de Beaugrande

I found what Henry had to say quite congenial. My only impulse is to see if we can't broaden it to reconcile his terminology with mine with respect to context and code working together. This has of course been a neglected topic in linguistics since its early decision to distinguish between language and language use as a necessary precondition for becoming a science. A great deal of linguistic theory since then including Saussure's and Chomsky's is an enormous construction taking the hypothesis as proven that you can in fact describe a language without looking at its use. However, after 70 years or so no such description has ever been produced and the results are in fact moving steadily further from consensus. It would therefore be reasonable to regard the hypothesis as refuted in that the announced intent to study the code was always an implicit and uncontrolled study of contexts.

Formalism has been popular because the forms of the language seem to be all that is left when you take out the social and the semiotic aspect. The former repertories look like the langue or the competence which is subject to scientific treatment by rewriting into formal notations. This also coincides with rather shallow and premature views of how science works. In addition, enormous problems arise if you describe syntax, morphology and phonology separately, you need impossibly complicated mechanisms to put them back together in communication. The fact that nobody has convincingly been able to reassemble them is eloquent evidence that they do not function as independent components, or as the fashionable term is now, nearly decomposable systems.

The current shift toward functionalism reflects my desire to look not merely at language in use but at language functioning as a whole. An unfortunate consequence is that it is very hard to study anything without studying everything. Functionalism does not allow you very well to break out a nice tidy issue like adjectives, adverbs of a domain of a complete theory. It is like going to the ocean, and seeing a fishnet and when you take hold of it you find out it is connected to the entire sea bottom and you can keep pulling it up endlessly until you give up or you wilfully cut off a small piece. We have here the basis

of arbitrariness and what Henry has called partiality Taking language away from use and breaking it down into components artificially heightens the arbitrariness of the results, simply because a considerable extent of motivation has been removed.

Current results in the emerging science of complexity suggest that the issue of motivation is most productively approached from a rather different standpoint than has previously been attempted. This motivation would be based on functional principles upon which all complex systems are being found to operate, from the evolution of life organisms out of the 'primordial soup' of chemicals all the way up to the stock market, and the international economics of buying, selling, and exchange. Despite the rather imposing name 'complexity theory' the principles are in fact much simpler and more unifying than had been anticipated. The interactions of relatively simple and local constraints often suffice to generate quite sophisticated global constraints; the term 'self-organising systems' has been proposed. I am currently attempting to work out a model of language that functions along comparable lines. A language description in this sense would be a model of an evolutionary system that is able to learn from the environment to perform a range of complex operations. The essence of the model is that every organism is an informational field with a data substrate interacting with the material substrate. In lower order organisms, the data substrate is fairly hard-coupled to the material substrate, so that behaviour is simple and little, if any, communication is possible. In higher order organisms, the data substrate is soft-coupled to the material substrate and a variety of behaviours considerable as is the communicative potential. In human language, a very small investment of matter and energy suffices for an enormously rich information transfer. In addition, language serves as a modality for open-ended higher amplification through cognition and communication. So we can envision language as a complex system in a highly dynamic sense so that it gains or reduces complexity and determinacy, thereby regulating the relationship between context and code. It would follow that the activity of producing discourse does not tap the knowledge of English as a whole, your knowledge of the lexis, but a reduced version of that which is still an operational system adequate for the purpose - in Firthian terms, the 'context of situation'. The idiomatic stretches and collocations are 'islands of complexity' (which is to say they have undergone self-organisation and can be managed more simply). If the lexis really operated word by word, putting them together would be an impossibly complex task as transformational grammar unintentionally demonstrated. If you try to write all the rules at the level of the morpheme and the lexeme you would get what we might call the 'infinity effect', so that a complete formal grammar would either be infinitely long, or else you would need an infinite number of grammars,

neither of which could be reasonably proposed as a research project, a more realistic operational description would provide for standing rules or constraints which would cover the more or less 'frozen islands' of the language that have been formalised fairly successfully plus indefinitely large sets of emergent rules or constraints which are generated to fit the context and which have, so far, stubbornly resisted formalisation. The downfall of all formal linguistics descriptions has lain in assuming that the entire language functions on these standing constraints or frozen islands, whereas in fact these constraints very soon shade out into the area of emergence as soon as we leave behind the relatively well-behaved and hand-picked examples that have been used as linguistic data in the past. The same factor was responsible for the stagnation of early formal text linguistics, which made the same general formality supposition for texts that had previously proven intractable for sentences, and of course, it was a disaster.

Henry said, and I wrote it down here, that 'context and code interact in strange and mysterious ways'. Perhaps, some of the newer models that are coming out of complexity theory to suggest how language acquired the capacities for context and code to interact may make the operation seem if not less strange at least as mysterious.

Prof. H. Schendl

Basically that ends the first part of the round table, I think Prof. Firbas would like to answer immediately.

Prof. J. Firbas

I should like to add three notes on the three types of function dealt with by Henry Widdowson. [At the round table I only presented Note 2 in full. Notes 1 and 3 have been expanded on here.]

As I see it, the system of language reckons with and responds to the three types of function discussed by Henry Widdowson.

Note 1. Function and structure

Language is a tool of communication. Like any other tool, it is shaped in such a manner as to fulfil the communicative purposes it is to serve, i.e. to function in the acts of communication. Linguistic elements are interrelated to one another in order to form a structure capable of serving communicative purposes of various types. For instance, in regard to the relationship of semantics to syntax, it holds that syntactic structuration effects a semantic connection, i.e. a connection of meanings (Reichling 1961: 1, Daneš 1968: 55). Seen in this light, the syntactic structuration that takes place when a sentence is produced is undoubtedly functionally motivated. Generally speaking, the structure of

language is not a haphazard cluster of linguistic elements; the elements constituting this structure are interrelated to one another in a hierarchical systemic way.

Note 2. General functions of language

Halliday's general functions of language can be traced back to those established by the Viennese psychologist Karl Bühler, who speaks of 'Darstellung', 'Kundgabe' and 'Appell'. These functions are served by various means offered by the structure of language. For instance, under the heading of 'Kundgabe', and also that of 'Appell', for that matter, come the language user's emotional attitudes to the message conveyed. These attitudes can, for example, be conveyed (signalled) by word order. As for the way in which word order can serve as a vehicle of emotion, and the extent to which it can do so, languages or different historical stages of one and the same language may differ. The differences are due to the differences in the structures of the languages or their different historical stages. The structure of a language determines the extent to which the various word order principles may assert themselves. Word order constitutes a system determined by the interrelations between word order principles (Mathesius 1942). Let us compare the operation of the system of word order in Modern English with that of the system of word order in Old English. In both systems, the emotive (marked) word order is caused by the deviations from the requirements of the leading word order principle. Whereas Modern English, emotive (marked) word order is due to deviations from the requirements of the grammatical principle, Old English emotive (marked) word order is due to deviations from the requirements of the FSP (functional sentence perspective) linearity principle. Roughly speaking, the basic requirement of the FSP linearity principle is the placement of the element conveying the high point of the message (rheme proper) in end position. The basic requirement of the Modern English grammatical principle is the placement of the subject before the verb, which in its turn is to precede the object or the subject complement. Let us comment on the following example sentences taken from the Old English version, and several Modern English versions, of the New Testament.

(1)

OE

... butan intingan hig me weorðiaþ and læraþ manna lara.

[in vain theyme worship and teach men's lore] (Matt 15.9)

ModE

(a) But in vain do they worship me, ... (Phillips)

(b) ... vain is their worship of me, ... (Moffatt)

(c) They worship me in vain; ... (NIV)

(d) But their worship of me is all in vain, ... (Goodspeed)
(e) ... ; their worship of me is in vain ... (NEB)
(f) Their worship of me is in vain, ... (Knox)
(g) But their worship is to no purpose, ... (BBE)
(h) They do me empty reverence, ... (NAB)
(i) It is in vain that they keep worshipping me, ... (NW)
(j) Uselessly, they worship Me with their teaching of human commands (MLB)

It follows that whereas the word order of the first sentence of OE 1 is rendered emotive (marked) due to the placement of rheme proper in front position, the word orders of ModE 1a and 1b are rendered emotive (marked) owing to the deviation from the S-V-O/C [subject Complement] order. The majority of the ModE versions, however, do not show this deviation. It is not without interest to note that, owing to the fact that the grammatical principle has established itself as the leading principle in the ModE word order system, ModE word order shows a decrease in emotiveness (markedness). (A certain degree of markedness is shown by the word orders of ModE 1i and 1j. In 1i, *in vain* is thrown into relief by means of the cleft construction. In 1j, *Uselessly* becomes conspicuous on account of its unusual front position, for adverbs of manner in *-ly* do not normally occur before the subject. Let me note that *Uselessly* is rhematic, but does not serve as rheme proper, the sentence being perspectived to *with their teaching of human commands*. Unlike its OE conterpart ModE 1j is not a compound, but a simple sentence. (For a discussion of the relationship between FSP and word order, see Firbas 1992: 117-48.)

Needless to say, emotive (marked) word order is not the only means that serves the function of ‘Kundgabe’, or that of ‘Appell’, for that matter. Any deviation causing markedness serves either or both functions.

Note 3. Function and context

At the moment of communication, the sentence becomes embedded in context, verbal (written or spoken) and situational. Language does not operate outside context. It is constantly affected by it. As I see it, context co-effects the perspective in which the sentence functions at the moment of utterance (written or spoken) and/or perception. It does so through the operation in language of the contextual factor, which plays the leading role in the interplay of factors determining the functional perspective of the sentence (FSP).

The signals yielded by this factor are (a) the occurrences (actual presence) of pieces of information in what has been delimited as the immediately relevant preceding verbal context, and (b) the re-expression(s) of such information at the moment of utterance and/or perception; or (a) the actual presence of a referent in what has been delimited as the immediately relevant situational

context, and (b) the expression of this referent at the moment of utterance and/or perception. Expressions conveying information retrievable from the immediatly relevant context do not express the high point of the message (rheme proper), towards which the sentence is perspectived. They constitute or co-constitute the foundation (theme), upon which the core of the message (non-theme, consisting of transition and rheme) is built up. In this way, they perform an important role in co-determining the perspective in which the sentence functions, and consequently participate in revealing the language user's communicative purpose. (This is indeed indicated by perspectiving the sentence to the element conveying the high point of the message, i.e. the rheme proper. (For a more detailed discussion of the immediately relevant context and the operation of the contextual factor in FSP, see Firbas 1992: 21-40).

My notes could be summed up as follows. Henry Widdowson has drawn our attention to various aspects of function and cautioned against integrating them prematurely into one system. His warnings must certainly be taken seriously. But I only wish to point out that, if function is understood as the operation of linguistic means in fulfilling the communicative purposes of the language user, the three types of functions discused in Notes 1, 2 and 3 do not operate outside the system of language and are therefore to be looked upon as integrated into this system.

Notes

°The contributions represent edited versions of the talks given by the participants. The differences in format reflect the divergent editorial practices by the contributors themselves.

References

Daneš, F. 1968. 'Some thoughts on the semantic structure of the sentence', *Lingua* 21: 55-69.

Firbas, J. 1957. 'On the problem of non-thematic subjects in contemporary English', *Časopis pro moderni filologii* 39:171-3. English summary of 'Kotázce nezákladových podmetú sučasné, angličtině', ib.: 22-42, 165-73.

---. 1992. *Functional sentence perspective in written and spoken communication*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Mathesius, V. 1942. 'Ze srovnávacích studií slovosledných' [From comparative word order studies], *Časopis pro moderni filologii* 28: 181-90, 302-7.

Reichling, A. 1961. 'Principles and methods of syntax: cryptoanalytical formalism', *Lingua* 10: 1-17.

Weil, H. 1844. *De l'ordre des mots dans les langues anciennes comparées aux langues modernes*, Paris: Joubert.

---. 1887. *The order of words in the ancient languages compared with that of the modern languages*, Boston: Ginn & Co.

On tables, dogs, and politicians: towards a pragmatic interpretation of discourse

Barbara Kryk-Kastovsky

1. Introduction

Numerous attempts to define pragmatics have either led to a proliferation of inadequate definitions frustrating the researcher, cf. Levinson (1983: 5ff), or to an entirely novel conception of the field, envisioned not as yet another level of language analysis, but as a perspective on all language levels, cf. Verschueren (1987). For the purposes of this paper, pragmatics will be understood as the study of language use in a socio-cultural context, which is in keeping with one of the latest and most appealing definitions of the field by Mey.[1] In other words, pragmatics, as the non-truth-conditional study of language use, accounts for all the speaker-related interpretations that semantics, the truth-conditional study of meaning, is unable to provide an adequate interpretation of. Or, as Gazdar (1979:2) has it: PRAGMATICS = MEANING - TRUTH CONDITIONS. Thus, utterances which a semanticist would consider ambiguous, contradictory, or even nonsensical, are amenable to a pragmatic analysis, provided appropriate extra linguistic information (socio-cultural context, mutual knowledge, etc.) is available.

Consider the following exchange between a taxi driver and his passenger, a woman in her thirties, going from a train station to a residential area late at night:

(1)

TAXI DRIVER: Your husband must be waiting for you with dinner ready.
WOMAN: I think so.

There would be nothing unusual in this conversation, if the woman were married, except that she is not. Thus, the taxi driver's presupposition is false. This produces an interpretation problem, since from the point of view of a semanticist utterances with false presuppositions are nonsensical or, as the advocates of three-valued logic would have it, neither true nor false, cf., for example, Strawson (1970). Consequently, according to a semanticist, the woman having inferred from the taxi driver's statement his false presupposition (probably something like: 'Women over 30 are usually married'), should have denied it, thus giving the utterance a semantic interpretation in terms of truth and falsity:

(1')

WOMAN: I am not married.

The reason why the woman did not react as in (1') is because she was acting according to pragmatic principles which overrode the semantics of the discourse. According to the pragmatist, the woman was perfectly right in replying as in (1). Not only was she cooperative, offering the most concise and least confusing answer (thus observing the Gricean Cooperative Principle, especially his maxims of Quantity and Relevance, cf. Grice 1975), but she was, above all, observing the Politeness Principle. Thus, in terms of Leech (1983), the woman's reply in (1) is an instance of negative politeness (minimizing the effects of impolite statements or expressions), as opposed to positive politeness (maximizing the politeness of polite illocutions), cf. Leech (1983: 131ff). The politeness of the woman's reply can also be analyzed in terms of the notion of (negative vs. positive) face, cf. Brown & Levinson (1987). If she had uttered (1'), informing the taxi driver about her actual marital status, it would pose a threat to her positive face (i.e. her status as an independent person), which would in turn force the taxi driver to cater for her negative face by saying something like:

(1')

TAXI DRIVER: I'm sorry, I didn't mean to be personal.[2]

This brings us to the aim of the present paper which will offer a pragmatic analysis of several kinds of discourse. These include conversational exchanges coming from American TV productions (sitcoms, cartoons), as well as everyday conversations in various settings, ads, notices, etc.,[3] (the selection criterion being the degree of 'pragmaticity' of a given discourse, i.e. the extent of its analyzability in pragmatic terms).

2. Analysis

Since pragmatics represents a functional approach to language, the discourses to be discussed here will be grouped according to the functions they play in communication. After it is demonstrated that the discourses in question cannot adequately be analyzed within a (truth-conditional) semantic framework, an additional pragmatic (i.e. non-truth-conditional) analysis will be postulated.

2.1. Requests for information

2.1.1.

Semantics is a study of meaning which analyses sentences in terms of their truth conditions, on the basis of which truth values can be assigned. In view of this, the following discourse (consisting of a request for information and an

answer) can only be analyzed as to the truth or falsity of the answer, which is a declarative sentence, whereas the request (as a non-declarative) escapes a semantic account, cf.:

(2)

BART: Can I say *crappy* on TV?
REPORTER: On this network you can. (cartoon 'The Simpsons')

Consequently, all a semanticist would offer as an analysis of (2) is that the answer to Bart's question is true, i.e. that there is such a TV network in which the proposition expressed by Bart's question is true, and it happens to be the network Bart and the reporter are on.[4] However, the semanticist would miss the humorous effect of the discourse, which can be inferred only if s/he shares some additional knowledge with his/her addressee(s). In this case, the inference would be something like: 'Some networks don't allow strong language, but since this one (FOX) is known for its explicit programs and movies, it would certainly allow words like *crappy*'. It goes without saying that what the viewers would find amusing about the reporter's answer, the network's manager probably would not. One could easily imagine that he would rather stick to the semantic interpretation of (2).

2.1.2.

While in the case discussed above the request for information led to an inferencing process with a humorous effect, other results are also possible. Consider the following exchange between an (unaccompanied) woman and a waiter (in front of the sign 'Please, wait to be seated' in one of the Pentagon Mall restaurants):

(3)

WAITER: Hi! Table for two?
WOMAN: No, table for one!
WAITER: Table for two. (*Walks away*)

I can already imagine how my examples (1) and (3) would be taken by feminist linguists as indicative of male chauvinism. Since I am not interested in the discrimination of women in terms of the false presuppositions about them, I will concentrate here on the pragmatic mechanisms governing the use of false presuppositions in general. In this case which, semantically speaking, is a routine request for information, all a semanticist can say is that the waiter's conclusion was simply false (maybe he misheard the woman?). A pragmatist can, however, go a little deeper than that and draw the following inferences:

a) the waiter's question carried a presupposition (something like: 'A table at a restaurant is usually for at least two, so if I see one person, that means two or more, anyway'), whereas the more frequent, neutral question: 'How many for lunch?' would carry no presupposition as to the number of customers;

b) moreover, the waiter ignored the woman's answer which revealed the falsity of his original presupposition;

The pragmatist is then likely to conclude that such a state of affairs could lead to a misfire, unless the woman denied the false presupposition explicitly, thus endangering the waiter's positive face and forcing him to apologize:

(3')

WOMAN: Excuse me, but I meant a table for one.
WAITER: Oh, I'm sorry.

It must be added at this point that the described situation is by no means universal, on the contrary, it is an instantaneous exchange which might be due to a number of cultural, social and even idiosyncratic personal factors (not to mention the Politeness Principle), so that different (over)hearers would be able to construct different possible scenarios following the exchange in (3).

2.1.3.

A much more complex instance of a request for information is the following conversational exchange I had at one of the university departments in Washington, DC. Its complexity follows from the number of presuppositions not shared by the individual speakers, which causes problems in communication, and eventually calls for repairs (in the sense of Schegloff, et al. 1977). Here is the conversation, conducted in front of a coffee machine operating in an open office space not far from the secretary's desk:

(4)

BARBARA: What's the coffee policy in this department? Do I pay for each cup or contribute a monthly lump sum?
SECRETARY (*pointing to the boss' door*): Oh, in fact it is his decaf, since no one else drinks it here.
BOSS (*appearing from his office*): Look, Barbara, if you'd like some coffee, you could bring your own and keep it in this thermos here.
BARBARA: Oh, no, thank you, that's too much trouble for everyone. I was just asking. I can, after all, get a cup from the machine downstairs.

As in the previous instances, this conversation would create numerous problems for a semanticist. Barbara's request for information is not directly answered by either the secretary or her boss. In fact, the word *coffee* occurs only in the boss' reply, but its referent is different from the one referred to by Barbara (the boss is talking about the coffee available somewhere else, and not at the department). Here is where the boss' answer also constitutes an offer (to use the thermos for Barbara's own coffee), which is eventually declined by her. Having reached a semantic gridlock, we are not able to elucidate the nature of this breakdown of communication, since the cross-referencing is only part of the matter. We feel intuitively that it is some background assumptions, differing markedly in the case of the boss and the secretary, on the one hand,

and Barbara, the outsider, on the other, that play a crucial role here. Let us try to reconstruct the possible pragmatic presuppositions underlying the individual contributions:

a) Barbara's inferencing: As follows from my previous experiences in the USA, coffee drinking is very popular in American institutions, universities included; there is a coffee machine in this department; I've seen a few people drinking coffee, so

b) Barbara's presupposition: Coffee is available (under some conditions) to staff members at the department;

c) Secretary's inferencing: Barbara thinks that it is regular coffee available to everyone; she doesn't know that it is decaf made only for the boss, so

d) Secretary's presupposition: Barbara wouldn't want the decaf anyway;

e) Boss' inferencing: Barbara wants coffee at work; the secretary implied that Barbara cannot have my coffee, which she might consider impolite;

f) Boss' presupposition: There ought to be some other way for her to have coffee at the department.

Note that the complexity of the entire exchange, the cross-referencing, the conflicting presuppositions and finally the breakdown of communication (boiling down to Barbara's failure to complete a seemingly simple task) could have been easily avoided if the secretary and the boss had decided that directness should have overridden politeness, and thus should have resulted in the clear message: 'We don't have a departmental coffee machine here; this is the boss' private decaf'. However, this would have been a socially unacceptable answer, and therefore Barbara had to infer her hosts' reasoning from the obscure combination of a violated Maxim of Manner (especially, its two submaxims: 1. Avoid obscurity of expression; 2. Avoid ambiguity, cf. Grice 1975) and Leech's Politeness Principle, cf. above.

2.1.4.

Finally, simple requests for information may result in a serious offense, as in the following discourse overheard in a (very long) line at the Department of Motor Vehicles in Washington, DC:

(5)

WOMAN (*addressing a man who has just jumped the line*): Sir, are you on this line?
MAN: I was here before and I've just come back.
WOMAN: Anybody can say that!
MAN: You have no faith in people, you must be Republican!
WOMAN: That's an insult!

The question-and-answer series, although semantically transparent at face value, in fact carries many pragmatic presuppositions. Take the woman's question initiating the exchange. If it were not directed at a man who has just

jumped the line, it could be interpreted as an innocuous request for information, encountered daily in shops, institutions, etc. However, in this particular context the question carries an obvious presupposition ('You are not on this line'), thus it is no longer a request for information but can be interpreted as a complaint. The man replies by denying the woman's allegation, although the truth value of the presupposition of his utterance ('I am on this line') is difficult to verify, and the man is well aware of that. In the next utterance the woman continues her accusation/complaint, which prompts the man to answer the accusation with an insult. Although one could easily ascribe to it a semantic reading in terms of causality ('Because you have no faith in people, you must be Republican'), the utterance would still not make sense to anyone who has no beliefs (presuppositions) about Republicans. In fact (5) is closely reminiscent of G. Lakoff's classical example of pragmatic presupposition ('John called Mary a whore/a Republican/a virgin/a lexicalist and then SHE insulted HIM', cf. G. Lakoff 1971: 333), where the acceptability of the sentence depends on the presuppositions of the speaker/addressee(s). One cannot help thinking that the anonymous opponent of Republicans might also have been a linguist familiar with the article, which served as a source of his insulting remark. Be that as it may, (5) makes sense only if the pragmatic apparatus is employed.

2.2 The humor of sitcoms

In this section we will look at two instances of the language of the TV sitcom 'Golden girls'. The verbal humor of this popular series is achieved by various means, both semantic and pragmatic. Thus, in (6) the humorous effect is due to the contradiction following from the incongruity of the two adjectives: *smart* and *dead*. They cannot have the same referent, since *smart* contains the feature [+animate], or rather [+alive], which is contradicted by the opposite feature [-alive] in *dead*.[5]

(6)

If he's so smart, how come he's so dead?

In addition, the utterance is semantically deviant due to the gradation of the adjective *dead*, which normally is immune to operations like gradability or comparability, since it is a member of the complementary pair *dead : alive*. However, this seeming contradiction lends itself to a pragmatic interpretation, under the condition that an appropriate context is provided. In this case Sophia (one of the heroines of the sitcom) noticed that someone who she always considered smart was lying dead. The mutual knowledge of this fact, shared by the characters of the sitcom and the audience, accounts for the alleged contradiction. As to the gradability of *dead* performed by means of *so*, it is a

parallelism with the expression *so smart* used in the previous sentence. This parallelism clearly serves here as a cohesion device, cf. de Beaugrande & Dressler (1981: 49ff). [6]

Another instance of sit-com humor can be illustrated by the following discourse:

(7)

> DOROTHY (*the daughter of Sophia*): I'm taking care of you in your twilight years!
> SOPHIA: What do you mean by my twilight years? You're in your twilight years, I'm supposed to be dead!

Here the point of the joke concentrates around the metaphor *twilight years*. Although many accounts of metaphor have been suggested, to mention only Levin's classical approach (cf. Levin 1977) or Lakoff and Johnson's study of metaphor as a pervasive linguistic-cultural phenomenon (Lakoff & Johnson 1980), it will be assumed here that metaphor is a pragmatic notion. Indeed, *twilight years* can easily be accounted for as a violation of the Gricean Maxim of Quality leading to the following inferencing: '*Twilight* can (literally) refer to a nature cycle or (metaphorically) to 'any period or condition of decline following growth, glory or success' (*The American Heritage Dictionary*). Thus, it is an expression which cannot be used with relation to persons, but assuming that Dorothy is cooperative, she probably means 'the years towards the end of Sophia's life''. Sophia retaliates by reminding her daughter, Dorothy, that she is in her twilight years, i.e. the metaphor applies to her, rather than Sophia who, as she herself says crudely, is past her twilight years, i.e. should be dead, which in itself is an instance of sick humor. The humorous effect of this discourse is achieved by the clash of a referential vs. pragmatic interpretation of the expression *twilight years*. If understood referentially, as 'the years towards the end of one's life', the expression would be vague, and thus amenable to different interpretations. If, however, additional pragmatic information were added in terms of the appropriate context, the ambiguity, hence the humorous effect, would disappear.

2.3. The Larry King case

Larry King enjoys the status of a public figure among Americans of various political and social persuasions. Many of them like his characteristic way of interviewing interesting and/or famous people in his daily CNN program 'Larry King Live'. However, not all foreigners share this opinion, so that I have heard the following comments:

(8)

> A: Do you want to watch 'Larry King Live'?
> B: How about Larry King dead?!

(9)

I'd rather see Rather than King!

Although admittedly abusive, (8) is probably just intended as a clever play on words contrasting the two complementaries *(a)live* and *dead*. One can hardly think of a literal interpretation of (8), thus the semantic reading should be abandoned in favor of a pragmatic one, something like: 'The speaker is not a sinister character, but being cooperative s/he probably means that s/he would rather not see Larry King at all, i.e. s/he does not like the person and/or his program'.

Note that (9) also comments on Larry King and also by means of a play on words, but in this case the message is much more indirect. Again, all a semantic interpretation could offer is a not very illuminating contrast, between a certain Rather and King. If, however, one tries to draw an inference from (9), accounting for the reasons of the contrast s/he will have to share with the speaker the knowledge that there is another American TV commentator, Dan Rather, whose traditional and cultured presentations of news programs certainly contrast with King's controversial and often aggressive ways. This is where mutual knowledge and pragmatics visibly interact with cultural patterns to the effect that the (verbal and non-verbal) behavior acceptable in one culture might be completely alien to another culture. The point was already made by Sapir & Whorf, but elaborated on recently by numerous studies contrasting in particular Western and Eastern cultural-linguistic patterns (cf. e.g. the list of papers presented at *4th International Pragmatics Conference* in Kobe, Japan).

2.4. Ads and (public) signs

The language of advertising and signs can be put together since these two forms of discourse share certain characteristics: they should be succinct and catchy, as their readers are not likely to devote much time to a thorough analysis.[7] Consider the following slogan advertising *The Washington Post:*

(10)

If you haven't got it, you haven't got it

Semantically a potential tautology, it shares with other colloquial tautologies (like e.g. *Boys are boys*) their pragmatic import, whereupon the first occurrence of an object stands for its referent, and the second occurrence stands for the properties of the referent.[8] The interpretation of (10) focuses on the two occurrences of *it.* While the first one is clearly an anaphoric pronoun having *The Washington Post* as its antecedent, it is the second *it* which might cause some problems for a semanticist. And this is where the pragmatist comes in again. Thus, if *it* stands for the properties of its antecedent, (10) is understood as a tautology with the following reading 'If you haven't got *The*

Washington Post, you haven't got all the news/the reliable information/your favorite editorials, etc. that make the newspaper'. If, however, the second occurrence of the entire phrase *You've got it* is interpreted idiomatically as *You've understood it*, (10) gets the following reading: 'If you haven't got *The Washington Post*, you haven't understood anything (about the latest events, etc.)' Once again, it is the semantics of the text complemented with some pragmatic notions that results in the desired interpretation of the ad.

Similar instances of succinct messages can be found in form of notices at various public places (e.g. *No shoes, no shirt, no service*, a sign on the door of a shop in Austin, Texas, quoted by Mey 1993: 15). The following sign was placed aboard a cruise boat in Key Largo, Florida:

(11)

Gratuities not expected but appreciated

Imagine the reaction of a foreign tourist to such a sign. Is s/he supposed to tip the captain or not? If s/he goes by the semantics of it, the first part of the sign conveys a clear message that one needn't give a tip, but such a possibility is not completely excluded (otherwise a more categorical statement would be used, e.g. in the form of prohibition).[9] All the doubts disappear upon reading the second part of the message, where tips are overtly invited. Thus it seems that from a semantic point of view the tourist is left with a choice of the two alternatives. Pragmatically, however, a much clearer message can be inferred along the following lines:

a) Although the first conjunct of (11) contains a negative statement, its literal meaning does not coincide with the speaker's meaning (cf. Grice 1971), who has downtoned his/her message clearly for politeness reasons, cf. Leech's Maxim of Generosity: 'Minimize benefit to self, maximize cost to self' (Leech 1983: 133f). Thus, what the author of the sign means is not 'Don't tip me' or even 'I don't expect being tipped', but something like 'There is no obligation for you to tip me, but...'.

b) It is the pragmatics of *but* that plays a crucial role here (cf. Lakoff 1971). The 'contrary-to-expectation *but*' invites the inference that something unexpected will follow, which is indeed the case. In the second conjunct of the sentence it is explicitly stated that gratuities will be appreciated, the wording being governed by the Politeness Principle (which takes care of the passengers' negative face in that they feel immune from outside pressure).

Once again, it has been shown that a combination of a semantic and a pragmatic approach to language in use is superior to a pure truth-conditional semantic analysis.

2.5. The language of politicians

Politicians often use language as a weapon to support their policies or to ridicule other politicians. This vast area of investigation could easily be a topic of another article, so I will limit myself here to a single example, a remark by ex-President Bush in one of his interviews during the 1992 election campaign:

(12)

My dog Millie knows more about foreign policy than governor Clinton.

In this case the literal reading would be excluded on obvious grounds: the predicate (*know about foreign policy*) can only apply to (sane, adult, educated, etc.) humans. Thus, semantically speaking, (12) is a contradiction. However, pragmatically speaking, Bush's statement is perfectly acceptable if the following inferences are drawn from it:

a) dogs do not know anything about foreign policy because they do not have human intellectual potential;

b) Governor Clinton knows about foreign policy less than the President's dog, so his intellectual potential is lower than that of a dog;

c) possible inferred conclusion (exploited by the media after Bush's interview): someone with no intellectual potential cannot be elected president.

2.6. The pragmatics of idioms

Finally, an anecdotal example of the use of idioms, which are supposed to be resistant to grammatical modification and contextual variation (cf. e.g. Makkai 1972) but, as can be seen below, do not escape situational humor. And this is where pragmatics is much more powerful than semantics, which treats idioms as unanalyzable wholes, so that e.g. *red tape* cannot be decomposed into *tape which is red*. Pragmatics, on the other hand, provides an interpretation in an appropriate context, e.g.

(13)

Look at that hot-dog!

said by my husband of a sweating and panting dog on a very hot day. It goes without saying that a semantic analysis of this example would have to be conducted along two different interpretations, the literal and the idiomatic one, whereas the pragmatic approach allows both interpretations to appear parallelly and, having clashed, to produce a humorous effect. After all, it is semantics that with its network of meaning relations such as synonymy, antonymy, or homonymy on the word level and implication, entailment, or presupposition on the sentence level yields numerous ambiguities, contradictions and paradoxes - and pragmatics is there to 'make sense of them'.

Notes

[1]Mey defines pragmatics as 'the study of the conditions of human language uses as these are determined by the context of society' (Mey 1993: 42). Cf. also R. Lakoff's catchy definition of pragmatics as 'the interesting stuff about language'. One can hardly disagree with her claim that this is the reason why many of us were attracted to linguistics (Lakoff 1993: 367).

[2]For details on the notions of positive and negative face, cf. Brown & Levinson (1987). See also the elucidating illustrations of the two terms offered by Mey (1993: 70ff).

[3]All the language data have been collected during my visiting professorship at The American University in Washington, DC. (1992-93).

[4]The line of reasoning presented here follows from my approach to semantics as the truth-conditional study of meaning as opposed to pragmatics, its non-truth-conditional counterpart. Some semanticists, like e.g. Lyons, might argue that at least part of the humorous effect of (2) is accountable for in terms of the connotations arising in connection with words like *crappy* (i.e. it is recognized as a taboo word/an instance of strong language, etc.). However, I still think that this would not be enough to get the punch line.

[5]For one of the latest accounts of the notion of semantic opposition, cf. Mettinger (1994).

[6]De Beaugrande & Dressler (1981: 49) define parallelism as 'Repeating a structure but filling it with new elements'.

[7]On the language of advertising, see Cook (1992); on the language of news media in general, cf. Bell (1991), Jucker (1986; 1992). See also de Beaugrande & Dressler (1981: 9f) for their analysis of a road sign as a text.

[8]See, for example, Levinson's analysis of tautologies like *Boys are boys* in terms of implicatures (Levinson 1983: 124f). Cf. also Wierzbicka's approach (Wierzbicka 1987) and its expanded version in Wierzbicka (1991: 391ff).

[9]Public signs prohibiting to tip waiters, taxi drivers, etc. are quite likely to appear in Japan, where this procedure is not customary, to the confusion, if not delight, of tourists from Western countries.

References

Beaugrande, Robert de and Wolfgang U. Dressler. 1981. *Introduction to text linguistics.* London: Longman.

Bell, Allan. 1991. *The language of news media.* London: Blackwell.

Brown, Penelope and Stephen C. Levinson. 1987. *Politeness. Some universals in language usage*. Cambridge: CUP.

Caton, Charles E., ed., 1970. *Philosophy and ordinary language.* Urbana: University of Illinois Press.

Cole, Peter and Jerry L. Morgan, eds. 1975. *Syntax and semantics 3.* New York: Academic Press.

Cook, Guy. 1992. *The discourse of advertising.* London: Routledge.

Fillmore, Charles J. and D. Terence Langendoen, eds. 1971. *Studies in linguistic semantics.* New York: Holt.

Gazdar, Gerald. 1979. *Pragmatics. Implicature, presupposition and logical form.* New York: Academic Press.

Grice, H. Paul. 1971. Meaning. In: Steinberg, Danny D. and Leon A. Jakobovits, eds. 1971. 53-59.

Grice, H. Paul. 1975. Logic and conversation. In: Cole, Peter and Jerry L. Morgan, eds. 1975. 41-58.

Jucker, Andreas. 1986. *News interviews*. (Pragmatics & Beyond VII:4) Amsterdam: J. Benjamins.

Jucker, Andreas. 1992. *Social stylistics. Syntactic variation in British newspapers*. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter.

Lakoff, George. 1971. Presupposition and relative well-formedness. In: Steinberg, Danny D. and Leon A. Jakobovits, eds. 1971. 329-340.

Lakoff, George and Mark Johnson. 1980. *Metaphors we live by*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.

Lakoff, Robin T. 1971. If's, and's and but's about conjunction. In: Fillmore, Charles J. and D. Terence Langendoen, eds. 1971. 115-149.

Lakoff, Robin T. 1993. Lewis Carrol: Subversive pragmatist. *Pragmatics* 3(4): 367-385.

Leech, Geoffrey N. 1983. *Principles of pragmatics*. London: Longman.

Levin, Samuel R. 1977. *The semantics of metaphor*. Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press.

Levinson, Stephen C. 1983. *Pragmatics*. Cambridge: CUP.

Makkai, Adam. 1972. *Idiom structure in English.* The Hague: Mouton.

Mettinger, Arthur. 1994. *Aspects of semantic opposition in English.* Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Mey, Jacob L. 1993. *Pragmatics. An introduction.* Oxford: Blackwell.

Schegloff, Emanuel A.; Jefferson, Gail; Sachs, Harvey. 1977. The preference for self-correction in the organization of repair in conversation. *Language* 53: 361-382.

Steinberg, Danny D. and Leon A. Jakobovits, eds. 1971. *Semantics. An interdisciplinary reader in philosophy, linguistics and psychology*. Cambridge: CUP.

Strawson, Peter F. 1970. On referring. In: Caton, Charles E., ed. 1970. 162-193.

Verschueren, Jef. 1987. *Pragmatics as a theory of linguistic adaptation. Working Document 1*. Antwerp: International Pragmatics Association.

Wierzbicka, Anna. 1987. Boys will be boys: 'radical semantics' vs. 'radical pragmatics'. *Language* 63: 95-114.

Wierzbicka, Anna. 1991. *Cross-cultural pragmatics. The semantics of human interaction.* Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter.

On 'root based' Indo-European: an embryological or phylogenetic note

Roger Lass, University of Cape Town

In his contribution to *VIEWS* 2(2), Dieter Kastovsky suggests that the usual view of Indo-European as having a canonically stem-based rather than root-based morphology may be erroneous. It is a function of taking our model for the protolanguage from rather too late a stage, where all the languages basically have that kind of structure, or something deriving from it (Kastovsky 1993: 75). That is, rather than having category-marked roots with 'meaning-less' thematic elements that simply served as indexes of stem-class, Proto-IE had 'neutral' roots, in which all categorial information was assigned by some kind of markers. His example is the /-n-/ infix in the present stems of forms like OE *sta-n-d-an* or L *ta-n-g-ere,* where the root would be aspectually neutral, but marked for 'present' by the infix. The point could have been further supported by citing the supine of *tangere, tac-tu-s,* which is a nominal formation off the same root. An even better example would be *fi-n-g-ere* 'fashion', supine *fic-tu-s,* with non-verbal derivatives off the same root in *fig-ū-ra* 'figure, shape', *fig-ū-r-āre,* etc. The roots taking nasal infixes are a relatively small class: we ought also to note the derivationally more interesting noun/verb ablaut relations (if for instance the same root appears in 'eat' and 'tooth', e.g. L *edere, dēnt-* < */H_1ed-/ 'eat' + */-nt-/).

Kastovsky suggests that these roots might have been 'word-class neutral semantic nuclei, much like the consonantal skeletons in Semitic languages' (*ibid.*); and he remarks in a note (5) that 'such an analysis would in fact provide some morphological support for the Nostratic hypothesis according to which IE and Semitic are genetically related'.

I want to comment briefly on both of these points, especially in the light of my own previous hesitation in suggesting such a connection. Even though I invoked the possibility of such roots in Lass (1993a), I did so more as a descriptive convenience than seriously. And I noted in a later paper in *VIEWS* (Lass 1993b) that I thought such 'neutral root' morphology was non-IE 'in feel', and 'much more Finnic or Semitic in type' (106). I think I was probably wrong, and that there is more to be said in favour of Kastovsky's view of what IE might have been like, and a different sort of Nostratic connection, which is maybe not as good as it seems, but interesting.

If, as perhaps most scholars now believe, the IE root was canonically CV(V)C-, this kind of morphology is virtually a necessary (if perhaps circular)

conclusion. That is, to take a simple example, the root for 'turn' seen in OE *weorþ-an,* Sanskrit *vart-a-mi,* Latin *uert-ere,* etc. could not under this interpretation have been of the shape */wVrt-/, but rather must have been */wVr-/, with the */-t-/ a 'determinative' or 'extension'. Further evidence may perhaps be seen in OE *wyrm,* L *uermis,* where we could reconstruct the same root with a different determinative, e.g. */wVr-m-/, with the */-m-/ an agentive marker of a semantically familiar IE type (the worm is 'the turner': cf. OE *fearh* 'pig(let)', *furh* 'furrow', L *porc-us* 'pig', *porc-a* 'ridge between furrows', etc. where the pig is 'the furrower').

On this account, the gross profusion of 'meaningless' suffixoidal elements in the ancient IE languages is the detritus of old, perhaps in principle unrecoverable word-formation (category-assignment, derivation). And indeed, it would be difficult to account for a set like L *terror* 'dread', *terreō* 'frighten', *tremō* 'quake', *trepidus* 'scared', Skr *trasāmi* 'tremble', etc. in any other way, except by multiplying synonymous and partly homophonous roots. This would lead to the bizarre claim that there were independent IE roots */ter-, trem-, trep-, tres-/, all sharing */t, r/ in that order and all having the same meaning. It is clear that separation of the terminal material from the root (*/ter-, tr̥-m-, tr̥-p-, tr̥-s-/) is satisfyingly parsimonious; and that the assumption that these determinatives proliferated *ad libitum* with no meaning in the protolanguage is precisely the opposite.

One could thus, following Kastovsky's overall scenario for IE and Germanic morphological evolution (root-based > stem-based > word-based) make a case for the root-determinatives as old word-formatives (even if we don't really know now what they meant); and also, an even better case for category-neutral roots with only semantic content, e.g. √wVr- 'turn', √tVr- 'quake', etc. I deliberately use modern English forms that are potential zero-derivations, to illustrate the last stage of Kastovsky's story, what might be called the 'triumph of the word'. So far I agree completely with what he says, and hope this is further support.

I am not however entirely happy with the Semitic connection, at least typologically (though I have another 'Nostratic' suggestion to make below). In Semitic, the root is typically a 'triliteral' or CCC structure, e.g. Hebrew √mlx- 'king/rule' in *melex* 'king', *mōlək* 'ruling', *mālax* 'he ruled', *mālᵊxû* 'they ruled', *malkāh* 'queen', *malkî* 'my king', etc., with vowels intercalated in the appropriate places. (Plus of course prefixes and suffixes.) IE roots to be sure do have consonantal skeletons; they may even all be C-initial, if you take the common hardline 'laryngealist' view that all apparent V-initials are actually laryngeal-initial, e.g. √H_1ed- 'eat' underlying L *edō,* √H_2eg- 'drive' underlying L *agō,* etc. In IE however, the root vowel is always both 'there' and in some sense 'basic'; even in the somewhat inverted system of the classical Sanskrit

grammarians, only roots with syllabic sonorants lack nuclear vowels entirely (these are supplied by the *guṇa* and *vṛddhi* processes, as are other grades of the root (cf. Whitney 1889: §§325ff). That is, the vocalism in IE is central to the root in a way that it does not appear to be in Semitic.

But the picture of IE that Kastovsky gives, and that I hope to have added a bit more to, is actually rather more like another non-IE group typically assigned by believers to the great 'Nostratic' phylum: that is Uralic, in particular Balto-Finnic. Finnish for instance is rather more like IE, in that the root vocalism is relatively solidly entrenched, and the basic derivational work is done by suffixation. And in particular, the roots themselves seem by and large not to be category-marked. A nice example is what I would represent as the root √kuv- 'picture', which appears in two stem-forms, *kuv-a-* and *kuv-i-,* each with its own set of derivatives. Thus *kuv-a* 'picture' (*a*-stem noun), *kuv-a-ja* 'portrayer', *kuv-a-ta* 'to portray, draw', *kuv-a-us* 'description'; and *kuv-i-o* 'description', *kuv-i-t-ell-a* 'to imagine', *kuv-i-t-el-ma* 'fantasy, image', *kuv-i-tt-a* 'to illustrate', *kuv-i-t-aja* 'illustrator', *kuv-i-t-us* 'illustration', etc. Note that the /-t-/ formative also contributes to the establishment of a derivation set, much like the IE determinatives.

Similarly, if with more allomorphy, the root √kät- 'hand', which gives the 'base' noun *käs-i* < */kæt-e/, and two sets of derivatives: an *s*-root, *i*-stem set like *käs-i-llä* 'close, at hand' (actually a lexicalization of the adessive case of *käsi*), *käs-i-n* 'by hand' (lexicalized instructive case), *käs-i-ne* 'glove', *käs-i-t-ell-ä* 'to handle', etc; and a set of *t*-root, *e*-stem derivatives like *kät-e-ll-ä* 'to shake hands', *kät-e-v-yys* 'handedness', *-kät-i-nen* '-handed', *kätt-e-ly* 'handshake'.

If Balto-finnic is genetically related to IE in some way, e.g. by sharing a parent at a pre-Proto-Uralic, pre-IE level, then Finnish morphology might furnish a model within the (extended) family that looks rather like Kastovsky's version of 'pre-stem' Indo-European, and thus corroboration for it.

The real question of course is whether this particular kind of morphology is, cross-linguistically, uncommon enough to be used as a genetic marker; my suspicion is that in the Nostratic connection it's weaker than really striking idiosyncracies, like the so-called 'Mitian' phenomena, i.e. the shared /-m-/ 'first person' and /-t-/ 'second person' markers. So for instance in the (non-cognate) verbs 'to be' Skr pres 1 sg *ás-mi,* 2 sg *ás-ti,* Finnish *ole-n* < */ole-m/, *ole-t,* L 1 pl *sumus,* Finnish *ole-mm-e,* L 2 pl *es-tis,* Finnish *ole-tt-e,* L *me* 1 sg acc, *te* 2 sg, Finnish 1 sg nominative *minä*, 2 sg *sinä* < */tinæ/, etc.

Whatever the phylogeny turns out to be (and I'm skeptical of the validity of monster families like Nostratic, Eurasiatic, Amerind and so on), there is no doubt of the areal connection, or that the two groups were in close contact for a long time (especially Baltic and Germanic with Finnic). And there is not

much doubt that the current morphology of Finnish looks in many respects very like the model Kastovsky suggests for earlier Indo-European.

References

Kastovsky, D. 1993. Inflection, derivation and zero - or: what makes OE and German derived denominal verbs verbs? *Views* 2.2:71-81.

Lass, R. 1993a. Old English *-ian*: inflectional or derivational? *Views* 2.1:26-34.

Lass, R. 1993b. Old English class II: more VIEWS. *Views* 2.2:104-10.

Whitney, W.D. 1889. *Sanskrit grammar.* Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.

Impressum:
Eigentümer, Herausgeber & Verleger: VIEWS, c/o Institut für Anglistik & Amerikanistik der Universität Wien, Universitätsstraße 7, A-1010 Wien, Austria. **Für den Inhalt verantwortlich**: Christiane Dalton-Puffer. **Redaktion**: Ute Angerer, Christiane Dalton-Puffer, Angelika Hirsch, Gunther Kaltenböck, Arthur Mettinger, Hans Platzer, Nikolaus Ritt, Herbert Schendl, Barbara Seidlhofer. Alle: c/o Institut für Anglistik & Amerikanistik der Universität Wien, Universitätsstraße 7, A-1010 Wien. **Herstellung**: VIEWS.

Some critical comments on V. Kniezsa's 'The post-Conquest lexical elements in the Peterborough Chronicle' *(VIEWS 2/2)*

Christian Liebl

Although the *Peterborough Chronicle* (*PC*) has long been regarded as a quarry of information about early Middle English, more than forty years have elapsed since the last major study of its vocabulary was published (Clark 1952-53); Veronika Kniezsa's recent contribution to *VIEWS* 2/2 is therefore particularly welcomed. The value of her paper seems however to be somewhat reduced by a strikingly high number of misprints[1] as well as several controversial points, some of which I intend to take up in the following.[2]

1. It is difficult to grasp the significance of the list in Kniezsa's table (1); although referred to as a list of 'new words', it is not confined to first attestations in *PC*, nor is it a list of purely French loan-words;[3] at any rate, given that Kniezsa also means her table to include semantic borrowings, one should add *ridere* 'knight', which 'appears as the equivalent of *chevaler*' (Clark 1952-53:84).[4]

2. Apart from tacitly subsuming the interpolations inserted by the first scribe under Part II, Kniezsa (1993:84, table 3) also attributes several loans to wrong parts of *PC*; here, then, are their correct occurrences:[5]

(Fig. 1)

I:	*acordad, acordedan* (III: *acordede*); *Aduent* (also in interpol. s.a. 963); *Theophanie*
I & III:	*prisun* (III), *prisune* (I)*; tur~Tur* (I: *turas, Ture*)
II:	*capitele* (I: *capitulan*); (*ærce-, earce*)*dæcne*(*s*) (interpol. s.a. 1114: *ærcediæcne*); *legat* (also in interpol. s.a. 675); *market* (also in interpol. s.a. 963)
II & III:	*canceler* (I: *cancelere*); *castles* (*castel* also in I); *clerc* (I: *clerecas*; III: *clerekes*); *prior* (also in interpol. s.a. 1107)
interpol.:	s.a. 1102 *calicen*; s.a. 656 *laces*; s.a. 1103 *procession* (II: *processionem*; III: *processiun*)

Consequently, Kniezsa's (1993:85) conclusions as to the 'greater affinity' between Parts I and II are hardly tenable; only one loan (*Aduent*) can be found exclusively in I and II (interpol.), as opposed to *sotlice*, *sotscipe* and *prior* in Parts II and III.

3. In note 5, Kniezsa claims that 'the two earliest French place-names: *Bataille* (1094) and *Malueisin* (1095) occur in Part I.' This statement,

however, must needs be rephrased to read 'the two earliest French place-names (on English soil) *in an English text*', for already in *Domesday Book* (1086) we find <Bulges> (Boulge, Suffolk; Ekwall 1960, s.v.), <La Batailge> (Battle, East Sussex; Mills 1991, s.v.), <Mauessart> (Meshaw, Devon; ibid.), <Montagud> (Montacute, Somerset; ibid.) or <Montgomeri ~ Mvntgvmeri> (Montgomery, Wales; Gelling - Nicolaisen - Richards [1986], s.v.), which is also recorded s.a. 1095 in *PC*.

4. Most controversial, however, is Kniezsa's (1993:87, table 7) classification of loans. In the discussion below I have singled out those borrowings where the etymology given seems problematic; for ease of reference, Kniezsa's labels have been adopted.

Pre-Conquest borrowings from Latin

(a) with a sound change in Middle English

ABBOT: While it is true that the predominant form in Old English was *abbod*, the number of Latinate *-t* spellings in *MCOE* is sufficiently high to assign their introduction to late Old English (cf. also Wollmann 1990a:519f.).

DÆCNE: According to Käsmann (1961:311), this form is best explained by the regular development of OE *æa* (replacing earlier *ia* in *diacon*) > *æ* (in the course of the 11th century; Luick 1914-40 [1964], I:§356/2), the syncope possibly being due to influence from OF *diacne*.[6]

MESSE: Considered by Clark (1952-53:83) to be a loan from Old French, *messe* occurs almost exclusively in Part II, apparently illustrating increasing French influence on the vocabulary of the Peterborough Continuations. However, given the distribution of *mæsse(-)* : *messe(-)* (approximately 28:5 (up to a. 1121) and 4:18 (II and interpol.)), could *messe* not equally well represent the Mercian form, practically absent in the 'Standard West Saxon' of Part I?[7]

MUNTES: At least s.a. 1129, this form seems to stand for the genitive plural of OE *munt*, and the change in question is thus of a morphological rather than phonological nature.[8]

TUR: As Wollmann (1990a:418f.) has convincingly shown, *tur* in *PC* is a loan from Old French - more precisely (Anglo-)Norman French - borrowed in the late 11th century at the earliest (cf. also *OED*, *ODEE*, s.v. *tower*).[9]

(b) with a change of meaning in Middle English

CASTEL: In *PC* and elsewhere, *castel*, meaning 'large fortified dwelling', is probably an adoption of Anglo-Norman/Old Northern French *castel* (see *OED*, *ODEE*, s.v. *castle*; Clark 1952-53:82), although the possibility of semantic borrowing cannot be totally excluded (cf. Burnley 1992:488).

CLERC: *Clerc* in the sense of 'a member of the secular (as opposed to the monastic) clergy' does not seem to be confined to Middle English, as it already appears in Byrhtferth's *Manual* of the mid-11th century (see *DOE*, s.v. *cleric*).
FALS: Although the semantic range of *fals* (adj., n.) becomes greatly extended from early Middle English onwards, *fals* (n.) 'forgery, fraud' (as in *PC* s.a. 1125) is well evidenced in Anglo-Saxon laws and some other Old English texts (see Peters 1986).
RICE: *ODEE* (s.v. *rich*) classifies *rice* as a Common Germanic adoption of Celtic *rīx*; as Godden (1990) has demonstrated, *rice* 'wealthy', probably first appearing at the end of the 9th century in the Old English Bede, does not really become established until the second half of the 10th century and the writings of Ælfric.[10]

Pre-Conquest French borrowings

MARKET: The etymology of this word is disputed, some opting for a borrowing from VL **marcātus* (Holthausen 1974, s.v.; Kluge 1989, Pfeifer 1993, s.v. *Markt*; Britton 1992:446), others for adoption of Old (Northern) French **market* (Serjeantson 1935:106f.; *OED*, s.v.). Davis (1952), on the other hand, explains it as a direct loan from Old High German or Old Saxon (as did already Grimm-Heyne, quoted ibid.), which latter is given as the source in *ODEE* (s.v.).[11]
SOTLICE: In contrast to *sot* and *sotscipe*, there exists no pre-Conquest evidence for *sotlice*, which is first attested in *PC* s.a. 1137.[12]

Post-Conquest Latin words[13]

(a)

MARTIR: Judging by the numerous occurrences of *martir(-)* listed by *MCOE*, it seems to be a pre-Conquest loan from ecclesiastical Latin (cf. also *OED*, *ODEE*, s.v. *martyr*); what is post-Conquest, though, is the 'distinctively French asyllabic ending' of the plural in <martyrs> (s.a. 1137; see Clark 1952-53:80, fn.44 and Käsmann 1961:89).
PASCHES: This is described by most authorities as a loan from Old French (see *OED*, *ODEE*, s.v. *Pasch*; Clark 1952-53:83; Käsmann 1961:350); Latin influence, however, will have to be assumed for <Pascan ~ Pasche> in Byrhtferth's *Manual* (Käsmann ibid.).

(b) with a French ending

IUDEUS: As far as I can see, the plural <Iudeus> (s.a. 1137) might equally well be a wholesale borrowing of OF *Judeu*, pl. *Judeus* (*MED*, s.v. *Judeu*).

MIRACLES: *Miracle* is generally held to be a borrowing from Old French (see *OED*, *ODEE*, s.v.; Clark 1952-53:83; Serjeantson 1935:109).

Post-Conquest French borrowings

(a) in Anglo-Norman form

CALICEN: This seems to me to represent a weak plural of OE *calic*, a long-established Latin loan, rather than an Anglo-Norman borrowing (cf. also Clark 1952-53:80).[14]

CAPITELE: Although *OED* (s.v. *chapitle*), Serjeantson (1935:108) and Burnley (1992:429), too, consider it to be an adoption from Old (Northern) French, an interpretation of <capitele> as the dative singular of OE *capitel*, a Latin loan frequently found in Old English, seems equally plausible (cf. also Käsmann 1961:338f. and Plummer 1892, s.v.) - even if this may contradict the 'abandonment of the dative' observed in *PC* (Clark 1958:lff.).

CANTELCAPAS: The etymology of this word has long been a bone of contention. Kniezsa's classification seems to be based on *OED* (s.v. *cantel-cape*, *-cope*), which derives *cantel* from Old Northern French, a view dismissed by Clark (1952-53:80, fn.45); like *MED* (s.v. *canter-cōpe*), Holthausen (s.v.) and Serjeantson (1935:49), Clark equates the compound with OE *canter-cæppe* (*canter* < L *cantor*).[15]

(b)

CELLAS: Giving this form as first attestation, *OED*/*ODEE* (s.v. *cell*) waver between Latin or Old French origin, which latter is advocated by both Serjeantson (1935:108) and Käsmann (1961:327f. & fn.1); they were, however, unaware of the oblique *cellan* 'monastic cell' recorded four times in the *Life of Saint Machutus* (s.xi in.; Ker 1957:no.168), where it is most certainly an adoption of L *cella* (see *DOE*, s.v. *cella*, *celle*). Consequently, *cellas* in *PC* need not necessarily be derived from Old French.[16]

CORONA: This looks rather like a pre-Conquest Latin loan (cf. *MCOE*; *DOE*, s.v.; *OED*, s.v. *crown*; Clark 1952-53:80; Käsmann 1961:314f., fn.5).

CRUCETHUR: The spelling <th> in this context is Anglo-Norman (Gerritsen 1961:301; Pope 1934:§§347,1215).

CURT, *MALUEISIN:* In view of <u> (for earlier *o̤*) and <ei> (for central OF *oi*), the source of *curt* and *Malueisin* is most likely to be (Anglo-)Norman (see Behrens 1886:114, 137ff., 144; Pope 1934:§§184, 230, 1085; Jordan 1974:§234; *ODEE*, s.v. *court*).[17]

NATIUITEÐ: As final <ð> suggests, this word must be a direct loan from Anglo-Norman (Pope 1934:§§347, 1176; Serjeantson 1935:108, fn.).

UUERRE, UUERRIEN: These words are, of course, classic examples of loans from Anglo-Norman/Old Northern French (cf. the doublet AN *werre* ~ central OF *guerre*; see *OED*, *ODEE*, s.v. *war*; Jordan 1974:§250; Burnley 1992:430).

Notes

[1]As it would be tedious to enumerate them all, suffice it to correct some of the more important ones:
p.83 table (1): for *acorded, -on* read *acordad, acordedan* / p.83 table (1), p.84 table (3), p.85: for *Natiuited* read *Natiuiteð* / p.83: Jespersen's count was based on the first *hundred* French entries for *A-I* and the first *fifty* for *J* and *L* (Jespersen 1948:§95). / p.84 table (2): The Old French borrowings as counted by Dekeyser are *2* (1101-1150) and *6* (1151-1200) (Dekeyser 1986:255). / p.85: Both *Natiuitas* and *processionem* appear only *twice* in Part II, the former also occurring in Part I. / p.86: for *hiredclerc* read *hirdclerc*; *prisun* occurs *seven* times in Part III; quotation (6): for *gri* read *grin* / p.87 table (7): for *iudesu* read *iudeus* / p.88: Contrary to what one might conclude from Kniezsa's wording, it was Bradley who first suggested the emendation <þa þestre[den] sona> (as opposed to Emerson's <þa wes treson>; see Bradley 1917).
References: Baugh 1935: add *French* [Loan-Words]; Bradley 1917: add page nos. *72-74*; for *Dauzet* read *Dauzat*; Gerritsen 1961: for [English Studies] *43* read *42*; Hall 1920: the correct title is *Selections from Early Middle English 1130-1250*; Herdan: for *Joseph* read *Gustav*; Plummer: for *1899* read *1892*; Serjeantson: for *1937* read *1935*; Tobler - Lommatzsch: for *1954ff*. read *1925ff*.
[2]A discussion of Kniezsa (1991) - an equally problematic article, apparently intended as a supplement but in fact published earlier - must be deferred for the present.
[3]Similarly enigmatic are her figures for the French loans in *PC* (p.84, table 2), which do not seem to square with the number of items listed in table (7); if the dates refer to the annals, there are at least two 'post-Conquest French borrowings' for 1051-1100 (*cancelere, dubbade* and, in an interpolation, *cantelcapas*, all first attestations) and clearly more than eight for 1101-1150.
[4]Cf. also *OED* (s.v.) and Burnley (1992:488f.), whereas the earliest quotation for 'knight' in *MED* (s.v.) comes, oddly, from Laȝamon's *Brut*. Incidentally, the names of the months in <Maies monðe> (s.a. 1080, s.a. 1110), <Iunies monðe> (s.a. 1110) and <Iulies monðe> (s.a. 1115) probably represent weakened (or genitival?) forms of their Latin equivalents rather than Old French loans, as one may be tempted to think (see Bödtker 1912:466).
[5]Here and elsewhere in this article, extensive use has been made of *A Microfiche Concordance to Old English* (*MCOE*); for the identification of the interpolations see Whitelock (1954:31, fn.73).
[6]Surprisingly, the *Dictionary of Old English* (*DOE*), contrary to *OED* (s.v. *deacon*, sb.[1]) or *MED* (s.v. *dǣken*), lists <dæcne> as an attested spelling for OE *decan*, yet adds the caveat '?or take as *diacone*'; still, the context and the identical spelling of the determinatum in *ærce-, earcedæcne(s)* might point to L *diāconus* after all.
[7]Wollmann (1990b:392ff.) has recently questioned the established interpretation of *mæsse* as the West Saxon equivalent of Kentish *messe* (cf. Luick 1914-40 [1964], I:§211, Anm.1; Wollmann 1990a:24f., 313); since *messe* is apparently not confined to Kentish or Mercian sources, he postulates the existence of two original variants, *mæsse* and *messe*. At any rate, Clark's (1952-53:83) objection that *messe* 'can hardly be derived from a variant of the OE loan *mæsse*, since elsewhere in this text *æ̆* > *ă*' does not really apply here, the vocalism in

messe being independent of *ǣ* > *ĕ*; her claim is also not borne out by the frequency of <e> for OE *ǣ* in Part II (see Meyer 1889:§2), although it is open to debate whether Rusch (1992:85ff.) is correct in attributing it to second fronting, of which there seems to be no trace in the East Midlands (see also Clark 1958:xxxvii, xlii; Dietz 1989:306ff., and, on the general vacillation between <æ ~ e> in late Old English, Schlemilch 1914:3ff.).

[8]Although in both cases referring to the Alps, <muntes> s.a. 887 is described by Plummer (1892, s.v.) as a (regular) genitive singular; this may well be the only interpretation possible within the declensional system prevalent in the copied annals, even though one would expect the Alps to be rendered by the plural (but cf. the genitive singular in a parallel construction s.a. 1119 as well as *alpes* : *munt iofes*, cited by Serjeantson 1935:47). In Parts II and III, however, *-s* for the genitive plural becomes increasingly common (see Clark 1958:l).

[9]Two further instances of *tur* in *PC* (<Ture> s.a. 1100, s.a. 1101) have apparently been overlooked by Wollmann (1990a:412). Incidentally, both Serjeantson (1935:105) and even Scheler (1977:53) still assigned *tur* to the 10th century, basing their judgment on an alleged <turū>, where the correct reading is <tunū> (glossing *turribus* in the *Durham Ritual*; Lindelöf 1928:147).

[10]Cf. also Kniezsa (1992:508), though there is not much evidence for her assumption 'that the meaning 'wealthy' had already developed when the Anglo-Saxons left the Continent'; in view of her previous article, the present classification seems somewhat strange.

[11]Britton (1992:446) excludes borrowing from Old Northern French, arguing that ONF *market*, with <t> normally standing for a dental fricative /θ/, would have yielded *marketh*; however, *market* might perhaps be a loan from Picard, which retained Latin post-tonic intervocalic *t* as /t/ in final position (see Pogatscher 1888:§321; Pope 1934:§356, App. §1320/xv). On the other hand, given the trade relations between England and Germany in the 10th and 11th centuries (see Kletler 1924:161f.), borrowing from a continental Germanic language should perhaps not be dismissed. Problematic, too, is the time of adoption. The sole pre-Conquest evidence for *market* is in the compound <gearmarkett>, which, though recorded in an authentic charter of c.1053-55, is only preserved in a 12th century cartulary copy (see Harmer 1950); even though Harmer (ibid.:360) considers the possibility of later substitution as remote, she concludes that the opinion voiced in *OED* that 'it is not certain that the word *market* was introduced into England before the twelfth century still holds good'.

[12]While later possibly reinforced from OF *sot*, OE *sot(t)* may originally have been an adoption of medL *sottus*, first recorded in a poem by Theodulf of Orléans (?c.800; see Du Cange, s.v. and *ODEE*, s.v. *sot*, but cf. Clark 1952-53:83).

[13]*Aduent*, *cardinal* and *legat*, derived by *OED*/*ODEE* (s.vv.) from Old French, had better be considered loans from ecclesiastical Latin, reinforced by their French equivalents, as was the case with *prior* (see Käsmann 1961:302f., 331, 343 and Clark 1952-53:82; somewhat peculiarly, her label 'Franco-Latin' - denoting medieval Latin loans in French garb - is also applied to words such as *Natiuiteð*, *canceler*, *concilie*, *market*, *carited*, *priuilegies* or *processiun*).

[14]Strangely enough, <calicen> as well as the immediately preceding <roden> (interpol. s.a. 1102), both normally following the strong declension, exhibit weak *-n* plurals (for *calic*, this is the only instance recorded by *DOE*, s.v.; cf. also <roden> in the interpol. s.a. 1070). Since the *-s* plural predominates in the Peterborough Continuations, one wonders whether these forms might have been influenced by the conservative language of Part I in which they are couched (cf. Clark 1958:xlv, l).

[15]As Clark (ibid.) points out, 'in the Middle English version of the gifts of Bishop Leofric to Exeter Cathedral, *cantelcoppys* corresponds to the Old English *canterkæppa*', whereas no change is observed in the following *canterstauys*, rendering *canter-stafas* (Hoad 1985:n.24); most recently, Kornexl (1993:269) has suggested association with L *canere* along the lines of ME *cantile*, *cantelene* < L *cantilena*.

[16]On the extension of the *-s* plural to other declensions see Clark (1958:xlv); in the light of <canonias> (s.a. 1129; cf. <canonie> s.a. 1123), however, it may also be argued that <cellas> represents an inverted spelling of OF *celles* (see Käsmann ibid.).

[17]This may also hold good for *prisun* (see Sturmfels 1886:560ff. and Burnley 1992:431, where the date of its earliest attestation should be corrected to *ChronD* s.a. 1076).

References

Amos, Ashley Crandell; Healey, Antonette diPaolo et al. (eds.) 1986-. *Dictionary of Old English*. Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies.

Bammesberger, Alfred (ed.) 1985. *Problems of Old English Lexicography: Studies in Memory of Angus Cameron*. (Eichstätter Beiträge, Bd. 15: Abt. Sprache und Literatur) Regensburg: Pustet.

Bammesberger, Alfred & Wollmann, Alfred (eds.). 1990. *Britain 400-600: Language and History*. (Anglistische Forschungen 205) Heidelberg: Winter.

Behrens, Dietrich. 1886. 'Beiträge zur Geschichte der französischen Sprache in England: I. Zur Lautlehre der französischen Lehnwörter im Mittelenglischen', *Französische Studien* 5/2:1-224.

Blake, Norman (ed.) 1992. *The Cambridge History of the English Language: Volume II 1066-1476*. Cambridge etc.: Cambridge University Press.

Bödtker, A. Trampe. 1912. '*Of* and the genitive case in late Old English', *Englische Studien* 45:465-467.

Bradley, Henry. 1917. '"Trēson" in the Anglo-Saxon Chronicle', *Modern Language Review* 12:72-74.

Britton, Derek. 1992. 'The *-th* spellings of English *market*', *Neophilologus* 76:446-451.

Burnley, David. 1992. 'Lexis and Semantics', in: Blake, Norman (ed.), 409-499.

Clark, Cecily. 1952-53. 'Studies in the vocabulary of the *Peterborough Chronicle*, 1070-1154', *English and Germanic Studies* 5:67-89.

--- (ed.) 1958. *The Peterborough Chronicle 1070-1154*. Oxford: University Press.

Davis, Norman. 1952. 'The proximate etymology of 'market'', *Modern Language Review* 47:152-155.

Dekeyser, Xavier. 1986. 'Romance loans in Middle English: a re-assessment', in: Kastovsky, Dieter & Szwedek, Aleksander (eds.), 253-265.

Dietz, Klaus. 1989. 'Die historische Schichtung phonologischer Isoglossen in den englischen Dialekten: Altenglische Isoglossen', *Anglia* 107:295-329.

DOE: see Amos, Healey et al.

Du Cange. 1883-87. *Glossarium mediae et infimae latinitatis conditum a Carolo du Fresne Domino du Cange: Ed. nova a Léopold Favre*. Vols. 1-10. Niort: Favre.

Ekwall, Eilert. 1960. *The Concise Oxford Dictionary of English Place-Names*. (4th ed.) Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Fox, Sir Cyril & Dickins, Bruce (eds.) 1950. *The Early Cultures of North-West Europe*. (H.M. Chadwick Memorial Studies) Cambridge: University Press.

Gelling, Margaret; Nicolaisen, W.F.H.; Richards, Melville (eds.) 1970 [1986]. *The Names of Towns and Cities in Britain*. London: Batsford.

Gerritsen, Johan. 1961. 'A ghost-word: crucet-hūs', *English Studies* 42:300-301.

Godden, M.R. 1990. 'Money, power and morality in late Anglo-Saxon England', *Anglo-Saxon England* 19:41-65.

Harmer, Florence E. 1950. '*Chipping* and *Market*: A Lexicographical Investigation', in: Fox, Sir Cyril & Dickins, Bruce (eds.), 335-360.

Healey, Antonette diPaolo & Venezky, Richard L. (eds.) 1980. *A Microfiche Concordance to Old English*. Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies.

Hoad, T.F. 1985. 'The reconstruction of unattested Old English lexical items', in: Bammesberger, Alfred (ed.), 131-150.

Holthausen, Ferdinand. 1974. *Altenglisches etymologisches Wörterbuch*. (3rd ed.) Heidelberg: Winter.

Jespersen, Otto. 1948. *Growth and Structure of the English Language*. (9th ed.) Oxford: Blackwell.

Jordan, Richard. 1974. *Handbook of Middle English Grammar: Phonology*. [transl. and rev. by E.J. Crook] (Janua Linguarum, Series Practica 218) The Hague & Paris : Mouton.

Kastovsky, Dieter & Szwedek, Aleksander (eds.). 1986. *Linguistics across Historical and Geographical Boundaries: In Honour of Jacek Fisiak on the Occasion of His Fiftieth Birthday. Vol. I: Linguistic Theory and Historical Linguistics.* (Trends in Linguistics, Studies and Monographs 32) Berlin - New York - Amsterdam: Mouton de Gruyter.

Käsmann, Hans. 1961. *Studien zum kirchlichen Wortschatz des Mittelenglischen 1100-1350: Ein Beitrag zum Problem der Sprachmischung*. (Buchreihe der Anglia Bd. 9) Tübingen: Niemeyer.

Ker, N.R. 1957. *Catalogue of Manuscripts Containing Anglo-Saxon*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Kletler, Paul. 1924. *Nordwesteuropas Verkehr, Handel und Gewerbe im frühen Mittelalter*. Wien: Österreichischer Schulbücherverlag.

Kluge, Friedrich (ed.) 1989. *Etymologisches Wörterbuch der deutschen Sprache*. [neubearb. v. Elmar Seebold] (22nd ed.) Berlin & New York: de Gruyter.

Kniezsa, Veronika. 1991 [1992]. 'Early Anglo-Norman influence upon English writing', *Folia Linguistica Historica* 12:45-55.

---. 1992. '*Rich Lake*: a case history', in: Rissanen, Matti et al. (eds.), 506-516.

---. 1993. 'The post-Conquest lexical elements in the *Peterborough Chronicle*', *Views* 2:82-90.

Kornexl, Lucia (ed.) 1993. *Die* Regularis Concordia *und ihre altenglische Interlinearversion*. (Münchener Universitäts-Schriften, Philosophische Fakultät: Texte und Untersuchungen zur Englischen Philologie, Bd. 17) München: Fink.

Kurath, Hans; Kuhn, Sherman M. et al. (eds.) 1954-. *Middle English Dictionary*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

Lindelöf, U. 1928. 'Die neue Ausgabe des Rituale Ecclesiae Dunelmensis und die Sprache der Glosse', *Anglia Beiblatt* 39:145-151.

Luick, Karl. 1914-40 [1964]. *Historische Grammatik der englischen Sprache*. Vols. 1-2. [ed. by F. Wild & H. Koziol] Stuttgart: Tauchnitz.

MCOE: see Healey & Venezky.

MED: see Kurath, Kuhn et al.

Meyer, Heinrich. 1889. *Zur Sprache der jüngeren Teile der Chronik von Peterborough*. Jena: Frommann.

Mills, A.D. 1991. *A Dictionary of English Place-Names*. Oxford & New York: OUP.

ODEE: see Onions.

OED: see Simpson & Weiner.

Onions, C.T. (ed.) 1966. *The Oxford Dictionary of English Etymology*. [with the assistance of G.W.S. Friedrichsen and R.W. Burchfield] Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Peters, Hans. 1986. 'Middle English *fals*', *Archiv für das Studium der neueren Sprachen und Literaturen* 223:120-125.

Pfeifer, Wolfgang (ed.) 1993. *Etymologisches Wörterbuch des Deutschen*. Vols. 1-2. (2nd ed.) Berlin: Akademie Verlag.

Plummer, Charles (ed.) 1892. *Two of the Saxon Chronicles Parallel*. Vol. 1. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Pogatscher, Alois. 1888. *Zur Lautlehre der griechischen, lateinischen und romanischen Lehnworte im Altenglischen*. Straßburg & London: Trübner.

Pope, M.K. 1934. *From Latin to Modern French with Especial Consideration of Anglo-Norman: Phonology and Morphology*. (Publications of the University of Manchester No. CCXXIX, French Series No. VI) Manchester: Manchester University Press.

Rissanen, Matti et al. (eds.) 1992. *History of Englishes: New Methods and Interpretations in Historical Linguistics*. (Topics in English Linguistics 10) Berlin & New York: Mouton de Gruyter.

Rusch, Willard James. 1992. *The Language of the East Midlands and the Development of Standard English: A Study in Diachronic Phonology*. (Berkeley Insights in Linguistics and Semiotics, vol. 8) New York etc.: Lang.

Scheler, Manfred. 1977. *Der englische Wortschatz*. (Grundlagen der Anglistik und Amerikanistik 9) Berlin: Schmidt.

Schlemilch, Willy. 1914. *Beiträge zur Sprache und Orthographie spätaltengl. Sprachdenkmäler der Übergangszeit (1000-1150)*. (Studien zur englischen Philologie 34) Halle a./S.: Niemeyer.

Serjeantson, Mary S. 1935. *A History of Foreign Words in English*. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.

Simpson, J.A. & Weiner, E.S.C. (eds.) 1989. *The Oxford English Dictionary: Second Edition*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Sturmfels, A. 1886. 'Der altfranzösische Vokalismus im Mittelenglischen bis zum Jahre 1400', *Anglia* 9:551-581.

Whitelock, Dorothy (ed.) 1954. *The Peterborough Chronicle: The Bodleian Manuscript Laud Misc. 636*. (Early English Manuscripts in Facsimile, vol. IV) Copenhagen: Rosenkilde & Bagger.

Wollmann, Alfred. 1990a. *Untersuchungen zu den frühen lateinischen Lehnwörtern im Altenglischen: Phonologie und Datierung*. (Münchener Universitäts-Schriften, Philosophische Fakultät: Texte und Untersuchungen zur Englischen Philologie, Bd. 15) München: Fink.

---. 1990b. 'Lateinisch - Altenglische Lehnbeziehungen im 5. und 6. Jahrhundert', in: Bammesberger, Alfred & Wollmann, Alfred (eds.), 373-396.

Sum and substance: some aspects of doing applied linguistics

Barbara Seidlhofer

1.

My slightly cryptic title is meant to suggest an analogy between the activity of summarizing on the one hand and the activity of doing applied linguistics on the other. By summarization I do not just mean techniques of text condensation, but all the processes that go into the reception of texts and their interpretation for oneself and for others. While these processes are relatively well researched with respect to language learning, they are not usually an object of reflection in the domain of applied linguistics. Exploring the analogy between these two intertextual practices offers a heuristic device for addressing the main concern of this paper, which is to consider conditions for learning from text.

Underlying my argument are two basic assumptions. The first is, as is widely recognized, that teachers can benefit from observing how learners learn. In that sense teaching and learning are reciprocal processes, and learning is not something that only learners do, but we all learn by our association with other people through our discourses. The second assumption is that, as second language acquisition research (e.g. Ellis 1994, Tarone 1988) has shown, there is nothing absolutely unique about the language that learners produce: studies of the variability of interlanguage remind us that if interlanguage is a natural language, then of course it will vary, because natural languages vary. Therefore what language learners do reflects variability in general. It follows, then, that a) there is nothing absolutely unique about the learning process and b) there is nothing absolutely unique about the language that learners produce. In this spirit, then, what learners do should be enlightening with regard to what other language users do - for example applied linguists.

This point of view justifies looking at summaries written by EFL students not just as a language learning activity, but as something which relates to other forms of language use as well. The question I should like to address, then, is 'How is the activity of summarizing like the activity of doing applied linguistics, (and what's the point of asking this question)?'

2.

It might be helpful to start with a brief explanation as to what I take the terms *applied linguistics* and *summarization* to mean. Kaplan and Widdowson, in the *International Encyclopedia of Linguistics,* say this under the heading *Applied Linguistics*:

> Scholarship has obligations to the non-scholarly world and it is this need that Applied Linguistics intends to meet. Its starting point lies in the language-related problems of practical life, and it adduces insights from the disciplinary areas of language study to the extent that such insights are relevant to the clarification and solution of these problems. (Bright 1992 vol 1:76)

Obviously, this definition places applied linguists in the role of mediators between theory and practice: in respect to theory, they have to make ideas ACCESSIBLE. In respect to practice, they have to point to their potential RELEVANCE. This mediation will of necessity involve the processes of selection and interpretation of ideas and the subsequent rendering of this interpretation for a specified receiver, such as the language teacher.

And this is where we can make the link with summarization, for what else is involved in summarizing than selecting, interpreting and rendering? The issue that is bound to arise here, of course, is that strictly speaking summary requires selection and rendering, yes, but certainly not interpretation- indeed, that interpretation is precisely what should be avoided in a faithful summary, which should only capture the important points. But this, of course, immediately raises such questions as 'faithful to whom?' and 'important for whom?'. And how can we be sure that we achieve a match between the author's intention and the reader's interpretation?

The fact that the processes of selection, interpretation and considerations of recipient design crucially determine applied linguistics texts can easily enough be demonstrated by comparison. Let me briefly do this with two short passages which attempt to explain the notion of speech acts to language teachers, both referring to Austin and Searle as their sources. The first extract comes from Michael McCarthy's *Discourse Analysis for Language Teachers*:

> [after presentation of a short dialogue between Eric Morecambe and Ernie Wise] When we say that a particular bit of speech or writing is a *request* or an *instruction* or an *exemplification* we are concentrating on what that particular bit of speech is *doing*, or how the listener/reader is supposed to react; for this reason, such entities are often also called *speech acts* (see Austin 1962 and Searle 1969). Each of the stretches of language that are carrying the force of requesting, instructing, and so on is seen as performing a particular act; Eric's exclamation was performing the act of informing the audience that a great show was in store for them. (McCarthy 1991:9)

To start with, the reference to the dialogue between Eric and Ernie that precedes this extract is clearly a device for invoking shared knowledge and

interest, a characteristic of 'considerate discourse' designed to make rather abstract notions more accessible.

But what about the concept of speech acts as such? Note first of all that McCarthy only refers to illocutionary acts (request, instruction) and thus simplifies the speech act concept by leaving out Searle's propositional act. Note too that the reference to 'how the listener/reader is supposed to react' conflates ILlocutionary (force) with PERlocutionary (effect). So here we have to do with instances of selection and simplification, based on an interpretation of the source text and an assumption as to what is to be of likely relevance to the target audience.

Another way of giving a brief rendering, or summary, of ideas is to use a kind of shorthand, such as the formulation here about 'what [a] piece of language is doing' - clearly, the language does nothing, it is people that do things with, or via, language. But the shorthand is expedient to avoid all kinds of awkward issues like human intentions and interpretations - for instance, WHO decides on illocutionary force: is it a function of intention, or of interpretation? Obviously a summary for teachers does not want to get into all this, so matters are shorthanded: it does not seem appropriate to 'problematize' things too much, because this would make it more difficult for readers to make the matter relevant to pedagogy which (perhaps) does not call for such subtle distinctions.

Another evasion, and again one that seems justified to me in terms of summarizing purpose, is the use of periphrastic terms for Austin and Searle's *sentence* and *utterance*: McCarthy uses 'piece of language', 'bit of language', 'stretch of language' - expressions which seem quite acceptable given the purpose of summary.

Let us compare McCarthy's text with the entry for *speech act* in Richards, Platt & Weber's *Dictionary of Applied Linguistics* (1992):

> SPEECH ACT
> an UTTERANCE as a functional unit in communication. In speech act theory, utterances have two kinds of meaning: (a) propositional meaning (also known as locutionary meaning). This is the basic literal meaning of the utterance which is conveyed by the particular words and structures which the utterance contains.
> (b) illocutionary meaning (also known as illocutionary force). This is the effect the utterance or written text has on the reader or listener. For example, in *I am thirsty* the propositional meaning is what the utterance says about the speaker's physical state. The illocutionary force is the effect the speaker wants the utterance to have on the listener. It may be intended as a request for something to drink. A speech act is a sentence or utterance which has both propositional meaning and illocutionary force. ... In language teaching, and SYLLABUS design, speech acts are often referred to as 'functions' or 'language functions'.
>
> (Richards, Platt & Weber 1992:265; my emphasis)

Here we have evidence of a different strategy for avoiding technical distinctions: 'A speech act is a SENTENCE OR UTTERANCE which has both propositional meaning and illocutionary force' - the terms here are used without being defined and it is unclear whether they are distinctive or synonymous: are sentence and utterance the same, or if not, how do they differ? The buck is passed to the reader here. This kind of hedging may well be intended to serve as self-protection, that is, first-person/ writer centred, and as a user of this dictionary I find this vagueness less helpful than McCarthy's avoidance, which seems to be motivated by considerations of second-person needs.

On the whole there is more selection and less reformulation in this book than in McCarthy's. The authors select propositional and illocutionary meaning, but leave out perlocution. On the other hand, their mention of 'the effect the speaker wants the utterance to have on the listener' suggests a confusion of ILlocution and PERlocution.

Propositional meaning is defined, under (a), as

> the basic literal meaning of the utterance which is CONVEYED by the particular words and structures which the utterance CONTAINS. (emphasis added)

Again, strictly according to the theory, you cannot say that a particular expression HAS a propositional meaning, as if it were simply a matter of the semantics of the sentence. The propositional meaning is also a function of an act, a propositional act, and is a pragmatic matter. It is not conveyed or contained by the words and structures themselves but is INFERRED.

In the last paragraph of their entry, Richards, Platt & Weber turn to language teaching and syllabus design and assert that there SPEECH ACTS are often referred to as FUNCTIONS or LANGUAGE FUNCTIONS. But in fact functions is the term used in language teaching for ILLOCUTIONARY but not PROPOSITIONAL acts. Even more confusingly, the authors say this themselves in a different entry, that for locutionary act: 'An ILLOCUTIONARY ACT is using a sentence [why not utterance?] to perform a function.' [emphasis added]

These are just some of the inconsistencies which abound in definitions of these terms. The question is: does this matter at the level of access and relevance that they are aiming at? All texts can be deconstructed and shown to be wanting, but we do not read as ANALYSTS but as people who want to bring our own schematic world to bear on the text to make it relevant to us. So the purpose of pointing out these shortcuts and inconsistencies is NOT to suggest my own, 'better' definitions and summaries instead, but to demonstrate that inevitably processes of selection, generalization, simplification, abbreviation, and (re)construction - in short, typical summarization procedures - have gone into their writing.

And we can speculate whether, or when, these were primarily motivated by the desire to express specific original ideas about speech acts, or by an endeavor to make these ideas maximally accessible, or by judgements as to what should be highlighted as potentially relevant for practitioners.

3.

What I have attempted to show, then, is that summarization (including interpretation and rendering) is a crucial issue in applied linguistics. As an alternative to the rather informal deconstruction procedure employed above, we might approach the issue of summarization by reference to quite precise models of text analysis. We might, as I have done in my own research (Seidlhofer 1991), examine what they have to offer for developing a kind of algorithm for summary. The models I examined included thematic structure, macrostructures and content structure analysis. A (potential) algorithm for summarization would, if applied correctly, yield a condensed version of the original text, retaining the essential points while discarding the merely auxiliary information.

It soon became apparent that such an absolute measure of summary is invalid because in these models the varying responses of different readers are not elicited. Instead, the analyst assumes the reader role and imposes an interpretation. This conflation of reader and analyst is epitomized in theoretical work by such phrases as 'the analysis claims that...' which appear alongside remarks such as 'judgements of our perceptions, as ordinary readers...'. This tension between the roles of reader and analyst is particularly acute in van Dijk & Kintsch's (1983) macrostructure approach[1]. In fact, I argue that this tension represents THE problem of the model. The problem manifests itself in the split between the presentation of macrostructures as specifying 'the general principles followed by all language users in understanding the global meanings of discourse' (van Dijk & Kintsch 1983:193) and the claim to provide a dynamic and strategic approach,

> in which the precise processes are specified by which a macrostructure is ACTUALLY inferred from text and knowledge. (op.cit.:192, emphasis added)

Van Dijk & Kintsch give a sample analysis of a *Newsweek* text and claim that what they are presenting is a 'plausible processing sequence' performed by an 'average reader' (pp.209 & 210), but in doing so they enact the part of that 'average reader' themselves, thus conflating the roles of analyst and participant, or reader. Van Dijk & Kintsch claim that the macrostructure, or gist, which they derive from their sample text is

> only one possible macrostructure, derived from our analysis of the text with an OBJECTIVE attitude, that tries to be faithful to the INTENTIONS OF THE AUTHOR. (op cit.:219, emphasis added)

What is not acknowledged in this procedure, of course, is the essentially interactive nature of reading and summarizing, in which any specific reader's reduction is determined by the correspondence between textual content and reader's state of knowledge and purpose in reading.

Bonnie F. Meyer's (1975) content structure model is up against very much the same problem. From all her and her co-workers' writings it is clear that the primary objective of reading is seen in capturing the author's, and only the author's, intended meaning:

> The reader's task, then, is to construct a cognitive representation of the text which is similar to that intended by the writer. The comprehension process will involve an active effort to discover the text's major logical relationships and the information expressed in these relations. (Meyer & Rice 1982:156)

According to the Meyer model, good comprehenders go about the task described in the above quotation by employing a structure strategy which will enable them to construct the organizational plan provided by the author. Readers who 'cannot utilize the structure strategy' use a 'default strategy', which (since they are investigating recall) means 'simply try[ing] to remember something from the text' (Meyer & Rice 1982:166). There is a third reader category in Meyer & Rice's scheme, but it is only dealt with in a kind of brief aside, since it does not fall within the scope of their research interests: this is the category of readers who 'choose not to follow the text from the writer's perspective'. Meyer & Rice conjecture that

> [i]n this case, readers (e.g. experts in a field) could have well-organized schemata for selection, differential processing, and retrieval which are different from those suggested by the texts. (Meyer & Rice 1982:167)

It would seem to me that this remark brings up a number of very intriguing questions regarding the modelling of reading processes and reading pedagogy. For instance, would it not seem desirable, and indeed natural, for readers to be able to approach practically any text as 'experts in the field'? Experts, after all, are not only people such as nuclear physicists and neurosurgeons perusing their professional journals, but also so-called 'ordinary people' consulting their daily papers for, say, classified ads, cricket scores or film reviews. What makes them expert is knowing what they are after, and how and where to find it in the text, how to bring their own schemata to bear and to interact with conceptual content in the text, according to their state of knowledge. In this respect we may say that LANGUAGE TEACHERS are expert readers, with their own experiences and purposes, and it is up to applied linguists to help them use this expertise in reading applied linguistics texts.

One last observation about the reader-analyst conflict: it would seem that the spectrum between (objective) analyst and (subjective) reader corresponds very closely to Widdowson's (1984) notions of SUBMISSIVE and ASSERTIVE

reading: if we think back to the discussion of Meyer's (1975) model and her insistence on the purpose of reading being the recovering of the content structure provided by the author, this describes an analyst who is skilled in the recognition, aided by signalling, of the top-level rhetorical structure intended by the author. The analyst's own 'mind set', comprising content and formal schemata, interest, attitudes, purpose of reading and the like, recede into the background, they are not asserted. The other extreme would be someone who does not care at all about the author's intention, but instead approaches the text with a very clear purpose in mind. He or she might even look for (and find) something in a text which the author perhaps had no wish to express. In such a case, we are faced with a reader who asserts his or her own schemata.

So much then for the upshot of my enquiry into the applicability of various theoretical models to summarization, which by implication and necessity also turned out to be an enquiry into the nature of summarization itself. It became apparent that such an enquiry, once it moved from reliable TEXT analysis to a more valid but elusive DISCOURSE analysis, raised very general questions about the pragmatics of summarizing. These questions all converge on the issue of how readers derive meanings from texts, how they make them their own, in short, the issue of relevance.

4.

But I also conducted an empirical study of student summaries. The observations which emerged from my analysis of student protocols turned out to focus on very much the same issues of interpretation and relevance. So how do the findings obtained there relate to the points arising from theory?

My purpose in the data analysis was not to make (reliable) quantitative statements about what I found, but to use the student protocols to guide me towards (valid) issues and implications of a more general nature which need to be considered in a well-founded approach to summarization and learning from texts.

My students were asked to read an article from *Time* magazine and were set tasks of two kinds: some were asked to write a SUMMARY (i.e. to say what the writer means by the text), others were asked to give an ACCOUNT (i.e. to say what the text means to them as readers). These tasks were designed to bring differences between submissiveness and assertiveness out into the open and make them objects of reflection. The expected differences emerged very clearly: there is an all-pervasive contrast between a tendency of summarizers to be submissively faithful to the text and producing assimilative reductions on the one hand, and on the other, a tendency of account writers to establish ownership by asserting reader initiative to make the text accommodate to their own world.

In the rest of this paper I shall, via rather drastic shortcuts, give an outline of the insights which I gained from my empirical analysis, and then identify in what ways these insights might be helpful for thinking about applied linguistics. My objective here is not to say what constitutes an 'acceptable' or 'inacceptable' summary, but to map out the 'discoursal terrain' within which summarization processes operate. Exploring the extreme positions on the continuum can be a useful way of approaching the formulation of criteria for decisions somewhere along that continuum, in specific situations and for specific purposes.

I cannot go into any detail here about the categories of description I used in order to arrive at a kind of 'reception format' of each student protocol. To mention just a few examples, these were criteria such as the length of the protocol, so-called 'own words' vs verbatim quotation, kinds of conjunctions used, use of metalanguage as indication of writer intervention, and the macroprocesses employed (such as deletion and generalization).

My observations gained from the student protocols can be encapsulated in one aspect, namely the roles the students assumed as summary and account writers. The responses covered the whole spectrum from extremely submissive to extremely assertive. Here are two examples. They are reactions to the same source text, but A is a summary whereas B is an account.

[A]

> The essay 'Childlessness' deals with the problem of American women who do not want to have a baby any more. A deliberate group of women decides early not to have a child, whereas the group of postponers leave the decision to nature. Nevertheless there can be now seen a tendency that the birth rate is beginning to climb again.

[B]

> I feel personally very much addressed by this article. Being in my early thirties it has been the question in my relationship with a man who is eager to become a father, even a cooperative one. I on the other hand feel quite content with my childless life, besides I wonder if I would ever feel the promised fulfillment a child is supposed to bring. What if this doesn't realize? The decision to have a child is such an absolute one, a decision of no return - and that's what makes me hesitate.

Protocol A is representative of summaries which simply give evidence that the text as such is ACCESSIBLE to the student, extracting ideas which are signalled as important by the original author. On the other hand B, by invitation, gives clear indications as to how the text is RELEVANT to the student. So students writing assertive protocols made an explicit link between the text and their own schemata, and so made the text, and the whole discourse event, their own. The crucial differences between submissive and assertive protocols could be captured in exactly the same terms as the points which I identified as problematic in my analysis of theoretical models: at the two extremes of the

spectrum I had submissive protocols, which were predominantly (but not exclusively) SUMMARIES, that is to say, abbreviated or reduced VERSIONS trying to capture the author's INTENTION. That is to say, they essentially gave an EXEGESIS of the input text. The writers of these submissive protocols generally represented themselves as detached ANALYSTS expressing the GIST of the article. There is evidence of a great deal of CONFORMITY to the original text, not only in terms of the ideas expressed but also of the actual words used, which were often VERBATIM QUOTATIONS.

At the other end of the spectrum we have assertive protocols, which were predominantly (but not exclusively) ACCOUNTS giving an INTERPRETATION of the article from the point of view of an involved PARTICIPANT. What rendering there was of the content of the input text was usually done as a formulation of the UPSHOT, REPORTING ILLOCUTIONARY FORCE rather than quoting words. Both the language used as well as the ideas expressed were often imaginative and CREATIVE.

It seems to me that distinctions made by Goffman (1981:144f) put these differences in a nutshell and thus help conceptualize these roles quite powerfully. He points out that a speaker/writer can fulfil three different kinds of role: the ANIMATOR is somebody who lends his or her voice to the expression of somebody else's ideas, acting as a 'sounding box', as Goffman puts it. The one responsible for the actual wording of the text is the AUTHOR. Behind these two, however, there is what he calls the PRINCIPAL: the originator of ideas, the one who is committed to them, and whose position is being staked out by the words.

The relationships between the different roles which enter into the process of summarization, and which are indeed crucial for understanding any attempt at communication of the kind applied linguists claim to do, can be represented like this:

(Fig. 1)

EXEGESIS	-	INTERPRETATION
ANALYST	-	PARTICIPANT
SUBMISSIVE	-	ASSERTIVE
ANIMATOR	-	AUTHOR/PRINCIPAL
objective/hypothetical	-	subjective/real

Goffman talks about these roles in terms of the 'production format' of the utterance, but these distinctions are just as useful for thinking about the 'reception format'.

It seems to me Goffman's distinction is a particularly useful conceptualization of what goes on in the processes of summarizing on the one

hand and responding to a text in an account on the other: generally speaking, the task of summarizers is to act as animators providing an exegesis of the text, whereas account writers make the text their own and so act as authors of their own interpretation.

Many accounts writers went far beyond an interpretation of the text: they actually made the entire communicative event their own and, to use Goffman's words, 'staked out [their] own position' in it - in short, they acted as principals. Of course, neither the distinction between roles, nor that between summaries and accounts are hard-and-fast categories.

The point I am trying to make is that reflecting on the roles involved in summarization and in the production of applied linguistics texts alike reveals something about the conditions for LEARNING FROM TEXT which both teachers and applied linguists should pay heed to. This is that texts and/or tasks need to be so designed that they allow readers to strike a balance between animator, author and principal roles, especially by specifying addressee and purpose. Clearly, for learners to get something out of a text, they need to make that text into a discourse of their own, they need to incorporate what they read into what they know. That is what learning itself involves - in learning you summarize IN your own terms and ON your own terms.

5.

Goffman's roles, and especially the balance between them, are absolutely crucial for all learning and all teaching. As learners, we animate ideas from others and draw on these to author our own understanding of them, and we become principals committed to our own beliefs and attitudes. As teachers we animate ideas in our disciplinary areas but in doing so we also author our own interpretations of them, and we do this as principals committed to our own beliefs about education and life in general.

So the processes we are engaged in in education are essentially those of making ideas ACCESSIBLE, and pointing to their (potential) RELEVANCE for learners. The accessibility of ideas is basically what can be achieved through summary, whereas the assignment of relevance is in the domain of the account. But of course the two are inextricably linked and depend upon each other: the sender can try and make ideas maximally accessible, but this can only be done if there is a participation on the other side which makes the content the receiver's own because only then can it be made relevant. So successful mediation crucially depends on a balance between animator and author roles in both writer and reader, teacher and student.

And so it is with applied linguistics as it was defined at the beginning of this paper. Applied linguists cannot determine relevance. All they can do is summarize in their own terms, formulate ideas in a way that will allow

participation on the part of the recipient. But the actual mode of presentation, the kind of discourse is important: ideas from the theoretical domain must be so presented that accessibility can go alongside a recognition of relevance. So the problematic dialectic between making accessible and making relevant is one that is central to all pedagogy, to all education, and must be central, therefore, to the applied linguistics enterprise.

NOTES

[1]The notion of macrostructures, derived from a text by the application of macrostrategies (deletion, generalization, construction), is central to summarization:
'a summary of a discourse is based on the so-called *macro-structure* of the discourse' (van Dijk 1981:187, original emphasis). For details see Kintsch & van Dijk (1978) and van Dijk & Kintsch (1983).

REFERENCES

Bright, W. (ed. in chief) (1992) *International Encyclopedia of Linguistics*. 4 vols. Oxford University Press

Dijk, T. van (1981) Sentence Topic and Discourse Topic. In *Studies in the Pragmatics of Discourse*. Mouton

Dijk, T. van & Kintsch, W. (1983) *Strategies of Discourse Comprehension.* Academic Press

Goffman, E. (1981) *Forms of Talk*. Basil Blackwell

Ellis, R. (1994) *The Study of Second Language Acquisition.* Oxford University Press

Kintsch, W. & Dijk, T. van (1978) Towards a Model of Discourse Comprehension and Production. *Psychological Review* 85/5: 363-394.

McCarthy, M. (1991) *Discourse Analysis for Language Teachers*. Cambridge University Press

Meyer, B.F. (1975) *The Organization of Prose and its Effects on Memory*. North Holland

Meyer, B.F. & Rice, E. (1982) The Interaction of Reader Strategies and the Organization of Text. *Text* 2/1-3:155-192

Richards, J., Platt, J. & Weber, H. (1992) *Longman Dictionary of Applied Linguistics*. Longman

Seidlhofer, B. (1991) *Discourse Analysis for Summarization*. PhD thesis, University of London.

Tarone, E. (1988) *Variation in interlanguage*. Edward Arnold

Widdowson, H.G. (1984) 'The process and purpose of reading' in *Explorations in Applied Linguistics 2*. Oxford University Press