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Contents

Letter from the Editors:

"Another new journal - why?" - this may be the first reaction on receiving these pages. The idea for this project was born on a sunny day in May during the ICEHL in Helsinki in 1990. The stimulating atmosphere of this conference gave some participants from Vienna the desire to extend such dialogue beyond that event. We wanted to have a forum for informal scholarly dialogue on English linguistics, an unpretentious paper in which work in progress could be presented and reacted to and which would invite and provoke direct and informal replies to the contributions. It took some time, a lot of discussions and still more hours at the computer before this first issue could be presented to a wider public. Another issue will apppear

in autumn and we hope that in the years to come VIEWS will continue to appear at least twice a year.

This first issue contains four papers written by members of the English department of Vienna University and reflects some of the research being carried out here. The topics range from ME word-formation to contrastive pragmatics - a range and diversity we hope to maintain in the future. All contributions generated heated discussions among authors and editorial board, and in this respect this first issue has lived up to our expectations. We are hoping that some of our enthusiasm will communicate itself to you, and incite you to submit contributions. We welcome spontaneous responses and criticisms, reports on work in progress, miscellaneous notes, discussions as well as shortish articles on any aspect of the English language.

These are the ways to contact us:

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The first two issues of VIEWS will be free, financed mainly by the editorial board. Any exchange with other (similar) departmental publications is certainly welcome.

We look forward to receiving your VIEWS.

The Editors

Note to contibutors:

We would like your contributions to reach us on disks (or via e-mail) in any standard IBM compatible word processing format (MS Word, Word for Windows, Wordperfect [for Windows], Word Star, R.T.F., ASCII ...) together with a printout showing character format, special symbols, formulae, tables etc. If you find it helpful to refer to a style sheet we suggest that of the MLA.

*A view on Middle English derivation: verbs**

Christiane Dalton-Puffer

0.

This paper presents part of the results of an empirical study of Middle English derivation. Its main body is dedicated to a description of derived verbs with the aim of establishing a catalogue of items that can be rightfully regarded as Middle English derivational morphemes. This part is strictly descriptive and taxonomic. The final - considerably shorter - part of the paper will present the outline of a semantic model. It will be argued that in order to cope with the descriptive needs of a diachronic study it is preferable to depart from a strictly taxonomic approach. The use of the concept of the derivational system enables us much better to account for the changes observable during the Middle English period.

Before embarking on my topic, I have to stake out its limitations. In principle, derived verbs can be produced in three different ways: by prefixation, by suffixation, and by zero-derivation as is exemplified for Present Day English in (1 a-c).

(1)

a. cage - encage, louse - delouse
b. black - blacken, pure - purify
c. mother_N - mother_V

All three derivation types are also well-represented in the Old and Middle English periods. As the discussion in this paper concentrates exclusively on suffixation, the account of ME derived verbs is necessarily incomplete.[1]

As for zero-derivation, it seems as though most of the verbal derivatives in Old English were, in fact, derived in this way (Kastovsky forthcoming: 174). One needs, however, to keep in mind that in an inflecting language like Old English zero-derivation is not completely zero. Apart from their syntactic functions, the inflectional endings serve as morphological markers for the syntactic category change, a factor which is commonly regarded as typical of derivation (cf. Dressler et al 1987, Bybee 1985). In dealing with verbal prefixes two aspects need to be mentioned: on the one hand we witness the all but total dismantling of the inherited prefix-system in Early Middle English. Practically only the negative *un-* survives unscathed.[2] On the other hand, prefixes which have entered the language in the guise of French loanwords take over important functions: e.g. *disconnect*, *deflea*,

enrich, *embolden*. How much of this "imported prefixation" becomes transparent during the Middle English period will have to be established in a complementary study covering verbal prefixes.

1.

We are now in a position to take a look at our data. All data discussed in this study come from the Helsinki Corpus of English texts. All figures and counts of items refer to that Corpus. The presentation therefore also follows the periodisation of the HC dividing the Middle English period into the following subperiods: ME1 1150-1250, ME2 1250-1350, ME3 1350-1420.[3]

The forms to be dealt with are listed in table (2) below. The capital letters indicate that these are considered citation forms; the spellings which occur in the HC are given in angled brackets without inflectional endings. The inventory of forms was arrived at by the consultation of handbooks and by intuitive extrapolation from the Modern English situation.[4]

(2)

Germanic: NEN <n(en)>, SIAN <s(ian)>
Romance: ATE <ate, at>, ISH <issh, iss, issch, is, yssh>, IFY <ifi(e), yfy, ify, efi, iffi>, IZE <ize, ise>

At the present moment the only claim I make about these forms is that they constitute isolatable strings and thus are potential Middle English suffixes. The ensuing detailed discussion of the data will have to establish which of these can be regarded as suffixes proper, which as suffixoids and which do not have a discernable morphological status at all. Until then, they will be referred to as formatives.

Even at this stage it is obvious that there are not many verbal suffixes and we might add that this list is much shorter than its counterparts for derived nouns and adjectives. The two Old English suffixes, *-læc(an* and *-ett(an* (Kastovsky forthcoming b:174-175) have become so rare in occurrence that they cannot be rightfully said to be recurring items in the Middle English data. As we shall see, SIAN is also limited to ME1 and should therefore, perhaps be grouped with *-læc(an* and *-ett(an*.

The following table (3) assembles the total number of occurrences in the HC of the items involved.

It has to be made quite clear that this first summary of overall figures does not differentiate in any way between different degrees of transparency and/or opaqueness but simply counts all verbs which contain recurring formatives. More details on how the above figures have been assembled can be found in sections 2.1 - 2.6 below.

(3)

Occurrences of verbal formatives in HC Middle English (sorted by ascending token frequency)

	types	**tokens**
ATE	-	-
IZE	2	9
IFY	12	47
SIAN	6	52
ISHEN	17	55
NEN	37	435
	74	598

2. The formatives one by one

The following sections will treat each individual formative separately with each section roughly adhering to a tripartite structure (quantitative aspects of the data in the corpus, morphology, semantics) but only in those cases where such a full treatment is warranted by the data in the Helsinki Corpus. The semantic descriptions at this stage will be impressionistic and pre-theoretical, modelled on the paraphrases in Marchand (1969) and the OED (and MED) dictionaries.

2.1 ATE

Even though *-aten* has an entry in the MED as a suffix "formed in ME to go with participles in *-at*", my data do not contain any evidence that would warrant a treatment of ATE as a derivational element forming verbs in Middle English. It is true enough that ATE originated in participles in *-at* but it is only these Latin participles which are present in my material, (e.g. *allegate*, *apostate*, *sophisticat*). All of them are in adjectival use. The one notable exception is the verb *translate* (ME3) - which is not an *-ate* verb anyway.

The OED and Marchand are thus probably perfectly right in locating the emergence of ATE as a quasi-derivational element only in the 16th century. It might, however, be interesting to look at the participles in *-at* occurring in Middle English and compare them with abstract nouns in ATION. If there is widespread alternation, this might, in fact, have contributed to the rise of ATE as a proper "adaptational termination with verbs" (Marchand 1969: 256).[5]

2.2 IZE

The Helsinki Corpus contains such few instances of verbs in IZE that a treatment of the form as a derivational suffix in Middle English is highly

questionable. There are only 9 tokens of such verbs, all of them in the last subperiod, ME3. The nine items belong to only two types, *baptise* and *chastise*. On a purely formal level *chastise* could be said to be based on the adjective *chaste*, but the semantic connection is not at all clear. It was not until later - probably the end of the 16th century - that IZE developed into a proper causative verbal suffix of the type 'to make A' (Marchand 1969:318-319).

Formally, IZE in Middle English is often indistinct from Old French *-ir-* loans with extended stems (cf. MED *-isen* and the discussion of ISH). In the case of OF *franchir* this has actually lead to the verb changing its paradigm. Instead of following the "regular" development OF *franchir* > **fraunchissen* > **franchish* (cf. *nourish, flourish, perish*) it has become *franchise*. One could speculate on the existence of phonological reasons (the avoidance of /t ʃ-ʃ/) but this shall not concern us here.

2.3 IFY

Of the Romance formatives, IFY is clearly the one with the highest incidence in the Middle English corpus so that its treatment as a Middle English suffix is probably justified. The table below presents the overall figures which exhibit the boost in ME3 common to most Romance suffixes, not only verbal ones.

(4)

	ME1	**ME2**	**ME3**	**all**
types	-	3	11	12
tokens	-	15	32	47

The morphological makeup of this total of 47 occurrences of IFY looks as follows:

(5)

base	**type**	**token**	**examples**
stem	7	13	*certify, magnify*
word	5	19	*signify, glorify*

The share of stem-based and noun-based formations is fairly balanced. Contrary to our expectations, the semantics of the morphologically transparent denominal formations is not always as clear as their morphology would warrant. The sense 'make/transform into N' can often be established only from a vague understanding of the semantics of "make" and on a fairly abstract level, as in *signify*.[6] In fact, the corpus contains only one denominal derivative where the reading 'make N' can be retrieved in a straightforward way: *scarefy* 'make small incisions (scars) in the skin'. It needs to be mentioned in this connection, though, that am quite deliberately ignoring the

tricky question as to what level the "transparency" of the said formations is to be located on. After all, the transparency judgements of bilingual French/Latin-English speakers would be different from those by monolingual speakers. But even with such a fuzzy concept of transparency it is still surprising that the stem-based derivatives contain more examples which are semantically transparent than the word-based ones. In several cases it would make sense to claim that they are actually derived from word-calss specific, adjectival, stems. The meaning 'make A' can be gleaned from *magnify* 'make big', *certify* 'make sure' *sacrefy* 'make holy' etc. As is obvious from the paraphrases, the problem is that the independent Middle English adjectives conveying the same meaning as the stems are morphologically totally unrelated. In fact, the corpus does not contain a single formation whose base is an independent adjective in its own right. This picture provided by the data thus calls into doubt the MED statement that "In late ME the suffix became productive, e.g. *clene-fi-en*". I am rather inclined to agree with Marchand (1969:300) who says that the number of deadjectival derivatives in Early Modern English - and Middle English - is very limited.

2.4 SIAN

The suffix SIAN is attested in Old English as deriving verbs from nouns and adjectives conveying the entire range of meanings which can be traced back to the paraphrase 'make x' exactly as with NEN (cf. Kastovsky forthcoming b: 175, and section 2.6 of this paper).

The ME1 section of the Helsinki Corpus contains 34 tokens representing 6 types (*bireowsian*, *clensian*, *gitsian*, *halsian*, *unrodsian*, *neosian*) of varying degrees of transparency. This global statement will suffice since in both ME2 and ME3 only *clensen* seems to have survived.

2.5 ISH

The string ISH is a noticeable verbal element in the Helsinki Corpus. The overall figures are as follows:

(6)

	ME1	**ME2**	**ME3**	**all**
types	-	5	15	17
tokens	-	19	36	55

The sequence <iss, ish, issch etc.> appears in the English versions of French verbs ending in *-ir*. As a matter of fact this goes to show that these verbs were borrowed into English, as it were, straight from the marketplace. Instead of appearing as equivalents of the French citation form or lexical

entry, the verbs in Middle English reflect actually occurring word-forms. In this case inflected forms which were formed on the extended stem in *-iss-*.

The term "stem" is also the key to the morphological make-up of these words within the context of Middle English. Table (7) splits the figures in terms of the morphological makeup of our data:

(7)

	ME1		ME2		ME3	
	type	**token**	**type**	**token**	**type**	**token**
N	-	-	1	2	2	3
A	-	-	1	8	1	11
sim/stem	-	-	3	9	11	22

Examples:

N	flourissen,	fynisschen
A	stablissen	
sim/stem	blemschen, dyffynysschen, norissen, punyschen	

As is obvious from the table, only a marginal number of loans is analysable as "word+ISH" on a Middle English basis. Quite a number of types simply are simplex lexical items (*cherishen*, *mynuschen*, *venquisshen* etc.). Even so, ISH seems to have given rise to a number of new formations which are mentioned by the MED: *famishen*, *publishen*, *amenishen*, *amonishen*. None of these, however, occurs in our material and none of them is itself word-based.

It is obvious that my semantic account, being based on such a small number of examples, has to be taken with a pinch of salt. In any case the analysable formations in ISH can be rendered with the paraphrase 'make X' which I have been using for other derived verbs. It is thus hoped that the discussion of the semantics of verbal derivatives in general will offer a more coherent account of the matter.

Summing up both the morphological and semantic evidence, it is doubtful whether ISH can be given the status of a verbal derivational suffix in Middle English.

2.6 NEN

In the case of verbal derivatives in NEN it is harder than usual to present reasonably reliable figures, simply because it is often difficult to decide whether a form should be classed as a NEN-verb or not. The policy adopted here is the following: accept all verbs derived from a base that had word- or stem-status in Old English, plus any verb derived from a base that has word-status in Middle English. This policy appears to provide us with sharper borders than there actually are: Firstly, not all derivatives from Old English are still transparent in Middle English (e.g. *listnen*, *herknen*). Secondly,

there is a number of simplex or zero-derived verbs whose phonological shape is very much like that of NEN-verbs (e.g. *bimurnen*, *crounen*) so that the two groups can hardly be said to be distinguishable on a purely Middle English basis. Thirdly, from ME2 onwards we find a considerable number of verbs from French exhibiting a stem-final /n/, so that their phonological shape makes them resemble NEN-derivatives (e.g. *examenen*, *susteynen*, *compounen* etc.). In any case, here are the figures for NEN-verbs compiled along the lines stated above:

(8)

	ME1	**ME2**	**ME3**	**all**
types	26	17	14	37
tokens	248	75	110	435

As can be gleaned from the first line in table (8), there is a considerable drop in numbers from ME1 to ME2. Quite a few of the old types seem to disappear from the language during the Early Middle English period (e.g. *rudnen*, *læcnien*, *fullhtnen*). The MED tends to have no attested examples after ca 1230. For the remainder of our period the figures above suggest that NEN led a stable tough not very lively existence. Marchand (1969:271) claims that at the end of the Middle English period new formations on adjectival bases spring up in greater number. If that was indeed the case, they have not left much of a trace in the HC material.

Historically speaking, NEN developed through a reanalysis. The suffix *-ian* (which originally is not even derivational) derived verbs from nouns. There must have been a considerable number of nouns whose stem ended in /n/ so that eventually this /n/ came to be reanalysed as part of the suffix. Such a development is by no means exceptional as can be seen from the emergence of the nominal suffix LING. If *-(n)ian* ever was exclusively denominal, by Old English times this had definitely been obscured and several formations could just as well be deadjectival (e.g. *(a)wakenen*, *fæstnen*). Eventually, it is the deadjectival type which becomes productive in English. Our material by itself, however, does not give conclusive evidence as can be seen from the table in (9).

The figures can be interpreted in two ways: either deadjectival derivation with NEN started to catch on only after the period covered here (which would mildly contradict Marchand 1969:271), or the incidence of these derived verbs is too small to leave a sizeable trace in a corpus of this size.

In actual fact a considerable part of what later came to be analysed as deadjectival derivatives in NEN were originally simply zero-derived deadjectival verbs with their inflectional endings marking them unequivocallly as belonging to the syntactic category verb.[7]

(9)

	ME1		ME2		ME3	
base	**type**	**token**	**type**	**token**	**type**	**token**
N	13	184	11	46	6	67
A	4	35	4	15	5	25
stem	6	16	-	-	1	9
sim	3	13	2	14	2	9

Examples:

N	christnen, toknen, willnen, namnen,tabournen
A	darknen, lightnen, liknen, fæstnen, wakenen
stem	glistnen, olhnen, fulcnen
sim	herknen, listnen, iahnien

Let me now turn to the issue of the transparency of NEN-formations. There is a certain residue from Old English which has become totally (*listnen*, *herknen*) or partially (*bisocnen*, *drohtnen*, *droupnin*, *fulcnen*, *olhnen*) opaque. But there are enough transparent denominal derivatives (*willnen*, *toknen* etc.) to warrant even a hybrid formation: *tabournyng* 'play the drums' (ME2). This word appears in context with *pipyng*, *trumpyng* and we might ask why it does not surface as **tabour-en*. I would suggest some kind of phonological motivation like a preference for certain consonants in the syllable onsets of suffixes. Apart from this one hybrid formation there are other 'new' denominal types: *hap-nen*, *threat-nen*, *christ-nen* (replacing the opaque *fulcnen*/*fulhtnen*). Among the deadjectival formations there are also some Middle English newcomers: *light-nen*, *quick-nen*, *lik-nen*. All three cases are remodellings of the inherited Old English verbs (*light-en*, *lik-en*, *quick-en*) which would have become identical with the adjective upon the loss of the infinitive marker (cf. footnote 7).

As to their semantics, formations in NEN can in general be paraphrased as 'make X'. There is, however, a great difference between denominal and deadjectival derivatives. Derivatives from adjectives can all be read straightforwardly as 'make A': *awakenen* = 'make awake', *quickenen* = 'make alive' etc. and it makes sense to assume that this semantic straightforwardness contributed to the ensuing productivity of this derivational type. In the case of denominal derivatives the 'make X' connection is much more tenuous and abstract. It can best be spelled out as 'exercise activity connected with N' such as *wilnen*, *hapnen*, *threatnen*.

3. Semantics of verbal suffixes

In the follwing I shall present the outline of a descriptive model which aims at combining morphological and semantic information as presented in 2.1-2.6 above into an integrated whole. The assumption underlying this

model is that word-formation patterns are a combination of a formal morphological process (i.e. the suffix + its attachment to the base) and a semantic function. The relationship between the two levels is not always biunique. On the contrary, biunique relationships between forms and meanings are an exception rather than the rule. This has led some theorists, notably Beard (1981), to postulate a strict separation between the two levels (into affixation and derivation). Without embracing Beard's theoretical position on the separation of affixation and derivation, I wholeheartedly agree with his plea for a synthesis in the description of word-formation "which is enlightening and liberating" (1981:176). In the following I will present a tentative way to achieve this.

The forms involved in verbal derivation in Middle English have already been presented. What we still need are some broad semantic categories in which verbal derivation can be said to operate. From those we shall pick the ones which are carried out by suffixes (i.e. we shall exclude zero and prefixes).

The index of principal sense-groups in Marchand's *Categories and Types* (1969:516-522) is useful for obtaining a first idea of what it is we are talking about, even though it is not systematic and includes categories of vastly different status. The index contains 15 verbal categories altogether. Only three of these categories have suffixal exponents (mostly as an alternative to zero and prefixal exponents). They are given as 1.-3. in (10). Sense group number four has been added by me to account for examples like *glorify,* which Marchand would apparently class as indicating a 'change of state'. Information in square brackets has also been added by me:

(10)

1. act as-	*-ize* [=stative?]
2. change of state	*be-, en-, trans-, -en, -ify, -ize,* zero
3. treat with	*-ate, -ize,* zero
4. ornative/provide with	*be-* zero [*-ify*]

For our Middle English material we have no need for two of the sense groups above, namely 'act as-' and 'treat with'. It would seem to me that they appear in the language at a later stage but this may also be due to the register they most often occur in, namely scientific writing. This leaves us with exactly two verbal sense groups realized by means of suffixes in Middle English: namely 2. and 4. In the interest of a consistent and compact terminology I would like to rename 'change of state' into causative, thus leaving us with the functions causative and ornative for verbal suffixes in Middle English so far.

Of course giving consistent names to derivational categories is not equal to setting up a consistent model of Middle English verbal derivation, far from it and the present paper is not anywhere near that goal. The fault is not

entirely mine since there are not many coherent treatments of English verbal derivation around which could serve as a starting point. One which I know of,[8] can be found in Szymanek's "List of some major categories" (1988:180-181). His account is part of the appendix of his book and does not include a discussion of the categories involved. Even so, Szymanek's account seems plausible enough for our present purpose. Altogether, he establishes seven different categories for verbal derivation in English (and Polish); in five of them CAUSATION is one of the cognitive concepts involved. Figure (11) presents Szymanek's categories. Column one contains the derivational category, column two the underlying cognitive concept(s), column three a paraphrase and a few Modern English examples.

(11)

Stative	STATE	'be A/N' doctor-0, slack-0
Inchoative	PROCESS	'come about to be A/N' faint-0, darken
Causative	CAUSATION	'cause to be A/N' free-0,purify,activate
Reversative	C+NEGATION	'cause to be, not A/V-ed' demoralize,unfasten
Ornative	C+POSSESSION	'cause to have N, provide with N' label-0,aromatize,
Privative	C+NEG+POSS	'cause not to have, deprive of N' deflea, unmask
Ablative	C+MOVEMENT+PLACE+PATH	'put out of N' derail, dislodge

Apparently, the concept of NEGATION and the concepts involved in the Ablative verbs are taken care of by prefixes only. On closer examination we realize that the categories we need for the description of the Middle English data are Causative and Ornative, and possibly Inchoative.

Looking at our material it turns out that for a description of the HC material, Inchoative is of marginal importance only: there is only the verb *bolnen* 'to come out in boils, to swell up'(ME3) which can profitably be explained that way. On the other hand, we shall probably have to make an ad hoc addition. In particular with NEN-derivatives we have a number of formations that can neither be interpreted as Causative nor as Ornative, e.g *willnen* 'to will, want', *lustnen* 'to feel like doing sth.' We could claim that these words were lexicalized in Old English. The only problem then is the existence of the new (and hybrid!) *tabournen*. Therefore I would like to

introduce an additional category covering verbs expressing the 'carrying out the activity typically connected with N' and call it Performative. We have here a case potentially parallel to the category of transpositional adjectives. These are commonly characterised by the fact that no new meaning is generated in the derivative apart from syntactic category change. It might, therefore, make sense to establish a parallel category of transpositional verbs.[9]

Figure (12) below gives a graphic representation of the correspondences between forms and functions as they appear in the HC material. I have attempted two quasi synchronic cross sections for Early ME (12a) and Late ME (12b) in order to make visible any reshuffles in this subsystem of word-formation.

(12) Semantic functions of verbal suffixes

a. Early Middle English (ME1)		b. Late Middle English (ME3)	
Causative		Causative	NEN
Ornative	NEN	Ornative	IFY
Inchoative	SIAN	Inchoative	ISH
Performative		Performative	

It is obvious that very little happens, not least because there are very few items something can happen to. In fact, NEN is the only stable factor throughout the Middle English period as SIAN has disappeared by the end of ME1. During ME2, IFY makes a tentative appearance but types and tokens are much too few to seriously include it into a 'derivational system'; the same is true of ISH. This in fact means that during ME2 we have only one suffix deriving verbs, namely NEN (plus, of course, zero-derivation and possibly prefixal derivation). Without doubt this is a state of affairs which favoured the sprouting of alternatives, although none of them (with the possible exception of IFY) seems to really catch on during the Middle English period.

Notes

*Thanks are due to the Hans Pinsker Fund for funding assistance.

[1]In the case of derived nouns and adjectives a similarly restricted view provides a far more complete picture of the respective areas. There, the derivation by way of suffixation plays a much more dominant role.

[2]For a comprehensive treatment see Hiltunen (1983); and also Zbierska-Sawala (1991) for an interesting semantic account.

[3]Publications on the Helsinki Corpus of Engish Texts are among others: Kytö/Rissanen 1988, Kytö 1991.

[4]The said handbooks are: MED, Fisiak 1968, Brunner 1967., Kastovsky in press.

[5]An extensive treatment of English verbs derived from Latin past participles is Reuter (1934).

[6]From a Modern English point of view it may appear doubtful to class *glorify* as denominal. The following selection of contexts will, I hope, corroborate my analysis:

...for Jhesus hwas not ȝit glorified..(Wycliff New T.:18)

If Y glorifie my silf, my glorie is nouȝt (Wycliff New T.:22)

[7]In saying "inflectional endings" I am not being precise enough: in fact the entire development seems to be tied up with the fate of the infinitival ending *-en*. This would point to the fact that this reanalysis took place at the lexical rather than the performance level. After all **some** inflected word forms are still around even today. It thus seems plausible to assume that the loss of *-en* was blocked in cases like *darknen, lightnen* because it would have left a completely unmarked infinitive form identical with the adjective.

[8]Clark & Clark (1979) treat Modern English noun-to-verb conversion.

[9]It might be interesting to have a closer look at these "transpositional verbs" in the light of Post`s prototype approach to the semantics of denominal (transpositional) adjectives of the type *musical, industrial* etc. (Post 1986).

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Brown and Levinson's Legacy of Politeness

A. J. Meier

0. Introduction

Brown and Levinson's (1987) theory of politeness and its concomitant concepts have become the mainstay of theoretical offerings in much research concerning so-called speech acts (e.g., requests, complaints, apologies). As valuable as this work may be, however, indiscriminate and uncritical employment of their concepts has resulted in confusion and inconsistencies which have hindered rather than helped further an understanding of the speech phenomena in question while running the risk of perpetuating "lingua-centricity" and national stereotypes.

It is time, I believe, to locate and tease out some of the tangles which have embedded themselves in recent work on politeness. The purpose of this paper is to do just that by taking a critical look at Brown and Levinson's theory and some of its repercussions in subsequent work, especially in the area of apologies. The conclusion is reached that Brown and Levinson's concepts are both too undifferentiated and limited to be useful beyond the scope of their own theorizing. I will argue that a preferable approach - incorporating the notion of interactional speech (Aston 1988)[1] within a more comprehensive framework of social interaction - is one which broadens the view of politeness, placing it at a superordinate level where it may be roughly defined as acting appropriately in relation to a set of social norms (cf. Zimin 1981). Such a view forces us to reject any equating of "politeness phenomena" with specific speech acts, lexical items or syntactic constructions, thus rendering the term "politeness phenomena" itself void. Any speech phenomenon, regardless of function, has the potential of being appropriate or not (i.e., polite or impolite) relative to a particular context. Furthermore, the appropriateness may also pertain to the occurrence or non-occurrence of a communicative act (e.g., a compliment or apology) rather than be restricted to the way in which an act is carried out as it is in Brown and Levinson.

1. Politeness à la Brown and Levinson

Brown and Levinson's (1987) theory of politeness consists of three basic notions: face, face-threatening acts (FTAs) and politeness strategies.

1.1. Face

An individual's face consists of two "wants": freedom to act without being impeded by others, termed "negative face"[2], and the desire that others approve of or value one's wants (material and non-material), termed "positive face". This distinction, however, entails a sufficient amount of vagueness as to render it problematic, as we will see below (2.1.).

1.2. Face-Threatening Acts

Either or both of these face aspects can be threatened by certain inherently face-threatening acts (FTAs), which Brown and Levinson identify both in terms of which face want is threatened and whose face, Speaker's (S's) or Hearer's (H's), is at stake. Acts that are determined by Brown and Levinson as constituting a threat to H's negative face include requests, orders, promises and compliments. Criticism, disagreement and misidentification are classified as threats to H's positive face. S's negative face is threatened by S's expressing or accepting thanks and making excuses, while apologies, admissions of guilt, responsibility or ignorance threaten S's positive face. Finally, complaints, threats and interruptions are cited as examples of FTAs that pose a threat to both positive and negative face (presumably H's).[3]

Although Brown and Levinson provide brief explanations to indicate the basis for their classifications, these often raise more questions than can be answered within the scope of their work.

The "weightiness" of a FTA (i.e., its risk to H's face) is calculated by combining the social variables of distance, power and rank of imposition (p. 76), and influences the choice of politeness strategy in performing a FTA. Brown and Levinson's perceived role of these variables, however, has also been challenged (see 2.1.).

1.3. Politeness strategies

The undesirable state of threatened face engendered by a FTA brings politeness onto the scene in the form of so-called positive and negative politeness strategies,[4] which are ways of performing a primary (face-threatening) act and as such are accorded only a supporting role in relation to the FTA by serving to redress or mitigate the threat to H's face.

Positive politeness strategies are addressed to H's positive face wants and described as expressions of solidarity, intimacy, informality and familiarity. Some examples are the use of in-group identity markers, promising, exaggerating interest in H and avoiding disagreement.

Negative strategies conversely are addressed to H's negative face and are characterized as expressions of restraint, formality and distancing. They are furthermore viewed as more face redressive, i.e., more polite, than positive strategies, a point which also calls for further comment below (1.4.). Being conventionally indirect, minimizing an imposition, giving deference, apologizing, impersonalizing and nominalizing are all cited as negative politeness strategies.

These politeness strategies can address any aspect of a FTA, the latter not conceived of as being confined to one category.

It is at this point that we see S's face mysteriously fade away as Brown and Levinson proceed to focus solely on H's face. S's face "adieu"! This neglect of S's face has had serious consequences for work on apologies, for example, as I will show below (2.5.2.).

1.3.1. Politeness Markers

In addition to enumerating both positive and negative politeness strategies, Brown and Levinson also identify certain syntactic, lexical, prosodic, and pragmatic features or "markers" of politeness which seem to either be "sub"-means of effecting a strategy or have strategy status.

Passive and dative constructions, for example, are claimed to effect the strategy of impersonalizing; "degrees of nouniness" (p. 208), due to the alleged formality of nominalized forms in English, are viewed as running hand in hand with degrees of negative politeness and constitute their own strategy. Contraction and ellipsis, on the other hand, are viewed as markers of informality, thus serving positive politeness ends. The two latter markers are also claimed to have the power to change conventional indirectness (a negative politeness strategy) into positive politeness. Tense manipulations are also cited as potential positive strategy realizations or, conversely, as distancing devices (e.g., moving towards or away from the here and now).

Lexical items which are markers of positive politeness include intensifying modifiers, address forms (e.g., *honey*, *guys*) and slang terms. Address forms are further characterized as "direct" markers which can occur "equally with markers of positive and negative politeness" (p. 18). Qualifying as negative politeness markers are hedges (e.g., *sort of*), which soften presumptions inherent in a "positive politeness opinion" (p. 230), and *just*, which minimizes imposition.

Prosodic markers are also cited as a way to carry out the positive politeness strategy of exaggerating interest in H.

On the pragmatic front, we find irony interpreted as positive politeness (p. 28). Indirect speech acts assume a major role as "the most significant form of conventional indirectness" (p. 132), a negative politeness strategy,

and are gradable, i.e., some are claimed to be more polite than others. They are additionally viewed as functioning as hedges. In fact, according to Brown and Levinson, politeness provides the major motivation for being indirect.

Brown and Levinson interestingly state, however, that "politeness is *implicated* by the semantic structure of the whole utterance, not communicated by 'markers' or 'mitigators' in a simple signalling fashion which can be quantified" (p. 22). We thus seem to be confronted with politeness strategies and/or markers of different status: some are independent strategies (e.g., avoid disagreement), other markers occur freely within other markers (e.g., address forms). Some are countable (e.g., intensifiers), some gradable (e.g., nominalization), and others are capable of changing a negative into a positive politeness strategy (e.g., contraction). However, none, in effect, are claimed to communicate politeness in and of themselves. This is indeed a confusing state of affairs, which Ide (1989) ascribes to an admixture of behavior strategies (e.g., give deference) and linguistic strategies (e.g., nominalize).

1.4. Degrees of politeness

Brown and Levinson view not only certain markers as gradable but also politeness in general, claiming that one type of politeness (negative) is more polite than the other (positive). They also allow for the possibility of being "too polite" (p. 230) to the point of being insulting, though it is unclear whether "too polite" refers to negative strategy use, positive strategy use or a sum of the two.

A difference in degree of use of the two types of politeness also seems to be responsible for a potential source of misunderstanding between cultures. They even speak of positive-politeness and negative-politeness cultures, with the former being related to familiarity, the latter to formality (p. 230), and contact between the two resulting in perceptions of over-familiarity, and presumably over-formality. How these cultural labels and "over-familiar" or "over-formal" are to be calculated, however, is not at all clear.

1.5. Universality

While recognizing a relativity among cultures, Brown and Levinson do, however, make a claim for universality of face to the extent that the two face wants are present in everyone, as is a mutual knowledge of face, a social pressure to attend to it (p. 62), and principles governing the realization of indirect speech acts (p. 138). What counts as a face threat and to whom, in addition to different strategy preferences, however, are left open to cultural variation.

2. Problems in application

The following section will take a closer look at some confusing aspects of the above theory and their manifestations in subsequent treatments of politeness. I will draw heavily on apology studies[5] as an example of a speech phenomenon whose analysis under Brown and Levinson's theory leaves much to be desired.

Two basic aspects are responsible, I believe, for inconsistencies across speech act studies concerned with so-called politeness phenomena. One involves the dichotomy depicted between positive and negative face and their associated strategies. The other lies in the very concept of politeness itself, i.e., in a lack of clarity regarding its status and in its restricted role as a secondary event which is H-focussed.

2.1. Face, FTAs and strategies

Let us first consider the lack of differentiation between positive and negative face wants and their redress. Brown and Levinson provide a general depiction of giving face to H as indicating that "no such face threat is intended or desired, and that S in general recognizes H's face wants and himself wants them to be achieved" (p. 70). Negative face wants then can be subsumed under positive politeness, for if positive face involves desiring others to want or respect what I want and one of my wants is to be unimpeded (negative face), then this also logically falls under positive face, and analogously any threat to negative face is also a threat to positive face. The politeness strategies, too, lose their differentiation as positive or negative strategies when these are defined on the basis of which face want is attended to as Brown and Levinson do.

The differentiation between positive and negative face is not as clean then as Brown and Levinson's presentation might lead us to believe, and this lack of clarity ineluctably carries over to the specifications of FTAs and redressive strategies.

First, it is not at all always clear whether an "act" qualifies as a FTA or as a politeness strategy and, if the latter is the case, whether it is a negative or positive strategy. Requests and compliments, for example, are both considered to be FTAs by Brown and Levinson. Such an assignment, however, can be argued to be dependent on context and interpretation, as one could well imagine a situation where a request, for example, is a sign of solidarity (Widdowson 1984:112); the same is true of compliments. This would qualify them both for positive politeness status rather than FTA status. In fact, despite Brown and Levinson's view of compliments as FTAs, they are widely viewed, following Wolfson (1983), as an attempt "to create

or maintain rapport with the addressee by expressing admiration or approval" (p. 86). This is virtually identical to the definition of positive politeness. If Brown and Levinson assign compliments to FTAs threatening H's negative face, they could not be positive politeness strategies, or, if they could be both then such a distinction becomes meaningless. This is also the case with promising, which Brown and Levinson cite both as a FTA in regard to H's face and as a positive politeness strategy.

Apologies have a somewhat different dual status for Brown and Levinson, being classified as both a FTA as regards S's positive face (though this is virtually ignored) and a negative politeness strategy as regards H's face. However, if I say *forgive me* or *excuse me*, could this also not be interpreted as a request for exoneration? If such expressions are requests, then according to Brown and Levinson they must also constitute threats to H's negative face. Now, we may grant that apologies simultaneously threaten both S's and H's face, but the latter is in conflict with the classification of apologies as politeness strategies (i.e., mitigators of FTAs). This seems to leave us then with a framework where something can be everything.

This problem also presents itself in regard to Brown and Levinson's strategy typology. The imprecision in distinguishing between positive and negative politeness strategies is mirrored by McLaughlin et al. (1983) in their description of negative politeness strategies as assuring H of "the actor's [S's] regard for his/her freedom" (p. 211). Assuring H of S's regard can again be assigned to positive politeness, freedom simply being one of the things which H wants to have regarded in accordance with her wishes.

One can surmise that it is also this lack of differentiation between strategy types that leads Ide (1990) to conclude in regard to the Japanese feminine particle *wa*, that negative and positive politeness strategies "are two sides of the same coin" (p. 76).

Baxter's (1984) study of requestive behavior provides further evidence for the murkiness of the distinction between strategies and seriously challenges the "representational validity" of Brown and Levinson's strategy typology as measured by respondents' perceptions of "message tactics" (p. 440) selected to operationalize the strategies in given contexts. She found functional overlap regarding not only the two strategy types but also regarding status as a FTA or strategy. On the basis of the overlap exhibited, Baxter even suggests that "positive politeness presupposes negative politeness" (p. 451), a very different conclusion than suggested above (2.1.).

Baxter (ibid.) additionally found that Brown and Levinson's predictions regarding the social variables of social distance and rank of imposition as determinants of politeness were not borne out: rank of imposition exerted

little influence in her study, and a closer relationship between interlocutors resulted in greater rather than less politeness.

Brown and Levinson (1987) readily admit that operationalizing their notions is problematic, but this cannot be so easily shrugged off by saying that their strategies "were never intended as an exhaustive taxonomy" and "do not necessarily provide sensible categories for quantitative research" (p. 21). If this is so and if the strategies are only an "open-ended set of procedures for message construction" (p. 21), their value for empirical studies is substantially reduced.

Let us now take a look at some studies employing Brown and Levinson's framework. In their attempt to relate account types[6] and contextual factors, McLaughlin et al. (1983) use Brown and Levinson's FTA and strategy assignments to classify the account types of concessions (e.g., apologies; offers of restitution) and excuses. While characterizing excuses as positive politeness strategies, as Brown and Levinson do, their explication of the way in which excuses offend S's negative face, differs from Brown and Levinson's. Unfortunately both reasonings for this classification are equally unsatisfactory.

Justifications, which are not specifically addressed in Brown and Levinson, are viewed by McLaughlin et al. (ibid.) as threats to H's face. From this we can conclude that they are not politeness strategies. Although justifications might conceivably be viewed as saving S's face (see e.g., Tetlock 1985), this is not considered, just as redress of S's face is not pursued in Brown and Levinson. McLaughlin et al. found that face-saving roles were not, in fact, predictors of account strategy selection.

Others that to varying degrees "pledge allegiance" to Brown and Levinson also stray a bit from the original, making loose use of their concepts. Leech (1983), for example, claims to derive his notions of negative and positive face and politeness from Brown and Levinson (ibid. p. 102, Fn 1), but by extending the notion of inherently impolite to inherently polite illocutions, Leech gives politeness a rather different twist. Negative politeness is defined as "minimizing the impoliteness of impolite illocutions" and positive politeness as "maximizing the politeness of polite illocutions" (p. 84). Later (p. 133) he characterizes negative politeness as avoiding discord and positive politeness as seeking concord. Leech further chooses to focus on the latter and ascribes to positive politeness Searle's category of expressives, which includes apologies. Hence, apologies emerge as positive politeness strategies rather than negative ones as in Brown and Levinson. The idea of inherently polite and impolite speech acts still persists, however, as we can witness in Haverkate (1988).

Even Brown and Levinson's (1987) view of apologies (in the narrow sense) as constituting a threat to S's positive face is disregarded by House (1989), who does not view apologies as involving a loss of face for S at all, because they are "the expected social norm" (p. 311).

Holmes (1990) cites Brown and Levinson in classifying apologies as negative politeness strategies, but seems to deviate from them by assigning excuses, justifications and explanations to the same apology category (p. 167).[7] For Brown and Levinson, excuses pose a threat to S's negative face, justifications are not dealt with at all and explanations are positive strategies. However, what is unclear is how an explanation, excuse and justification are to be differentiated or in the case of Holmes, how they qualify for assignment to the same category. Holmes also finds apologies and compliments alike in that both function to maintain H's face. In the case of compliments it is H's positive face which is attended to, and in the case of apologies, either negative or positive face is redressed, depending on which face a previous FTA threatened. As we have seen, this is not in line with Brown and Levinson's concept of the same phenomena (see 1.3.).

Olshtain and Blum-Kulka (1985), while also claiming adherence to Brown and Levinson, exhibit several interesting variations on the latters' "theme". They concur that apologies are "hearer-supportive acts which threaten the speaker's face" (p. 306), and differentiate between positively- and negatively-oriented apologies (cf. Schmidt and Richards 1980:139), not, however, according to whether negative or positive face was previously threatened (as in Holmes 1990), but in regard to the content of the apology itself. A positively-oriented apology, according to Olshtain and Blum-Kulka, manifests itself in minimizing the level of offense and placing responsibility on factors other than S. A negatively-oriented approach manifests itself in S's taking on greater blame, accepting responsibility, and using more elaboration and intensifiers. Although the authors profess to be employing Brown and Levinson's concepts, we find that the latter include minimizing the imposition under negative politeness strategies, and intensifying modifiers are assigned to positive politeness. Olshtain and Blum-Kulka, however, deviate in including minimizing the imposition under a positive-oriented tendency for apologizing while intensifiers fall under negative politeness.

Comparability between studies employing different interpretations of core concepts is necessarily weak; additionally, the results of even one study may lose their credibility unless some basis is provided for the classification employed therein.

2.2 Strategy use and cross cultural comparisons

What is more unsettling, perhaps, than the unfounded classification above is that Olshtain and Blum-Kulka (1985) account for a society's predominant use of apology strategy type, identified according to their definition of positive or negative orientation, on the basis of whether the society in question minimizes or maximizes the value it places on social distance and private space. They determine, for example, an American English preference for indirect negative oriented strategies and ascribe this to the high value Americans place on private space (ibid. p. 308, 309).

Very questionable here is the arbitrary decision that "societies which tend to minimize social distance will show a preference for positive politeness strategies, while societies that place a high value on respect for private space will show preference for negative politeness" (p. 309) and the equally arbitrary decision that American society values respect for private space and that Israeli culture tends to minimize social distance. These may or may not be true assertions, but such sweeping assumptions are far from acceptable. Furthermore, the authors seem to assume an incompatibility between minimization of social distance and respect for private space, an assumption of likewise dubious nature.

Others too have attempted to characterize cultures according to positive or negative politeness tendencies with results often portraying a different image. Garcia (1989), for example, in seeming agreement with Olshtain and Blum-Kulka (see above), indicates an American preference for deference politeness compared to a Venezuelan preference for the expression of solidarity, i.e. positive politeness. Scollon and Scollon (1983), on the other hand, claim that while the British have a "deference politeness society" (emphasizing distance and analogous to negative politeness), Americans have a "solidarity politeness society" (emphasizing common ground and analogous to positive politeness) (p. 176). Richards (1981), in contrasting Japanese culture and North American culture, concurs with Scollon and Scollon's (ibid.) view of North American culture. Brown and Levinson (1987: 251) likewise expect positive politeness from Americans.

Wierzbicka (1985), in comparing Anglo-Saxon culture and Polish culture, finds that the former value distance (negative politeness) and that the latter find distancing offensive. Blum-Kulka (1987) classifies both Japan and England as negative politeness oriented societies and Israel as a solidarity politeness oriented society.

The lack of agreement here is closely related to similar divergent claims based on directness.

2.2.1. Directness

The issue of directness warrants separate attention in considering cultural relativity regarding politeness given the connection often claimed between directness and politeness, i.e., that indirectness increases politeness (e.g., Leech 1983:108) or that politeness is the motivation for indirectness (1.3.1.). We might note here that Leech concerns himself with positive politeness and thus what indirectness increases is positive politeness, whereas for Brown and Levinson indirectness is a negative politeness strategy. Cultures have been compared, however, in line with Brown and Levinson, and we are again in muddy waters concerning these distinctions.

Tannen (1981), for example, views Americans as more indirect than Greeks, which, in Brown and Levinson's terms, would indicate an American preference for negative politeness. Both Sifianou (1991) and Pavlidou (1991) view Greek society as a positive politeness society (related to directness) in contrast to British and German societies respectively. Blum-Kulka (1982, 1983) also found Hebrew speakers to be more direct than Americans. Blum-Kulka and House (1989) found Argentineans to be even more direct than Hebrew speakers while Australians were the most indirect. Trosborg (1987) found that her British English subjects used virtually the same amount of direct apologies (as opposed to indirect apologies such as excuses) as did her Danish subjects. House and Kasper (1981), in their investigation of directness levels in complaints and requests in German and British English, found that the German speakers generally used higher levels of directness.

What these differing perceptions point to is that a particular culture's characterization in terms of positive vs. negative politeness society cannot be viewed as absolute, but is dependent on the cultures being compared as well as on the particular communicative act, e.g., whether it be interactional or transactional, more conventionalized or less conventionalized.

It is problematic to determine exactly what criteria one should employ in ascertaining cultures' orientations. Functional equivalence will not automatically follow from formal equivalence, especially cross-culturally. House and Kasper (1981) pose a crucial question in this regard: if Germans use higher directness levels[8] than do the British, does this mean that Germans are not as polite as the British? Blum-Kulka et al. (1989) see a need to answer this empirically, testing whether "similar choices of directness levels, for example, carry culturally differentiated meanings for members of different cultures" (p. 24).

House and Kasper answered their question above in the negative, albeit not as unequivocally as Thomas (1983), who declares an affirmative answer

to be fatuous, pointing out that "we are not dealing with moral or spiritual qualities, only with the linguistic encoding of certain attitudes and values" (p. 106). It is unfortunately the former which is reflected by the following: "German speakers display *more aggressive* verbal behavior in socially delicate situations" (House and Kasper 1981:177) [emphasis added]. Likewise, Tanaka and Kawade (1982) seem to posit two different types of society, polite and impolite, and claim that explicit performatives or a bare imperative are "normally awkward" in "polite societies" (p. 18).

However, Wierzbicka (1985), in comparing Polish and English directives, points out that a bare imperative is generally perceived in Polish as appropriate inoffensive directive behavior, constituting "one of the softer options in issuing directives" (p. 154), while in English it is offensive. In terms of Tanaka and Kawade's (1982) assessment, Polish society would assumedly be dubbed as impolite. Additionally, in Polish interrogative directives convey increased formality.

Why then do we call imperatives direct if they are not perceived as such in Polish? Is this a reflection of an Anglophone ethnocentricity that Wierzbicka finds present in much work on speech acts or can one argue that a directness scale can be established on the basis of illocutionary transparency (see Blum-Kulka 1987; Kapser 1989) or illocutionary opacity (see Weizman 1989)? Wierzbicka's example might lead to the argument that what is transparent, due to convention, in one language community, may not be in another.

And, what do we do if we maintain that indirectness implicates politeness in the case of *I apologize*, which, containing a performative verb, is unambiguous, therefore direct and must be dubbed non-polite(?), impolite(?), informal(?). All of these are intuitively untenable. This is further complicated by classifications such as Trosborg's (1987), in which she perceives excuses as being indirect apologies. But, what makes them indirect? If we claim that an excuse is an indirect way of apologizing, then this in turn assumes that both have the same function and that in one case, the illocutionary force is obvious and unambiguous and in the other case it is not. Do they actually have the same function, and if so, at what level? Could one not, along the same lines, also distinguish between direct and indirect excuses? We are left with a very dubious basis on which to label and compare cultures.

The previous examples might lead one to doubt the linear correlation between indirectness and politeness as it has been perceived, and in fact, it has increasingly been called into question (House 1986 cited in Blum-Kulka and House 1989; Blum-Kulka 1987; and Held 1990). It appears that at least some confusion with directness and its measurement can be ascribed to the

terms "directness" and "indirectness" being used as both formal and functional labels. This can be nothing but problematic if form is not in a one-to-one correspondence with function, which it is not, neither within one language nor across languages. The difficulty of operationalizing directness and indirectness leads me to concur with Wierzbicka (1985:175) in pronouncing the terms to be ill-advised in cross-cultural studies.

I would hasten to add as well that value-judgement labels such as *aggressive verbal behavior* which ignore the meaning of structures in context, perpetuate cross-cultural stereotypes rather than contribute to an understanding of how and why they came into being. Only a pursuit of the latter can lead to a more informed understanding of cross-cultural miscommunication.

2.3. Gradability

The notion that politeness is gradable has prevailed following Brown and Levinson: Leech (1983:110) refers to increasing positive politeness; Holmes (1990:196) views more elaborated apologies to be more polite and quantity and type of strategy to affect an apology's politeness (p. 177); Baxter (1984) and Ide (1990), among a plethora of others, speak of women as being more polite than men.

Baxter (1984) does question Brown and Levinson's politeness hierarchy but only in so far as suggesting that positive politeness be accorded higher status than negative politeness.

This leads us back to the view of politeness itself, i.e. what is it? It is time to specifically address this question.

2.4. Where does politeness lie?

As we have seen, within Brown and Levinson's theory, politeness is portrayed as gradable information - running parallel to an utterance's primary illocutionary force -which conveys that no face threat is intended. Politeness is somehow implicated by an utterance's overall semantic structure, which seems to be a composite of various politeness "carriers" of two types, having different powers and character. The distinction and relationship between the types, however, are obscure, leading to differences of definitions (and presumably taxonomies) from one study to the next, making comparisons tentative at best, especially in regard to quantitative studies.

2.4.1. Deference and politeness

The interplay between deference and politeness is an apt example with which to approach the core of the problem, as the notion of politeness has

gotten confused along the way with deference, though not always in the same way.

Brown and Levinson claim to derive their notion of face from Goffman (1967), who identifies two forms of deference[9] which attend to H's face, namely avoidance ritual and presentational ritual, analogous to negative and positive e politeness respectively. What began then with Goffman as deference transformed itself into politeness in Brown and Levinson, where deference does appear but with a different "lower level" status as one of the strategies of negative politeness. Despite this classification, however, Brown and Levinson additionally claim that there are two sides to the realization of deference, namely, one which corresponds to negative politeness (S humbles herself) and one which corresponds to positive politeness (S raises H)! Again, waters between the two types are very muddy.

Deference assumes a higher status for both Scollon and Scollon (1983) and Blum-Kulka and House (1989), who characterize all negative strategies as deference. Scollon and Scollon actually substitute the term "deference" for Brown and Levinson's "negative politeness". Blum-Kulka et al. (1989:7) even seem to equate deference and politeness, presumably on the grounds that "in the Western world, politeness is usually associated with negative or deference strategies" (Blum-Kulka and House 1989:138).

Confusion regarding deference and politeness is further complicated when we turn to Hill et al. (1986) and Ide (1989, 1990), where we find the introduction of yet another concept, namely, discernment or "wakimae", which is defined as "conforming to the expected norm" (Hill et al. 1986:348) and depicted as automatic behavior which allows the speaker relatively little active choice. It is interestingly claimed to be "the passive use of the strategy of 'giving deference' in Brown and Levinson's framework" (Ide 1990:65). The inception of this concept was motivated by what was felt to be limitations of previous politeness theories to deal with the importance of this factor of politeness in Japanese.

Others (e.g., Zimin 1981; Fraser and Nolen 1981) have explicitly rejected equating deference with politeness, placing them on two different levels as it were. Politeness occupies the higher level of "doing what is socially acceptable" (Zimin 1981:41), which is served by deference, "a symbolic subordination of the speaker to the hearer" (Fraser, personal communication, cited in Zimin 1981:40). Identification as polite or impolite is a property of utterance rather than sentence in the sense of being context dependent. Following this view, certain address forms, for example, would not be more polite than others, but within a particular language would convey more deference. It is the appropriateness of deference relative to a particular context which would be at issue in politeness, not the address

forms themselves. Caution is again called for in cross-cultural comparisons, remembering that what constitutes this distancing device of deference in one language may not do so in another.

Leech's (1983) reference to "a degree of politeness appropriate to the situation" (p. 81), sounds very much like the above depiction of deference. It is only in this regard that politeness can be viewed as gradable, i.e., the amount of disparity between the phenomenon or a combination of phenomena uttered and its appropriacy in a given context.

Leech (ibid. p. 102, Fn 3) also speaks of overpoliteness and underpoliteness and claims that in a relative sense underpoliteness can establish a bond of familiarity (positive politeness within Brown and Levinson's framework). Thus it appears that a lack of politeness is a way in which to be polite, which is better expressed as a less distancing or deference being appropriate in some contexts.

Also crucial for politeness studies is a view broad enough to account for a wide range of data. In this respect, too, we find Brown and Levinson's framework too limited as we will see in the next section.

2.5. Limitations

Reference to the limitations of Brown and Levinson's view of politeness involves two aspects: first, its function as merely an accompanying antidote to a FTA, and second, its almost exclusive concern with H's face.[10] Apologies serve as a good example to illustrate these two aspects.

2.5.1. More Than a Supporting Role

If apologies are viewed as politeness strategies, as they are within Brown and Levinson's framework, and if politeness strategies are only accompaniments to FTAs, then we are neglecting a major occurrence of remedial work or apologies as retrospective to some previous FTA rather than a simultaneous or future FTA . Despite the fact that all empirical studies I am aware of have investigated retrospective rather than anticipatory remedial work, Brown and Levinson's notions have at least been given lip service as a theoretical basis on which to define and even classify apologies strategies; the incongruity between the context of data from which initial concepts arose and the type of data being examined has been largely ignored.

If apologies are not necessarily always parallel to some other act, their function as a politeness strategy must be reassessed. Rather than being an instrument for making some other communicative act polite, an apology may itself comprise the primary communicative intent. This would mean that the occurrence of an apology may not be deemed appropriate in a particular

context: an ill-placed apology can be just as offensive as the lack of one. This depends on the constellation of variables in a context and again points to politeness as appropriateness rather than as a list of strategies and markers parallel to another communicative act.

For the most part, especially in empirical investigations, Brown and Levinson's concepts of face and politeness have simply been accepted without question or qualification. The lack of fit and different interpretations that are found are most assuredly a partial product of using concepts designed for one phenomenon to explain another, dissimilar one.

2.5.2. Looking Beyond H's Face

The second limitation, i.e., almost exclusive concern with H's face, has repeated itself in much work on apologies, portraying apologies as redressive or supportive only in regard to H's face (e.g., Edmondson 1981; Olshtain and Blum-Kulka 1985; House 1989; Olshtain 1989). Although it is usually noted that apologies, as well as excuses (where the two are differentiated) also pose a threat to S's face, this latter function as a FTA is virtually ignored. However, if S's face is only involved as an object of threat, this neglect may be a blessing, for a focus on this would obscure even more the role of remedial work in redressing S's face, which has been noted by some (e.g., Holly 1979; Trosborg 1987; Aston 1988; Holmes 1990). This aspect, regrettably, is mentioned more as an aside - except for Holmes, who grants it greater importance, at least initially - and plays no crucial role in an explication or classification of politeness or remedial strategies. It is precisely the saving of S's face, however, that I believe can provide a crucial explanatory function for remedial work. Unfortunately, this has been largely ignored in linguistic studies - an artifact of Brown and Levinson's focus on H's face.

In summary, we can agree with Brown and Levinson in pronouncing their concepts problematic for quantitative studies.[11] This can be attributed to too limited a view of politeness and to core concepts that are too undifferentiated. In the following section I will attempt a preliminary sketch of a broader view of politeness, illustrating how remedial work and its strategies might be accounted for and identified within such a view.

3. An alternative approach

Zimin (1981) is representative of those, generally unheeded, who elevate politeness to a higher "cover term" status, describing it as "simply doing what is socially acceptable " (p. 41). She likewise unequivocally embraces the consequences of such a definition, namely that politeness can only be judged relative to a particular context and hearer and is thus a part of

utterance meaning rather than sentence meaning and as such is nonquantifiable. This leads to the main thesis of her paper, i.e., that it is a misnomer to label women as "more polite" than men. What she does view as quantifiable is deference (see 2.4.1.). Deference is thus allotted a lower level status and contributes to the higher level of politeness, which is realized by behaving appropriately relative to the social norms of a particular reference group. In the same vein, Weinreich (1986) describes politeness as the normal state within interaction, the polite person not evoking special notice. Politeness then becomes the unmarked state. It does not deserve special attention since it is the appropriate expected behavior. Adegbija (1989) depicts politeness as "a property associated with a communicative situation by virtue of which a person speaks or behaves in a way that is socially and culturally acceptable and pleasant to the hearer" (p. 58). Held (1989) and Hübler (1987), though not providing a definition of politeness, have also, within the scope of operationalizing the concept for empirical work, called for a similar broader definition of politeness which would seem to be answered by the above views.

Given the view of politeness which evolves here, it would make no sense to equate politeness with certain forms or speech acts. "Politeness phenomena" thus also loses its meaning as a cover term for the latter.

As regards universality, politeness is universal in the sense that every society has some sort of norms for appropriate behavior, though the norms themselves vary. This also allows for societies in which an individual's relative position within a group takes precedence over the individual, as is claimed for Japanese society (see e.g., Matsumoto 1988; Ide 1989). There are simply different norms and value hierarchies at work, but ones which nevertheless require adherence, whether this involves little or much active choice.

Additionally, it would not make sense to speak of one culture as being more polite than another, nor of one culture making more use of one type of politeness than another, because there would be no positive or negative types of politeness. There would only be different ways to be appropriate relative to a myriad of contextual factors. The folk notion of one culture being "more or less polite" than another can be ascribed to one language using linguistic constructions, for example, that are associated with a different context in another language community. Studies comparing language communities must consist of comparing linguistic behavior in similar contexts and assessing their respective perceptions as appropriate or not.

Impoliteness consists of not acting in a socially acceptable way, and this is why "overpoliteness" (*over* indicating an inappropriate degree) can be

impolite. In fact overpoliteness, within this view, would make more sense if one spoke in terms of deference, i.e. a certain degree of deference (e.g. too much) in a given situation could be socially inappropriate, and thus responsible for the folk-label "overpolite". Different deference devices in themselves, however, could not be labelled polite independent of context.

Apologies or remedial work (e.g., apologies, excuses, justifications, etc.) within this view, are not then viewed as politeness phenomena co-occurring with some other face-threatening act. They are rather an attempt to remedy any damage incurred to image upon a responsibility linkage between an actor and inappropriate behavior. Contrary to Brown and Levinson, I posit remedial work as a face-saving device as regards S (not H). Concern for H's face is only a by-product of the attempt to serve the intent of saving S's face. S's image, thus, becomes the central one. The intent of remedial work then is the repair of S's image.

We can proceed even further, identifying an underlying goal which this intent serves, namely the maintenance of social harmony. This is advantageous to group members and therefore those who contribute to it are accorded social value and consequently power. If individuals establish themselves as persons who act appropriately (i.e., who are polite), then others in the relevant group know what to expect from them and this makes them valuable since their behavior contributes to interactions which function smoothly, or in other words, to social harmony. Thus, maintaining one's image as a rule-follower relative to a particular group is very important.[12] Leech (1983) captures this idea in everyday terms: "unless you are polite to your neighbour,...you will no longer be able to borrow his mower" (p. 82). The goal underlying remedial work then is to maintain social harmony by seeking to reaffirm shared attitudes (which have been called into question) with H upon violation of a social norm by S. S undertakes to preserve her/his image as someone who can be counted on to act appropriately in the future relative to a particular reference group's expectations.

Remedial work is thus a case of "interactional speech", which Aston (1988) speaks of in terms of "the negotiation of shared attitudes with bringing about and manifesting of an affective convergence of participants' worlds" (p. 250). (Cf. also Widdowson 1983.) Put very simply, remedial work is an attempt to show that S is nevertheless a "good guy" (i.e., a rule-follower) when S does something wrong. This explains, for example, the strange-sounding, *I'm not a bad guy but I'm sorry I did that* (Brown and Levinson 1987:286, Fn 14).[13] *But* indicates something unexpected or contradictory and is inappropriate here. Why? Because saying *I'm sorry* is a remedial strategy, i.e., precisely an attempt to convey that S is "not a bad guy". More acceptable would be *I'm sorry I did that and I'm not a bad guy*

or even the more causal chains *I'm sorry, so I'm not a bad guy* or *I'm not a bad guy, so I'm sorry*.

So long as I can show that "I am a good guy", I will be allowed to remain a member of the relevant group, and hence derive the same benefits from my co-members' predictable behavior as they derive from mine. We are thus confronted with "an altruism in egoism" (Gouldner 1960:173): individuals act in ways others deem as appropriate because this maintains their desired image within the group, which in turn affords various kinds of personal (or group) benefits. If the individual slips up, then something must be done to remedy the situation of the endangered image and its potential contribution to divergence in the interlocutors' worlds, which in turn inhibits negotiation.

There are a potential myriad of ways to show that "I'm not a bad guy", and these will comprise a set of remedial strategies, which facilitate convergence of S's and H's worlds, classified not according to positive and negative strategies, but according to their similarity in function in re-establishing S's image and narrowing the gap between S and H. I'd like to suggest three general ways of carrying out remedial work on the basis of which other, more specific strategies can be classified and whose appropriateness can be explored relative to various socio-cultural parameters. The three "supercategories" are:

a. S $\rightarrow$ H orientation, whereby S "moves" towards H; S indicates that she/he can step into H's shoes.

b. $\lfloor$S $\leftarrow$ H$\rfloor$ orientation, whereby S seeks to "bring" H to S; the focus is on seeking H's understanding on some basis or other.

c. S$\rightarrow\leftarrow$ H orientation, whereby the "slate is wiped clean"; an appeal is made to return to the status quo.

This should also provide a basis on which to compare and contrast within one culture as well as across cultures.

It is believed that a comprehensive attempt to place an empirical study of remedial work within a framework such as described above merits attention not only for remedial work, but possibly for other cases of interactional speech as well which have previously gone by the name of politeness phenomena. This presents a challenge in the attempt to enhance our understanding of linguistic phenomena, which are necessarily embedded in a larger framework of social interaction and must also be explained therein.

Notes

[1]See also Brown and Yule (1983) for a distinction between transactional and interactional speech.

[2]see Brown and Levinson (1987:61) for further examples of negative face wants, e.g. a claim to territory, rights to non-distraction, etc.

[3]For a more extensive classification of FTAs see Brown and Levinson 1987:66-68.
[4]According to Brown and Levinson (1987) these are both ways of doing FTAs "on record" with redressive *action;* one can also perform a FTA on record without redress, i.e. "baldly", baldly meaning "doing it in the most direct, clear, unambiguous, and concise way possible" (p. 69). Off-record acts, on the other hand, are ambiguous as regards intent. The only other strategy concerning a FTA is not to do it at all.
[5]While "apology" is usually use*d by Brow*n an*d Levinson* in the narrow sense to refer to expressions such as I'm sorry or I apologize, most studies use it in its broader sense, covering all "remedial work" (Goffman 1971:109), e.g. excuses, justifications, etc.
[6]Their account types, following Schönbach (1980), consist of concessions, excuses, justifications and refusals.
[7]Holmes very closely follows Olshtain and Cohen's (1983) classification system for apology strategies.
[8]The authors establish eight directness levels presumably on the basis of the degree of inferencing demanded by the context.
[9]Goffman defines deference as "that component of activity which functions as a symbolic means by which appreciation is regularly conveyed to a recipient of this recipient or of something of which this recipient is taken as a symbol, extension, or agent" (1967:56).
[10]This represents a difference of focus from Goffman upon which Brown and Levinson claim to base their notion of face.
[11]See Brown and Levinson (1987:21) for additional studies presenting problems of quantification and operationalization.
[12]See Goodenough (1981) for a more detailed discussion regarding the advantages conferred upon those who behave according to a set of social rules, which provide a basis for expectations and thus satisfy a drive for consistency (cf. also Greenwald 1980 and Berger and Bradac 1982).
[13]Brown and Levinson, however, see nothing amiss here, using the sentence as an example of an apology which supports S's positive face.

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Contrastivity: cognition and lexical representation

Suggestions for a research project

Arthur Mettinger

0. Introduction

The following considerations sketch the framework for a research project that I will start working on at the University of Leuven in October 1992 and that should ultimately result in my Habilitationsschrift at Vienna University.

1. The point of departure

1.1 What has been done so far

In my dissertation (*Aspects of semantic opposition in English: a corpus-based study of binary meaning-relations*) I investigated pairs of opposites such as *right - wrong, strong - weak, important - unimportant, clean - dirty, pleasure - pain* etc. on the basis of data collected from more than fourty British and American novels as well as from Roget's Thesaurus. It could be shown that from the semantic point of view a pair of opposites is characterized by two indispensable factors: the items in question must share a common semantic basis (called 'archisememe' in the theoretical framework adopted in my study) that accounts for their sameness, and they must differ along a specifiable 'semantic dimension' stating with regard to which property the opposition has been established.(cf. also Mettinger 1988b:151ff.)

The classic typology of pairs of opposites in English (Lyons 1977) has been established primarily on logical criteria, i.e. in terms of contradictory and contrary opposition. In contrast, I have proposed an analysis and ensuing typology on the basis of syntactic and semantic properties: if one looks at opposites in English texts one can observe that they are (or cannot be) used in comparative, superlative, and equative constructions, that they are (or cannot be) found together with intensifiers like *very, highly, absolutely* etc. These observable gradability phenomena (which are basically syntactic in nature) permit the assumption of diverse scalarity properties of the semantic dimensions involved. Thus, dimensions can either be non-scalar (as in the case of *dead - alive*) or scalar. Opposites operating over scalar dimensions cover different zones on such a scale:

A pair like *weak* - *strong* constitutes a uni-directionally open scale STRENGTH with no member of the pair representing a zero-degree, whereas in the case of *important* - *unimportant* the prefixed member can be interpreted as including the zero-point of the IMPORTANCE scale (*completely/totally unimportant* vs. ?*completely/totally weak*). For the pair *clean* - *dirty* I would assume a uni-directionally open scale of DIRTINESS whose zero-point is represented by *clean* (which could explain *almost clean* as approximation towards the digit), the remainder of the scale then being represented by *dirty*. Finally, a pair like *pleasure* - *pain* operates over a bi-directionally open scale with an evaluatively positive and an evaluatively negative zone which are covered by the meanings of the respective lexical items.

With the help of archisememes, semantic dimensions, and semantic features (which specify the value, range of values, or zone each member of a pair of opposites occupies with regard to a semantic dimension) it has been possible to arrive at a coherent description of oppositeness of meaning in the English lexicon (for details see Mettinger 1988a, 1988b, 1990).

This approach has, of course, its theoretical foundations and consequently leaves a number of unresolved questions.

1.2 Theoretical framework

The descriptive framework sketched above is firmly rooted in the European structuralist tradition which, following Saussure (1916), distinguishes between the language-system (*langue*) and speech (*parole*). With regard to *langue* the linguistic sign is defined negatively in that it differs formally and semantically from other linguistic signs; consequently, meaning-relations such as the ones discussed above must also be described against the foil of the language-system, which has led to the introduction of the term 'oppositeness of meaning' for referring to *langue* properties. On the other hand, as the data consisted of actual occurrences of opposites in texts, another term, viz. 'contrast', was established for referring to *parole*-phenomena. Apart from *langue* and *parole*, however, we must assume a level outside language that takes care of the external world (or rather the way humans perceive it) and possibly also of the world of human thought: this level, which so far has received fairly little attention, was labeled 'adversativity' (Mettinger 1988:31 f.). It has turned out that oppositeness of meaning as a systematic phenomenon of *langue* can be described adequately in terms of archisememes, semantic dimensions, and semantic feature-relations. Such a description is, however, a totally intralinguistic, functional one, and does not postulate any psychological or cognitive reality of the linguistic constructs it uses. This approach therefore does not link meaning

with conceptualization, i. e. it is not concerned with the relationship between linguistic and cognitive phenomena. Such a situation might be conducive to the discarding of the basic theoretical framework of European structuralist semantics, the cry for a 'change of paradigm', and the wholehearted adoption of 'cognitive linguistics' (see 2.2) as a radically different theory that would be able to answer all the questions that have not been answered so far. One aim of the project will therefore be to check whether a change of paradigm is necessary and/or feasible.

2. Research goals

2.1 Problems to be solved

2.1.1 Contrast

The first problem that becomes obvious as soon as one takes texts as the raw material for describing oppositeness of meaning is that contrast is very often expressed by pairs of words that do not meet the requirements of being analyzable in terms of archisememes and semantic dimensions. Pairs like *debit - credit, venial - mortal, love - money, wits - looks, life - literature* are not instances of stable, context-independent meaning-relations, but depend on context and encyclopaedic knowledge for their contrastive interpretation. As one comes across a considerable number of such cases, it would be interesting to find out more about the reasons for and the mechanisms of establishing contrast in actual speech.

2.1.2 Linguistic coding

Up to now, work on oppositeness of meaning has concentrated on the description of individual pairs of opposites and on establishing various types of oppositeness. Though this approach has undeniably given us much insight into linguistic micro-structures, it has obscured our view on the structure of larger areas of vocabulary. In particular, the question as to which semantic properties are common to all members of a specific group of opposites has not been asked yet. Once these properties have been established through linguistic analysis, we will have to go one step further and look at them from the point of view of linguistic coding. This approach opens up two avenues: on the one hand, we will have to investigate whether, why, and to what extent linguistic coding is grounded in man's perception of the world (cf. Johnson 1987), which involves looking into the human perceptual apparatus (cf. Oeser - Seitelberger 1988), into the biological foundations and functions of human language (cf. Marquardt 1984), and into philosophical and psychological research on language and cognition (cf. Freundlich 1976,

Lorenz 1983, Tanenhaus 1988). On the other hand, we will have to explore whether, why, and to which extent contrast phenomena in language use are anchored in the cultural and traditional background shared by the members of a speech-community.

2.1.3 Ontology

The most interesting and probably also the most controversial question is that of the ontological status of the scales assumed in 1.1. In this respect Talmy (1988) and Krzeszowski (1990) have done some trailblazing in the field of 'axiality' and 'axiology'. With regard to the pair *well* - *sick* Talmy points out:

> ... such adjectives ... presuppose a schematic axis that is structured and directed in a particular way. Each adjective, then, labels a different portion of that axis. The adjectives here seem in particular to suppose a directed line bounded at one end; *well* refers to the end-point while *sick* refers to the remainder of the line, correlating greater magnitude with greater distance along the line. These are the "axial properties", or "axiality", of the lexical items, i.e., the specific relation each has to a particular **conceptual axis** [my emphasis]... It is the lexicalization of such axiality that can align adjectives with expressions of spatial relation.
>
> (Talmy 1988:187)

The parallelism between scalar semantic dimensions and Talmy's conceptual axes is striking - the problem is, however, that while the criteria for establishing semantic dimensions and their ontological status are clear, particular conceptual axes have been taken for granted by their advocates without any kind of empirical testing. One of the major aims of my project will therefore be to investigate the epistemological status of conceptual axes and to develop appropriate 'discovery procedures'.

2.2 Theoretical framework

The problems sketched in 2.1 should have made clear that their solution is not possible within the framework of structuralist theory in its present state of development.

A rather recent trend in linguistics, viz. 'cognitive linguistics', which has developed primarily in the United States since the 1980ies, might offer an appropriate alternative framework - at least with regard to some of the problems. Among the basic assumptions of cognitive linguists are the following ones:

a) lexical concepts have to be studied as a proper part of human cognition at large,
b) there is no distinction between semantic and encyclopaedic knowledge,
c) semantic studies cannot ignore the experiental and cultural background of the language user,
d) if language is one of the basic cognitive tools of man, it should not be studied autonomously, but it should be considered in the light of this cognitive function,

> i.e. of interpreting, ordering, retaining, and expressing human experience.
>
> (cf. Geeraerts 1988:652ff.)

Fascinating though these basic tenets might be, they open Pandora's box: the notion of 'concept' and 'conceptualization' will have to be defined unambiguously, also with regard to epistemology and psychology. Apart from that, one should not be oblivious of the fact that 'concept' has been an integral, though maybe largely disregarded, part of the Saussurean definition of the linguistic sign as

> ...a link ... between a concept and a sound pattern. The sound pattern may ... be distinguished from the other element associated with it in a linguistic sign. This other element is generally of a more abstract kind: the concept.
>
> (Saussure 1916 [1983:66])

In a way the research project that is being suggested here may be regarded as an attempt at integrating some of the principles of structural linguistics into the wider framework of a conceptual perspective on language. Two more principles of cognitive linguistics, need to be mentioned in this context: the principle of 'iconicity' claims that "in iconic relationships, our conception of reality is mirrored in the structure of language" (Radden 1991:3); the principle of 'conventionality' states that

> ...the grammar of a language (including semantic structure) is a characterization of established linguistic convention; conventionality implies that something is shared - and further, that it is recognized as being shared - by a substantial number of individuals.
>
> (Langacker 1983:81)

These two principles might be fruitfully implemented in the investigation of whether and to what extent linguistic coding is based on bodily and/or on cultural phenomena.

Many of the key-notions in cognitive linguistics as advanced in their present form I would regard as too dogmatic in nature, cf.:

> Meaning is equated with conceptualization. Linguistic semantics must therefore attempt the structural analysis and explicit description of abstract entities like thoughts and concepts. The term conceptualization is interpreted quite broadly: it encompasses novel conceptions as well as fixed concepts; sensory, kinesthetic, and emotive experience; recognition of the immediate context (social, physical, and linguistic); and so on. Because conceptualization resides in cognitive processing, our ultimate objective must be to characterize the types of cognitive events whose occurrence constitutes a given mental experience. The remoteness of this goal is not a valid argument for denying the conceptual basis of meaning.
>
> (Langacker 1990:2)

2.3 Working hypothesis

Accepting the principles of iconicity and conventionality I will assume that opposites are interpreted through the human cognitive capacity of perceiving

and coding similarity and dissimilarity. As a working hypothesis, I suggest the 'principle of contrastivity' which means that 'contrastivity' as a conceptual phenomenon would have to be characterized by the simultaneous implementation of two constituents/functors: a conceptual integrator and a conceptual differentiator. The former accounts for the sameness of two entities with regard to certain properties, the latter states the properties with regard to which two entities are different. Though the ontological status of these two constituents/functors is far from clear at present, their function is obvious: the conceptual integrator is assumed to cover one important prerequisite for opposites, viz. the fact that there must be a basis of comparison, the conceptual differentiator states the common basis against which the opposition as such is established. The process of implementing these two functors is a cognitive one and requires varying degrees of encyclopaedic knowledge:

In cases like *debit* - *credit* and *venial* - *mortal* the conceptual integrator corresponds to what has been termed a 'frame', i.e. a static configuration of knowledge (ACCOUNTING and RELIGION, respectively), whereas establishing the two functors for cases like *love* - *money*, *life* - *literature*, and *wits* - *looks* requires more intellectual work (which might be testable psychologically) and depends more strongly on the experiential and cultural background of the language user. As far as 'prototypical' opposites (i.e. the ones described in Mettinger 1988) are concerned, I will assume that they are highly, if not absolutely conventionalized cases of contrastivity. The conceptual integrator is equal to what has been introduced as 'archisememe' and the conceptual differentiator to the 'semantic dimension'. But this, of course, means that their ontological status will have to be reconsidered as well.

3. Conclusion

The research project thus has three basic goals:

a) to establish, describe, and explain contrastivity as a conceptual phenomenon that is operative in our perception of reality, the structuring of thought, and corresponding linguistic coding;
b) to establish, describe (and, if possible, test) scale (axiality) phenomena that seem to be operative in the coding of contrastivity;
c) to attempt a synthesis between European structuralist semantics and the cognitivist point of view.

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Looking for evidence of textbook influence in interlanguage performance data: initial observations[1]

Iris Schaller Schwaner

0. Introduction:

This paper reports on initial observations relating to work in progress concerned with two major questions. First, are there differences between the officially sanctioned Austrian EFL textbooks in their pedagogical treatment of the grammatical area of future time reference? Second, if there are differences, do they have an effect on the interlanguage of the learners using these textbooks? In an attempt to answer these questions, I will exemplify how textbooks can be examined quantitatively and qualitatively from the point of view of notional grammar (cf. Newby 1989, Kettemann 1989, Schwaner 1990) and what kind of differences can be revealed by a comparison of such findings.

The general hypothesis leading to the above questions is that the differences revealed between the textbooks have an effect on the interlanguage (IL) of the respective users. To test this hypothesis a study was carried out among 200 Viennese 3rd formers in grammar schools (*Allgemeinbildende Höhere Schulen*) who had been using three different textbooks in school for two years. A communicative grammar test served as one of the test tools. The subsequent discussion of the IL performance data reflects a first attempt at tackling the apparent chaos that emerged. However, the data description does include a rough frequency count of the forms used by the three test groups. Statistical analyses have not as yet been carried out. The preliminary findings show that the three test groups differ not only in their average production of target forms but also in the quantity and quality of non-target forms produced. Keeping in mind the danger of making any premature claims, I will try to demonstrate how certain frequency counts indicate an influence by a specific feature of the textbook; others will require explaination in relation to other variables. I will argue that in certain cases the textbooks' weaknesses and assets in their treatment of future time reference can be shown to manifest themselves in the IL of their users, at least when IL is elicited with an instrument such as the one designed for this study. The extent to which other factors play a role must be left for further investigation.

1. The textbook comparison:

Table 1

Forms and meanings related to the expression of future time in English

will+inf	Prediction
	Resolve
	Willingness
going to+inf.	Interpreting Signs
	Intention
present progressive	Arrangement
present simple	Fact

The basic prerequisites for this undertaking are two interdependent decisions. One is the decision as to what to compare. The other concerns the *tertium comparationis*. It is also important to note that these decisions are closely tied up with one's underlying theoretical assumptions about language, language teaching and language learning (cf. Stern 1983:23-25). For the present purpose, at least a comment on the theory of grammar involved is in order, since this aspect is directly related to the descriptive linguistic frame of reference used. In keeping with the 1985 Austrian national syllabus and its communicative meaning-priority approach to grammar, grammatical competence is viewed as an integral part of communicative competence.[2] Grammar is assumed to include semantic and pragmatic aspects.[3] The relation between the grammatical meanings that include these aspects and the formal inventory of a language is, and this is crucial, a non-one-to-one relation. This means that in certain areas there may be more meanings than forms that encode them or vice versa. The meanings have been called notions.[4] Since the appropriate use of a range of formal options may derive from a wider range of conceptual or meaning options, it is important to give equal consideration to both aspects. In the area of future time expression in English we therefore have to consider the four most frequent forms, viz. *will*+inf[5], *going to*+inf, present progressive and present simple, listed in Table 1 in order of frequency (Quirk et al.1985:213-216, Leech ²1987:56, Wekker 1976:1), together with their seven most frequent meanings.[6]

What is crucial to the subsequent discussion is the distinction between the meanings of *will* and those of *going to*. It is clear that *will* Prediction and *going to* Interpreting Signs have something in common. Both meanings are Epistemic, i.e. they are concerned with the speaker's assumptions or assessments of possibilities (Coates 1983:18). However, whereas *will* conveys pure, neutral prediction as in e.g., *It will be lovely to see you* or

Well, I'll be back tomorrow, I should think, *going to* contains indications of a future event or state, it indicates a process of deduction or inference from evidence, e.g. in *Everyone looked impressed and Mother said proudly, "Julia's going to be clever"* or *She's going to have twins*. *Will* Resolve and Willingness, on the other hand, also have something in common with *going to* Intention, viz. that all three are Root (Coates 1983: 12) meanings of volition. However, Resolve differs from Willingness in that the latter focuses on the subject's state of mind whereas the former focuses on the proposition. Both these meanings of *will* can be distinguished from the volitional meaning of *going to* by the premeditation and forethought that is characteristic of *going to* Intention.

Thus, based on the notional theory of grammar, the descriptive linguistic *tertium comparationis* for my textbook analysis describes not only the most frequent forms but also the notions associated with future time expressions. Returning to the initial question of what will actually be compared, we can now distinguish between the quantitative analysis, in which we count how often a form+notion occurs in the textbooks (i.e. how often it is used in stories, songs, exercises etc.) and, of equal importance, the qualitative analysis, in which we look at the way in which textbooks treat these meanings and meaning differences at the presentation and practise stages, and in the pedagogical rules given, etc. With regard to the pedagogical grammar which constitutes the framework of comparison for the qualitative analysis a few important notional imparatives can be mentioned, viz. introduce meanings separately, concentrate on one meaning at at time and avoid focus on form without concommitant focus on meaning. Both aspects, the quantitative and the qualitative one, are equally valid if one assumes that both pedagogical grammar and target language input as well as the interaction between the two play a role in foreign langauge learning.[7]

Of the entire empirical results yielded by a quantitative analysis, those for the distribution of *going to* and *will* and their meanings in the 1st and 2nd year volumes of *Ann and Pat* (AP), *English for You and Me* (EYM) and *Ticket to Britain* (TB) are presented in Tables 2 and 3. Every occurrence of the forms, i.e., both as they actually appear in the corpus and as items generated by exercises, was recorded and classified according to the meaning it was used to express. Tables 2 and 3 summarize the results.

The first question I want to address is how the textbooks compare among themselves with regard to indeterminacy of meaning. Second, I want to compare the notional category frequencies found in the textbooks; these results are then compared with the linguistic content specifications found in the syllabus. Working hypotheses will be formulated about the

consequences that the discussed features may have on the learners using these textbooks.

Table 2:

The distribution of *going to* and its meanings in Ann and Pat (AP) 1+2, English for You and Me (EYM) 1+2, Ticket to Britain (TB) 1+2

	Interpreting Signs	**Indeterminate**	**Intention**
AP1	3	24	110
AP2	26	7	96
Total	29	31	206
EYM1	1	14	128
EYM2	8	10	48
Total	9	24	176
TB1	3	18	277
TB2	33	12	92
Total	35	30	370

Table 3:

The distribution of *will* and its meanings in Ann and Pat (AP) 1+2, English for You and Me (EYM) 1+2, Ticket to Britain (TB) 1+2

	Prediction	**Indeterminate**	**Willingness**	**Resolve**
AP1	36	8	5	38
AP2	151	59	49	54
Total	187	67	54	92
EYM1	4	-	-	3
EYM2	139	14	-	42
Total	143	14	-	45
TB1	15	1	3	21
TB2	220	3	-	58
Total	235	4	3	79

The cases of indeterminacy listed in both tables are those in which it was impossible to decide which meaning a form was meant to express. Only a marginal number are the result of naturally occurring ambiguity or merger of meanings. In actual fact, they are mainly due to contrived textbook language that occurs without context. It is precisely this problem that repeatedly arose in AP2, in which there are 67 indeterminate cases of *will* compared to only four in TB2. The implications of this finding are discussed below.

The Austrian syllabus specifies *going to* Intention for the first year of English;*will* is restricted to the specification of*will* Willingness in one of its functions: "Bereitschaft äußern" ('expressing preparedness'). Only for the second year does the syllabus specify the *will*-future, probably implying *will* Prediction.

What do we find in the textbooks? Table 3 shows that *going to* Intention occurs 277 times in TB1 and only 110 times in AP1 or 128 times in EYM1. For the second year textbooks, the number is roughly the same for TB (92) and AP (96) but merely half for EYM (48). Of the second year volumes, TB2 has the highest number of occurrences of *will* Prediction. Another relevant observation is that AP has the highest proportion of volitional meanings of *will*, i.e. Willingness and Resolve. The ratio of Prediction: Willingness: Resolve is 187:54:92 for AP2 as compared with 143:0:45 for EYM2 and 235:3:79 for TB2.

The central theoretical assumption which underlies all the hypotheses to be formulated is that the (relative) frequency of occurrence of a form as conveying one particular meaning (i.e., from the learner's point of view, the frequency of encountering a form+meaning in the input) plays a role in the learners acquisition of this form+meaning. Therefore one may hypothesize that a high frequency of meaning-indeterminate forms will have negative effects, which suggests difficulties for AP learners. One may also assume that the relatively higher frequency of *going to* Intention in TB1 will be reflected in a relatively higher production of this target variant in the grammar test by the group that had used TB. Another basic consideration is that the total frequency with which one particular form-meaning complex is encountered by the learner is not the only factor that can be assumed to influence acquisition. Equally important is the distraction that comes from early notional mix-ups resulting from occurrences of the same form in different meanings, especially if these meanings are not acknowledged, as is the case with AP. In this textbook there is no pedagogical focus on either of the two meanings, neither in terms of explicit grammar explanations nor in terms of functional statements. This could represent a disadvantage for the learner which one would expect to show in the IL performance of the AP group.

With regard to the qualitative analysis of pedagogical grammar in the textbooks, one may speak of different degrees to which the approach spelled out in the syllabus is implemented and notional grammar is realized. Let me illustrate this by juxtaposing and discussing examples from AP2 (cf. Illustration 1) and TB2 (cf. Illustrations 2.a,b), since they represent the greatest contrast in the entire textbook analysis.

Illustration 1 shows the first page of Chapter 4 of AP2, dedicated to the presentation of the *will*-future. Despite this objective, *will* is immediately contrasted with *going to* Intention. The heading of the first dialogue (AP2:20) contains *will* Willingness. The dialogue immediately following (AP2:21) even contains more examples of Resolve than of Prediction. As can be seen in the illustration, the grammar grid at the bottom of the page

falls back on a wide-spread school grammar misconception of *going to* as 'near' future. In fact, it also contains the paraphrase *plan* to convey Intention. However, the vocabulary section accompanying this chapter contains an entry in which the meaning of the lexical item *plan* is defined in the following way: "You say what you will do in the future" (AP2WB:W11) [my emphasis]. The explanation of *will* Prediction in AP seems to be inadequate for the following reasons. First, the model sentence itself, ...*I hope he'll give us an interview* (AP2:20), contains an instance of merger of the meanings Prediction and Willingness. Second, uncertainty, the concept emerging most clearly from the description "Here you are **not sure** what will happen in the **future**" (AP2:20), is by no means the identifying feature of *will* Prediction. The co-occurrence of the harmonizer *I'm sure* throughout AP and as well as on the same page in the dialogue chart makes this sufficiently clear, but it is an obvious contradiction of the explanation given.

The notional mix-up at the presentation stage for the *will*-future, the nullification of one explanation by another in the case of *going to* and *plan* and the inadequate conceptualization of *will* Prediction as uncertainty are all examples of a wealth of descriptive linguistic and pedagogical weaknesses in AP that motivate the hypothesis that learners will not realize the meaning differences and will fail to use one or both forms appropriately.

Illustration 1: Beginning of Chapter 4 of Ann and Pat 2 (20)



TB is different in its overall organization insofar as there is no single chapter that is apparently dedicated to 'covering' the *will*-future. TB2 proceeds cyclically in that it first presents *will* Prediction in the contexts of weather forecasts (Unit 2, TB2:24) and subsequently extends its use to other contexts and other kinds of prediction. The notion Prediction is made explicit from the very start by the mother tongue paraphrase "Vorhersagen machen" ('making predictions') (TB2:24). In Unit 8 *will* Prediction is again

Illustration 2a: Excerpt from Unit 8 Ticket to Britain 2 (97)



recycled in a reading passage about the school of the future (TB2:97, cf. Illustration 2a). The follow-up exercise requires the learners to use the form and meaning in expressing their assessment of the likelihood of the predictions made in the text: "**Talk about the text**: What will happen? What will not happen?" The epistemic modality of *will* Prediction is thus implicitly illustrated and the occasion of actually using *will* in a protoptypical context may provide an opportunity for its acquisition. It is not until Unit 9 that the Epistemic *going to* appears. The difference between *will* Prediction and *going to* Interpreting Signs is focussed on. The inferential meaning of *going to* ("...aufgrund bestimmter Anzeichen zu erwarten..." ['to be expected on the basis of certain indications']) and the non-inferential meaning of *will* are clearly differentiated in the form of an awareness-raising self-assessment test (TB2WH:47, cf Illustration 2b).

Illustration 2b: Excerpt from Unit 9 Ticket to Britain 2 (Wiederholungsheft:47)

The above findings can be regarded as typical of the assets of this textbook, which motivates the prediction that learners will acquire the meaning differences and will appropriately use *will* and *going to*.

2. The IL performance test:

The subjects involved in the study were 200 pupils from four different Viennese grammar schools (*AHS*) in nine different 3rd forms, i.e., they were at the beginning of their third year of learning English at secondary school level. They naturally fell into three groups according to the EFL textbook they were using: 56 AP users, 65 TB users and 86 EYM users.

A description of the communicative grammar test administered is restricted to its first three test tasks, for which the first stage of coding has been completed.[8] Each of these tasks was designed to elicit the production of one different form-meaning complex at a time. To this end, I created contexts in which one form is prototypically used to express one specific meaning. In the first task, drawings provide the evidence or the signs from which a future event or process can be inferred. The instructions are

designed to reinforce this concept: "PLEASE INTERPRET THESE PICTURES: What can you say about the future?"[9] The second task involves the completion of a pre-structured conversation. A context is simulated by the introductory statement: "It is Saturday morning and you are speaking with two friends (A and B) about your plans for the weekend." Guidance for completion is provided by mother-tongue paraphrases of the missing parts that are to be supplied, e.g. "*A sagt, daß er/sie die Absicht hat, heute mit seiner/ihrer Familie die Großeltern zu besuchen*. A: Today my family and I...". In these paraphrases the concept or notion to be expressed is overtly stated in German (*Absicht haben, sich vorgenommen haben, vorhaben*). The third task is intended to create the ideal context for predictions by placing the learner in the (fantasy) role of a fortune teller, thereby excluding the possibility of inference: "IN THE YEAR 2010: What are your predictions for the future? Imagine you are a fortune teller (Wahrsager) and write five sentences about yourself, your friends, your family, school, life in the city, etc."

The IL samples collected for these three tasks have so far been analysed and coded with regard to the verb form used without scoring for comprehensibility, notional and functional appropriacy, degree of formal deviance etc. Of the preliminary findings presented here, the first one is the most striking.[10] There are 52 different types of IL forms in the data yielded by three test tasks, for which only two different target language forms would have been sufficient. In addition to these 52, there are four more categories: zero production, production of verbless chunks, answers in German and utterances that relate to something enitely different. Table 4 below lists the types of IL verb forms together with examples occurring in the three tasks.

Table 4:

Types of interlanguage forms produced in tasks 1-3

IL Form	**Examples of interlanguage**
*be +inf	*He is win the race. (48au1)
*be +inf to +inf	*She is like to play tennis. (50au1)
*be +inf to +Ving	*It's beginn to raining. (40au1)
*be going +inf	*This girl is going play tennis. (36au1)
*be going the	*He is going the win. (196au1)
*be going to	*[In the year 2010 t]he school is going to new. (117au3)
*be going to +preterite	*This airoplan is going to fell on the erd. (14au1)
*be going to +Ving	*...an I'm going to listening records... (69au2)
*be will +inf	*The schools are will be a schopingcenter. (98au3)
*be will be +Ving	*Its' will be raining. (59au1)
*be will to +inf	*It's will to thunder. (47au1)

*be/have +preterite	*It's began to rain. (35au1)
*go to +inf	On Sunday my family and I go to do a bicicle toure. (35au2)
*going to	*[In the year 2010 m]y friend going to a famous popstar.
*going to +inf	*Today my family and I going to visit my grandparents. (79au2)
*had +inf	*She had play tennis. (uf3au1)
*has/have +Ving	*A man has facking her. (123au1)
*have/has +inf	*The woman has catch a baby. (uf2au1)
*Ving	*And on Sunday I writing to the english letterfriend. (uf2au2)
*will	*In the future I will a tennis star. (101au3)
*will +past participle	*She will born a baby. (180au1)
*will +preterite	*It [the plane] will fell down. (24au1)
*will +Ving	*My family and I will going in our garden. (25au2)
*will be +inf	*The horse 9 will be winn.(uf2au1)
*will be going	*He will be going the winner. (131au1)
*will be going to +inf	*The plane will be going to crash. (131au1)
*will going to +inf	*This earoplane will going to fly to America. (18au1)
*will going to +Ving	*The plane will going to sturtzing up. (140au1)
*will to +inf	It [the plane] will to get down. (38au1)
*will to +Ving	*The number 9 will to wining the race. (47au1)
*would +preterite	*He would fell into the water. (202au1)
*would +Ving	*In the afternoon I would walk with our dog, listening to records and write a letter... (160au2)
*would be +inf	*We would be ride a bike. (63au2)
*would going to +inf	*We all would going to make a biketoure. (153au2)
*would going to +preterite	*in the afternoon I would going to went wit the dog.. (153au2)
be going to +inf	She is going to play tennis. (1au1)
chunks	A airoplain (49au1)
German	Sie wird tennisspielen. (182au1)
imperative	Go swimming (107au1)
modal	[In the year 2010 w]e can drive a car with 4 years. (31au3)
past tense	(*)Today my family and I were by my grandperens for tea. (45au2)
past tense progressive	*[In the year 2010 m]y friends were working in a big city.
present perfect	*[In the year 2010] I have married a nice women from this school. (uf2au3)
present progressive	The woman is going to a tennis field. (8au1)
present simple	*...and at Sunday I write a letter to my English pan friend. (2au2)
something different	Jack and Jill went to the hills to have much fun, but Jill forgot her pill and now they have a sun. (134au1)
want +to inf	I want to have a child and a house with my husband. (15au3)
wanted +to inf	(*)We wanted to make a biketour together. (133au2)
was/were going to +inf	(*)Today my family and I were going to look for grandmother and grandad. (53au2)
will +inf	In the year 2010 I'll be very rich... (1au3)
will +perfect inf	In 2010 I'll have finished the school.(30au3)
will be +Ving	In 2010 I'll be working in a company. (30au3)

would +inf	In the afternoon I would take the dog for a walk... (63au2)
would like to +inf	I would like to go riding. (27au2)

At present the forms are simply listed in alphabetical order, the ones marked with an asterisk precede the unasterisked ones, pending a decision regarding a principled way to group them. Obviously, some types seem to be related to each other in terms of interlanguage variation of one common target language form.

The forms **be going* +inf, **be going the*, **be going to*, **be going to* +preterite, **be going to* +V*ing*, **going to* +inf, **going to* and *was/were going to* +inf, for example, might be regarded as IL variants of the grammatical target language construction *be going to* + inf. But what about **go to* +inf, **will be going to* +inf, **will be going*, **will going to* +V*ing*, **would going to* +inf and **would going to* +preterite? Can they legitimately be grouped as such as well? Or should **will be going to* +inf, **will be going*, **will going to* +V*ing* be grouped as variations of *will* +inf and **would going to* +inf and **would going to* +preterite with *would* +inf? Or should they constitute a group of their own? Another problem to be solved is if and when to mark an interlanguage utterance as deviant. For the time being asterisks have been used firstly to indicate types that formally deviate from target language forms and secondly, to mark utterances containing forms that belong to the target language inventory but whose actual occurrence violates restrictions of co-text or context.

What is also reflected in some of the examples quoted, e.g. that of the category "something different", is the test population's adolescent sexual preoccupation that expressed itself in quite a number of the elicitations and may have influenced the learners' performance in terms of decreasing their test motivation.

The frequency data (i.e., the figures showing the number of tokens of each type in the individual tasks for the three test groups) are displayed below in the form of tables. There is one table for each task and in each table there are three columns of figures, one for each of the test groups. The figures are the result of a frequency count. In some cases the average frequency is given in parenthesis. No statistical analyses have as yet been carried out.

Before discussing the figures, two things should be pointed out. First, it is not clear at this stage which of the types that seem to be related to a particular target language form can be regarded as realizations of the target language notion. Therefore the discussion will mostly concentrate on types representing grammatical forms, which may or may not be the target forms in the respective task. Second, in general learners' inability or failure to produce the target forms in the test contexts can mean two different things.

First, they may not make the connection between a concept and a form, i.e., they have not learnt the form-meaning complex (which may be attributed to several factors). Second, a concept is not accessible in the given contexts in the first place. The second possibility must always be excluded before we can assume that the first possibility is the case.

Table 5:

Token frequency count *(averages)* for Task 1 *going to* Interpreting Signs (selection of types from IL preformance test)

Form/type	**Ann&Pat(56)**	**Ticket to Britain(65)**	**EYM(86)**
be going to+inf	96*(1.714)*	46*(0.707)*	145*(1.686)*
will+inf	115*(2.053)*	129*(1.984)*	166*(1.93)*
pres.simp.	36*(0.642)*	51*(0.784)*	67*(0.779)*
pres.prog.	42*(0.75)*	46*(0.707)*	54*(0.627)*
chunks	7	64*(0.984)*	29*(0.337)*
will+preterite	47*(0.839)*	1	6
0	12	66*(1.015)*	8

Going to Interpreting Signs is the target form of the first task. *Be going to* +inf was used most frequently by the AP learners, but these learners are also the ones who used *will* +inf most often. If the 47 tokens of the type *will* +preterite in the AP group were added, *will* would by far be the most prominent form with an average of almost 3 (2.892) occurrences per test subject in this group. It could, in fact, be justifiable to do so since a more general preference for preterite instead of infinitive in this group is indicated by the exclusive occurrence of the type *be/have* + preterite (27 tokens) with AP users. If one group of learners, the AP group, shows the highest average frequency for both forms, what did the other two groups do? If we added the type *will be* +V*ing* instead of *be/have* + preterite to *will* +inf, the picture would be altered: the TB group (18 tokens of *will be* +V*ing* as compared with 2 and 4 in AP and EYM) would take the lead with an average of 2.261. This means, firstly, that the leading position can change depending on which forms one views as belonging together, and secondly, that there was a preference for the target form in the AP group whereas the TB group exhibited a preference for *will*, a non-target form in this task. However, the figures for chunks and 0-answers are highest in the TB group, too. What about the EYM group? They used *will* +inf more often than *be going to* +inf and and both of these more often than any other form; however, they also revealed a more pronounced spread across other types than the other groups did. The AP data include 25 different types, the TB sample only 18 different types, but the EYM sample includes 29 different types, a finding which is difficult to interpret at this point.

A general observation at this stage is that the TB group was least successful in producing the target form and the range of variation in this group is the most limited, probably because they gave up more often than the other two groups did. The number of 0-answers and verbless chunks can be regarded as a refusal to make a statement, as it were. One possible interpretation is that the concept of Interpreting Signs was less accessible to this group in this context than to the others; the other interpretation is that the connection between *going to* and Interpreting Signs is not part of this group's interlanguage to the same degree to which it is for the others. Those who did not give up opted for the *will* solution and tried to render the future time reference by this means.

Table 6:

Token frequency count *(averages)* for Task 2 *going to* Intention (selection of types from IL preformance test)

Form/type	**Ann&Pat** (56)	**Ticket to Britain** (65)	**EYM** (86)
going to+inf	48*(0.857)*	167*(2.569)*	66*(0.767)*
will+inf	133*(2.376)*	93*(1.523)*	199*(2.313)*
pres.simp.	24	57	37
pres.prog.	3	26	20
would+inf	0	4	30*(0.348)*
want to+inf	54*(0.964)*	21*(0.323)*	50*(0.581)*

Going to Intention was the target form in the second task. Here the findings may be even more revealing. First of all, the absolute leaders in producing the required target form *be going to* +inf are the TB users (average 2.569 as compared with AP 0.857 and EYM 0.767). Of the other two groups almost as many opted for the *will* +inf solution (averages AP 2.376, EYM 2.313). Thus, one might claim that the concept of Intention was not accessible to the AP and EYM users in the context of this task. But in these two groups the frequency figures for two other types are quite high, namely for the *want +to* inf solution in case of the AP group and the *want +to* inf and the *would* +inf solutions in case of the EYM group. Interpreting *want* as an expression of *Absicht* ('intention') is an obvious possibility. In the case of *would*, the explanation might be the similarity to German *wollen* meaning 'want'. One may therefore claim that the context is suitable and the concept of Intention is indeed accessible but the learners in these two groups could not make the connection with *going to* since the form-meaning complex is not established to the same degree to which it is in the TB group. If one recalls the more than 100% higher number of occurrences of *going to* Intention in TB1 as compared to AP1 and EYM1 this is not really come as a surprise and it could be the first strong indicator for the interpretation that the textbook does make a difference, at least from a quantitative point of view.

Table 7:
Token frequency count *(averages)* for Task 3 *will* Prediction (selection of types from IOL preformance test)

Form/type	**Ann&Pat(56)**	**Ticket to Britain(65)**	**EYM(86)**
*going t*o+inf	17*(0.3)*	12*(0.184)*	17*(0.197)*
will+inf	127*(2.267)*	181*(2.784)*	168*(1.953)*
pres.simp.	47*(0.839)*	58*(0.892)*	107*(1.244)*
would+inf	1	1	37*(0.43)*
modal	6	17*(0.261)*	9
0	49*(0.839)*	47*(0.723)*	55*(0.639)*
task-irrel.	5	11	24*(0.279)*

The findings for task three are interesting as well. The target form *will* +inf was used most often by the TB group and least often by the EYM group. The non-target form *going to* was used most often by the AP group, but not very frequently. So the question is, what happened in the EYM group? The most obvious answer is to be found in the category for utterances relating to something entirely different. Task 3 was the point at which quite a number of responses from learners in the EYM group contained sexual overtones. The other conspicuously high figure is the one for *would* +inf. Either the EYM group used*would* +inf here again to express their wishes for the future, or the *would*-solution has got nothing to do with volition after all and is just used to refer to future time. Other comparatively high token frequencies are the ones for present simple forms. Since there is no indication that the concept was not accessible in this context, I would argue that the link between form and meaning was weaker for the EYM group and that there was therefore more crosslinguistic influence. In (Austrian) German the present tense is the most frequent form used for future time reference. Consulting Table 3 for *will* and its distribution in the textbooks, we find that the number of occurrences of *will* Prediction is indeed markedly lowest for EYM2. When compared with AP2 the difference is not all that great (AP2:151 vs. EYM2:139), however. Also, the frequency of indeterminate instances of *will* or other notions of *will*, which might distract the learner, seems negligible as compared with AP2 (AP2:162 vs.EYM2:56). In addition, the risk of a negative effect ought to be smaller, since the other notion that occurs in EYM2 (42 instances of *will* Resolve) is accounted for by at least one adequate explicit grammar explanation. My present inclination is not to ascribe this difference between the EYM group and the two others to the input provided by the textbook. The determining factor may well be found among one of the teachers, or it might be the gender composition of the EYM group, in which there are more males than females. A decrease in test motivation in the EYM group in the course of the test, indicated by the increasingly tense and aggressive atmosphere in this group,

could also have been a contributing factor. Without systematically taking into account other variables nothing conclusive can be said at present.

3. Summary and conclusion:

In the teaching of English to Austrian 10- to 14-year-olds, the EFL textbook is an important tool for grammar instruction, a widely held assumption that was confirmed by teacher interviews conducted in the context of this study. Basically, all the textbooks are supposed to conform to the Austrian national syllabus, and so one would expect them to treat grammar in accordance with the meaning-priority approach taken in this syllabus. However, there are noticable quantitative and qualitative differences between the textbooks in the area examined here. Do they play a role for the learner? Is one textbook better than the other in helping the learner learn the target language grammar for future natural communication? Although these questions are obviously at the heart of this kind of research there is no way of answering them. I had to restricted myself to looking into the complexity of problems from one specific point of view. I tried to design test tasks that require the learner to select one of the grammatical forms available to her/him on the basis of the meanings with which they are associated. Provided that the context created in the task makes the conceptual meaning accessible, the learner will use the appropriate form, again provided that a form associated with the expression of this meaning is an available. As is argued above, there are certain indications in the interlanguage data and in the test behaviour of the learners from which one can draw conclusions about the accessibility of a meaning in the context of a task. Where the condition of accessibility seems to be fulfilled one can interpret the appearance of an appropriate form in the learner's performance data as indicating that the connection between this form and this meaning is part of the learner's interlanguage competence. In this case, one can finally begin to attribute results to the influence of the textbook, provided one can determine the influence of other variables and rule out chance.

Obviously, any conclusions that might eventually be drawn depend on the correctness of the above assumptions. What I have tried to show in these initial observations is that the preliminary findings can partly be interpreted as supporting the general hypothesis that textbook differences produce differences in the IL performance of the textbooks' users. At least there is no evidence yet to reject this hypothesis and its underlying assumption that the pedagogical grammar of future time reference in and the input provided by the different textbooks have an effect on the interlanguage of the learners using them.

Notes

[1]This paper was submitted for publication in July 1991. It is based on the talk "Does the textbook make a difference? First results of an empirical study of Austrian EFL learners' interlanguage", given at the 2nd National ELT Conference Vienna, May 1991. For a presentation summary cf. *English Language Teaching News* 14 July 1991 (special issue): 74f.

[2]For a definition and discussion of the terms cf. Canale & Swain (1980) and Canale (1983).

[3]Arguments in favour of an 'inclusive' view of grammar and of communicative grammar in particular are convincingly put forward by Leech (1988:10-15). On grammar, meaning and context cf. also Widdowson (1990:82-104).

[4]Grammatical meanings or notions can be conceived as, e.g., fuzzy sets (Coates 1983), prototypes (Aijmer 1985) or cognitive concepts (Wierzbicka 1988), depending on the overall theoretical framework.

[5]Mindt-Utecht (1980:289) confirm the view that *shall* with 1st person subjects instead of *will* is rare (less than 5 % frequency), which is why it is left out of consideration in this paper.

[6]For a discussion of the literature on English future time reference cf. Schwaner (1987,forthcomimg b). My synthesis, from which Table 1 derives, is mainly based on Coates (1983), Wekker (1976), Newby (1989) and also draws on Quirk et al. (1985), Leech (^{2}1987) and Edmondson et al. (1977).

[7]For a more extended account of a notional theory of teaching and learning cf. Schwaner (forthcoming b), which mainly draws on Newby (1989)and Widdowson (1990).

[8]Of the tools used, the general questionnaire for acquiring information regarding various variables is not discussed here since its results have not yet been systematically analyzed and cannot be taken into account at this stage. The same is true of the results of the achievement test (verbal factor, reasoning, word fluency, space, closure, perceptual speech and number), which was administered in order to establish the comparability of the test groups.

[9] One of the pictures showed a pregnant woman, which inspired lively reactions from some students (cf. list of IL examples in table 4).

[10] It also points to the reason why, outside a performance-related context, IL research has for a long time refused to take the target language (TL) as a yardstick for analyzing IL.

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