



VIENNA ENGLISH WORKING PAPERS

VOLUME 15

NUMBER 2

DECEMBER, 2006

INTERNET EDITION AVAILABLE ON: [HTTP://WWW.UNIVIE.AC.AT/ANGLISTIK/VIEWS.HTM](http://www.univie.ac.at/anglistik/views.htm)

CONTENTS

LETTER FROM THE EDITORS	1
MARTIN ADAM	
Functional sentence perspective: horizontal vs. vertical	3
THERESA-SUSANNA ILLÉS	
English words in Irish texts – a view on cooking recipes	16
RONALD KEMSIES	
A cognitive linguistic view of the ‘conceptual glorification’ of 9/11	36
KATHRIN KORDON	
“You are very good” – establishing rapport in English as a lingua franca: the case of agreement tokens	58
IMPRESSUM	84

LETTER FROM THE EDITORS

Dear Readers,

The present issue of Views should appeal to very diverse linguistic tastes, ranging from an FSP approach to text study through mutation in Irish recipes to the linguistic compensation of 9/11 and establishing rapport in ELF.

The first contribution by Martin Adam falls into the field of functional sentence perspective (FSP). Paying particular attention to the difference between co-referential strings and dynamic-semantic tracks, Adam approaches the study of horizontal and vertical relations operating within the macrofield as opposed to lower levels of text, i.e. the clause. By applying the

principles of FSP to the macrofield of the gospel, he is able to show how the horizontal-vertical relations are transparently traceable within FSP analysis.

From the analysis of the gospel, the next contribution then proceeds to the study of a very different text type, namely of Irish cooking recipes. Theresa-Susanna Illés considers the grammatical and orthographical integration of English loanwords in Irish cooking recipes published between 1998 and 2003 in selected issues of the weekly tabloid *Foinse*. Concentrating on initial mutation in Irish, she discusses the perseverance of this specialised phenomenon, particularly in its application to English loanwords in Irish texts.

In our third contribution, Ronald Kemsies then presents a cognitive linguistic view of the ‘conceptual glorification’ of 9/11. Focusing on the cognitive mechanisms of linguistic compensation, he analyses several examples of political rhetoric as well as imagery from the aftermath of September 11 and illustrates how linguistic compensation operates in terms of a ‘conceptual glorification’ of 9/11.

Finally, Kathrin Kordon shows that ELF, which is generally assumed to mainly serve transactional functions, also features an interactional dimension. In particular, an analysis of agreement tokens in a self-compiled corpus of informal ELF conversations between Vietnamese and Austrian speakers was carried out in order to illustrate in how far the main phatic functions can be identified in ELF talk.

We hope that you will find the diversity of the current issue’s contributions inspiring and would be happy to include your comments in form of a reply to one of the articles in our next issue.

We wish all our readers a happy and successful 2007!

THE EDITORS

Functional sentence perspective: horizontal vs. vertical

*Martin Adam, Brno**

1. From sentence to text

1.1 Text linguistics

As the theory of functional sentence perspective (FSP) deals with text linguistics, it will be necessary to provide the reader with at least a brief outline of this approach towards the study of language.

Text linguistics has played a crucial role in the development of discourse analysis. It views texts as elements strung together in definable relationships (see e.g. van Dijk 1985 or de Beaugrande & Dressler 1981), dealing with the analysis of the ‘surface’ structures that unify the text (cohesion) on the one hand and the ‘deep’ semantic relations between the elements (coherence) on the other. These concepts derive basically from the British discourse analysis approach represented by Halliday (Halliday & Hasan 1989). Text linguistics treats the text material from different perspectives; it is, however, unified by interest in describing language from the higher-level, suprasentential perspective as well as in the role of context and communicative approach.

Text grammarians take into consideration concepts such as hypersyntax (i.e. the syntactic structure of the whole text), standards of textuality and text types (de Beaugrande & Dressler 1981: 3ff.), discourse topic and the representation of discourse content (proposition) (van Dijk 1977 or Kintsch 1974), cohesion (texture) and coherence (e.g. Halliday & Hasan 1989), schemata as ‘higher-level complex knowledge structures’ (van Dijk 1981: 141ff.), context, ‘text-world’ as a network of relations between elements (de Beaugrande & Dressler 1981) etc.

Closely related to the study in the field of text linguistics is the theory developed by the Prague (and Brno) School of Linguistics, most notably by

* The author can be contacted under martinadamcz@yahoo.com.

Jan Firbas – the theory of functional sentence perspective. Generally speaking, it explores the theme-rheme structures and the relationships between the units of information in the utterance. The theory of functional sentence perspective (FSP) and its analytical methods have been considered one of the prominent tools of discourse analysis and information processing.

1.2 Functional Sentence Perspective

Combining the approaches adopted both by formalists and functionalists, the theory of functional sentence perspective draws on the findings presented by the scholars of the Prague Circle. The founder of FSP himself – Jan Firbas – drew on the findings of his predecessor, Vilém Mathesius. As early as in 1911, Mathesius was the first to notice the language universal that every utterance has a theme (topic) and a rheme (focus/comment), and to formulate the basic principles of what was to be labelled FSP only later.

In Firbas's view, the sentence is a field of semantic and syntactic relations that in its turn provides a distributional field of degrees of communicative dynamism (CD); Firbas defines degree of CD as "the extent to which the element contributes towards the development of the communication" (Firbas 1964: 270). The most prominent part of information is the 'high' point of the message, i.e. the most dynamic element; other elements of the sentence are less dynamic (have a lower degree of CD). The degrees of CD are determined by the interplay of FSP factors involved in the distribution of degrees of CD: linear modification, context and semantic structure (Firbas 1992: 14-16). In spoken language, the interplay of these factors is joined by intonation, i.e. the prosodic factor.

It is the continuum of the degrees of CD along with the interplay of the basic FSP factors that make FSP specific within the field of text linguistics. One is able to analyze and interpret a clause making use of exactly given criteria. CD operates on the level of a clause; when viewed from the level of a macro-structure, the individual thematic and non-thematic elements form then thematic and non-thematic strings (see below). In other words, the theory of FSP transcends the domain of text grammar, enriching it with the approach adopted by the study of information processing.

The domain of the theory of functional sentence perspective (FSP) has been explored mostly on the sentential level, i.e. in the area of the basic distributional field created by the clause. Recently, however, attention has been paid also to the functional picture of higher hierarchical levels of text; research has shown that an FSP analysis of a distributional macrofield (a

paragraph, a chapter) is a promising step taken in the study of FSP and that it can reveal significant characteristic features of a whole text (cf. Adam 2004 and 2006).

This article proposes to examine the distributional macrofield from the point of view of functional sentence perspective, focusing on the horizontal and vertical relations operating within the text.¹

2. FSP analysis of the clause

Since the pioneering work of Jan Firbas' research into the theory of functional sentence perspective, the interpretative analysis of the clause has been the corner stone of FSP. Indeed, it is the FSP analysis of a basic distributional field (clause) that is the starting point of the functional interpretation.

The very Firbasian notions connected with the functional and dynamic approach towards text derive from the functional analysis of the clause; Firbas claims that the central position in FSP interpretation "is occupied by distributional fields provided by independent verbal sentences" (Firbas 1992: 11-12). He views a clause as "a field of relations" (syntactic and semantic above all) that determine the distribution of communicative dynamism (CD) over individual communicative units of the clause. Units carrying a lower degree of CD form the thematic part of the clause and those carrying a higher degree of CD form – together with so called transition – the non-thematic part of the clause (Firbas 1992: 80-81).²

Since the sentence is a field of relations, it is necessary to define what is meant by a basic distributional field. Firbas (1992: 15-17) agrees with Svoboda (1989: 88) that

a sentence, a clause, a semi-clause and even a nominal phrase serve as distributional fields of CD in the act of communication, and their syntactic constituents (e.g. subject, predicative verb...) serve as communicative units.

Through the interplay of FSP factors (context, semantics and linear modification), it is then possible to identify the degrees of CD carried by the communicative units: according to the gradual rise of CD, it is theme proper

¹ All the concepts and terms used or referred to in this paper can be consulted in *Functional Sentence Perspective in Written and Spoken Communication* (Firbas 1992).

² Svoboda (1989: 25) also considers the functional study on the level of the sentence a basis of functional syntax; he labels the sentential level units 'mezzo-structures', hierarchically occupying the sphere between micro-structures and macro-structures.

(ThPr) – diatheme (DTh) – transition proper (TrPr) – transition (Tr) – rheme (Rh) – rheme proper (RhPr).

To sum up, the functional analysis of a basic distributional field is, in its essence, a horizontal process and the relations between individual segments are purely syntagmatic. The table below displays the interpretative arrangement of a clause consisting of six communicative units represented by black dots: the degree of CD they carry is symbolized by the size of the dots.³

ThPr	DTh	Tr	TrPr	Rh	RhPr
•	•	●	●	●	●

Table 1: Symbolic FSP analysis of the clause

3. FSP analysis of a macrofield

For the purpose of the following FSP analysis, I selected an extract from the New Testament of the Bible (see below). Biblical texts have repeatedly proven to be a rich and suitable source of discourse analysis studies (most notably Firbas 1992 and 1995, Svoboda 1983, Adam 2004 and 2006). Especially the later studies published by Firbas dealt with a number of Old and New Testament texts. Firbas made it clear in his works that such text material represents a set of written discourse (of narrative, dialogic and poetic types) manifesting numerous remarkable language phenomena: both generally linguistic and text-specific. Let me recall, by means of illustration, his treatise on the establishment and the function of the dynamic-semantic layers of *Luke 2:1-20* (Firbas 1995), the case study in linear modification discussing the translation of the *Book of Revelation 21:6b* (Firbas 1996) or his congenial interpretation of *Psalms 91* based exclusively on FSP (Firbas 1989).

As mentioned above, the principles adopted in the FSP analysis of a clause are applicable also to higher hierarchical levels of text, such as paragraphs or chapters. The dynamic relations appear not to be restricted to

³ The distribution of degrees of CD within a sentence is not necessarily implemented linearly, and so it is inevitable to distinguish between the linear arrangement of sentence elements on the one hand, and their *interpretative arrangement* on the other (Firbas 1995: 63). The latter is defined as “the arrangement of the sentence elements according to the gradual rise in CD irrespective of the positions they occupy within the sentence” (Firbas 1986: 47). The two arrangements may either coincide, or there are differences of various kinds.

the level of individual clauses but to exceed them, to operate on the suprasentential, macro-structure level of a communicative macrofield (for details see Adam 2004: 17-18).

Looking at an integral piece of text, we may – apart from the horizontal FSP analysis of individual clauses – identify two types of vertical relations that “chain” into strings: co-referential strings and dynamic-semantic tracks.⁴ By means of illustration, let me give an example of an FSP chart of analysis, where both types of chains are indicated. First, the text under analysis will be presented in full, so that the reader may see the piece of writing in context (it is an extract taken from the New Testament, namely a passage from *The Gospel according to Luke*, chapter 2, verses 4-9).

So Joseph also went up from the town of Nazareth in Galilee to Judea, to Bethlehem the town of David, because he belonged to the house and line of David. He went there to register with Mary, who was pledged to be married to him and was expecting a child. While they were there, the time came for the baby to be born, and she gave birth to her firstborn, a son. She wrapped him in cloths and placed him in a manger, because there was no room for them in the inn. And there were shepherds living out in the fields nearby, keeping watch over their flocks at night. An angel of the Lord appeared to them, and the glory of the Lord shone around them, and they were terrified. (Kohlenberger 1997: 387-389)

In Table 2 below, the referential strings of the notions of ‘Joseph’, the ‘baby Jesus’ and the ‘shepherds’ respectively are presented in CAPITALS, whereas the dynamic-semantic track created in the rheme-proper layer is indicated by the use of *italics* (both these categories will be discussed separately below).

⁴ To name the vertical dynamic-semantic strings, two different labels have been used: *layers* and *tracks*. In his key monograph (Firbas 1992) and preceding works, Firbas consistently uses the term *layer*. In Firbas 1995 (an article dealing for the first time with the FSP principles adopted in higher-level approach) and the following articles, he replaces this label by *track*; this term, in his opinion, depicts the dynamic character of the strings. The term *layer* is then used for the whole bodies of the thematic, the transitional and the rhematic spheres. In the present paper, I am using the terminology accordingly.

Verse	Clause	TrPr (conj)	ThPr (Set/B)	DTh (Set/B)	TrPr/Tr (Q/Pr)	RhPr (Q)	Rh/RhPr (Sp/FSp)	RhPr (Ph)	Scale
2:4	4	So1		also4 from the town of Nazareth in Galilee5	went3		<i>to Bethlehem</i> 6	JOSEPH2	Pr
5	5		there3	HE1	went to register2		<i>with Mary, who...4</i>		Q
	5a		TO HIM4	who1	was pledged2		<i>to be married</i> 3		Q
	5b	and1	^		was expecting2		<i>a child</i> 3		Q
6	6			While they were there1	came3			<i>the time for the BABY to be born</i> 2	Pr
7	7	and1		she2	gave birth3		<i>TO HER FIRSTBORN, A SON</i> 4		Q
	8		She1	HIM3	wrapped2		<i>in cloths</i> 4		Q
	9	and1	^ HIM3		placed1		<i>in a manger</i> 4 <i>because there was no room for them in the inn</i> 5		Q
8	10	And 1	there2	out in the fields5	were3			<i>SHEPHERDS keeping watch over their flocks at night</i> 4	Pr
9	11			TO THEM3	appeared2			<i>An angel of the Lord</i> 1	Pr
	12	and1	AROUND THEM4		shon3			<i>the glory of the Lord</i> 2	Pr
	13	and1	THEY2		were3		<i>terrified</i> 4		Q

Table 2: An example of FSP analysis

3.1 Co-referential strings

It is of crucial importance to distinguish between the co-referential strings on the one hand and the dynamic-semantic strings on the other. The co-referential strings are chains of individual communicative units with the same referent; the string usually starts in the rhematic sphere and, moving across the transition, it finally establishes itself in the thematic layer (Firbas 1992: 27-29). In the thematic sphere, if the notion remains context-dependent, the process may continue within a number of distributional fields. In Table 2, one can easily follow the vertical run of three co-referential strings: those of 'Joseph', the 'baby Jesus' and the 'shepherds'. These strings may be presented in a simplified way as follows:




Table 3: Co-referential strings of LK 2: 4-9

Firbas defines the co-referential strings as “linguistic elements naming or indicating the same extralinguistic phenomenon, in other words having the same referent” (Firbas 1995 and 1992: 32). In the flow of communication, “co-referentiality links elements together, producing co-referential strings” (Firbas 1992: 63).

Apparently, the co-referential strings – in contrast to the syntagmatic quality of the FSP analysis of the clause – run in the text in vertical direction, forming thus a field of paradigmatic relations. The general character of the co-referential strings is demonstrated in Table 4 (the black dots symbolize the movement of the referent from the rheme-proper layer - via the transition - to the thematic layer):

Th	DTh	Tr	Rh
○	○		●
○	●		○
●	○		○
●	○		○
●	○		○
●	○		○
●	○		○

Table 4: Analysis of the co-referential string

3.2 Dynamic-semantic tracks

The other type of vertical chain – the dynamic-semantic tracks – is not based on such inter-layer relations as the co-referential strings are, but on the links established within one of the tracks exclusively. The existence and function of the dynamic-semantic tracks was first described by Firbas in relation to the concept of notional homogeneity of the RhPr layer (Firbas 1992: 77 and 1995: 64-66). The tracks are formed by all the thematic, transitional and rhematic elements of the text respectively. In other words, the rhematic track

of a text, for example, may be described as a complete set of all the rhematic elements found in the given passage. Let me add that since the rhematic sphere is the most dynamic section of every piece of text (Rh-elements carry the highest degrees of CD), it is usually the rhematic track that is central to the functional analysis of a text. Also the thematic and even transitional tracks are, however, capable of chaining into separate dynamic-semantic tracks.

Coming back to Table 1, we can identify, for example, the following rhematic track constituted by all the rhematic elements (due to space limitations, I will present the track in lines, although its character is, of course, vertical):

RhPr: Joseph ⇒ to Bethlehem ⇒ with Mary ⇒ to be married ⇒ a child ⇒ the time for the baby to be born ⇒ to her firstborn, a son ⇒ in cloths ⇒ in a manger ⇒ because there was no room for them in the inn ⇒ shepherds keeping watch over their flocks at night ⇒ An angel of the Lord ⇒ the glory of the Lord

Table 5: The Rhematic Track of the text analysed

At this point let me comment on the semantic character of the rhematic track: a mere outline of its prominent members ‘tells the story’ and contains the information necessary for the reader to follow the narration. Thanks to this notional homogeneity, the dynamic-semantic strings are capable of summarizing and communicating the main points of the message conveyed (for details see Adam 2003: 48-50). The enumeration of the rhematic elements neatly shows the semantic structure of the text and, at the same time, corroborates the significance and prominence of the rhematic layer.

To be more specific, the scene of the text under discussion is gradually entered by four participants: Joseph, the baby, shepherds, and an angel – i.e. the elements that enter the course of communication for the first time and so carry the highest degree of CD. These RhPr notions are accompanied and semantically developed by the elements occupying the Rh-sphere, to be found in Table 2 in the third column from the right.

As has already been mentioned above, the dynamic-semantic tracks may be viewed as a vertical phenomenon; they run through all the distributional fields ‘downwards’. Following a track (for instance a rheme proper track), we get a vertical ‘cut’ through all the text, creating a line of successive members of the RhPr layer. It is then possible to make use of simplified outlines of all the members of the respective dynamic-semantic track. In this sense, they are – together with co-referential strings – a vertical field of paradigmatic relations, though each of them is of a different character.

The paradigmatic chaining of three dynamic-semantic tracks (thematic, transitional and rhematic) can be observed in Table 6 reflecting the FSP analysis in a symbolic way:

Th	Tr	Rh
◆	●	■
◆	●	■
◆	●	■
◆	●	■
◆	●	■
◆	●	■

Table 6: Analysis of the dynamic-semantic tracks

3.3 Syntagmatic and paradigmatic relations within FSP

At this point, by way of a summary, let me recall that the functional analysis of the basic distributional field created by the clause is a horizontal phenomenon characterized by syntagmatic relations between individual elements, whereas the FSP picture of a distributional macrofield formed by higher levels of text operates on the vertical axis and is characterized by two sets of paradigmatic relations (co-referential strings and dynamic-semantic tracks).

Such a two-direction system of relations operating within the discourse logically corresponds with Ferdinand de Saussure's concept of the structure of the language system (de Saussure 1993). De Saussure was the first to come up with the idea that language – as any other signifying system – is based on the relationships that can occur between the units in the system – basically relations of difference and similarity.

The most important kind of relationship, according to de Saussure, is a syntagmatic relation, i.e. a linear (or as I say horizontal) one. He points out that in language – whether in spoken or written form – words come linearly one by one, forming a chain, by which one unit is linked to the next (de Saussure 1993: 170-172). For instance, word order in English – the position of a word in a chain of signification – contributes to meaning: in a neutral clause it is the subject that occupies the first position, following the SVO principle, etc. This concept obviously reflects what has been said above in regard to the dichotomy of the horizontal – vertical relations in FSP analysis: in the interpretation, the syntagmatic relations are primary. Furthermore, de Saussure claims that individual 'syntagms' acquire their value only because they stand in opposition to all elements before or after them. Similarly

enough, the degrees of communicative dynamism are distributed over individual units of the basic distributional field according to the degree to which they contribute to the development of communication; in this sense, the syntagmatic relations are in concordance with one of the central factors in FSP, linear modification. In the development of communication, the meanings of individual elements continually move closer to the high point of the message to finally fulfill the communicative purpose of the author (Firbas 1992: 105). The elements, showing different degrees of CD, differ in the extent to which they contribute to the development of communication.

The other type of Saussurean relationships that functions in the language system is labeled ‘associative’. From the point of view of de Saussure’s dichotomy, the associative relation “unifies individual notions into a virtual mnemonic chain”, in other words, it creates associations of meaning among other members of the text that are not a part of the syntagmatic unit (de Saussure 1993: 171). In this way, the associative relations correspond with the paradigmatic relations described in the theory of FSP; both are non-linear and associate notions in dynamic chains that – if arranged in a logical sequence – carry meaning.

Let me now summarize the results deriving from the discussion above in Table 7:

distributional field	functional level	type of relation	axis of direction	symbol
basic field	clause	syntagmatic	horizontal	
macrofield	co-referential strings	paradigmatic (associative)	vertical	
	dynamic-semantic tracks			
	text	paradigmatic-syntagmatic	horizontal-vertical	

Table 7: Horizontal – vertical relations within FSP

4. Conclusions

As has been shown in this article, it is not merely the clause that may be analysed within the theory of functional sentence perspective; the same principles of FSP may be readily applied also to the higher level of text, i.e. distributional macrofields (such as the paragraph or the chapter). The present article has focused on the horizontal and vertical relations operating within the macrofield as opposed to lower levels of text (the clause). The main concern has been the difference between the co-referential strings and the dynamic-semantic tracks. The theory of FSP has been applied to a particular text type, namely the macrofield of the gospel. It follows that the above-mentioned horizontal – vertical relations are transparently traceable within FSP analysis; the two-dimensional characteristic has been discussed also with regards to the dichotomy concepts offered by Ferdinand de Saussure.

Let me share an observation concerning the functional comparison of FSP and de Saussure's teaching. As has become clear, the vertical-horizontal concepts of study adopted in the theory of functional sentence perspective are in their function identical with the corresponding dichotomy introduced by de Saussure's theory. This may raise a legitimate question: why is that? How is it that the structuralist principles are, in an analogical way, reflected in Firbas's functional approach? In my opinion, both theories are well-founded on the very nature of language. They both study the same material, i.e. the living language used as a tool of communication, and it is only on this provision that the two theories may draw similar conclusions. In the same way as de Saussure looks at the meaning of an individual lexeme or a whole sentence both from the syntagmatic and associative point of view, the researchers in the field of FSP may analogically explore a text both from the horizontal and vertical angles. Generally speaking, in the study of language, both axes are functional.

Finally, I would like to highlight the benefits derived from a two-dimensional approach to the FSP study of text. When both directions – horizontal and vertical – are applied, the functional picture of the text becomes more plastic and distinct. Such an approach apparently enriches the set of methodological tools available. Besides, the present paper has shown that the essential principles adopted in the theory of FSP are also applicable to higher levels of text, i.e. distributional macrofields; one is able to trace both the co-referential strings and the dynamic-semantic tracks running through the text.

This article is meant to be a humble contribution to the research in the field of functional sentence perspective, above all to the function of the thematic and the rhematic layers and the facts resulting from such analysis. It seems that functional implementation of the vertical axis (to broaden the FSP analyses) is worth investigating and that the two-dimensional approach to FSP opens new vistas to further research within text and corpus analysis. The aim of the paper has not been an exhaustive account of the theory of FSP; some interesting issues have been touched upon only briefly and would deserve a more thorough treatment. Being fully aware of the limitations, I am now offering this study to further discussion.

References

- Adam, M. 2003. *Religious text: the thematic and the rhematic layers within a distributional macrofield*. Unpublished PhD thesis, Masaryk University.
- Adam, M. 2004. "FSP analysis of a distributional macrofield". *Brno Studies in English* 30, 13-19.
- Adam, M. 2006. *Functional macrofield perspective (A Religious discourse analysis based on FSP)*. Brno: Masaryk University.
- de Beaugrande, R.; Dressler, W. U. 1981. *Introduction to text linguistics*. London: Longman.
- Brown, G.; Yule, G. 1983 [1991]. *Discourse analysis*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Firbas, J. 1964. "On defining the theme in functional sentence analysis". *Travaux Linguistiques de Prague* 1, 267-280.
- Firbas, J. 1986. "On the dynamics of written communication in the light of the theory of functional sentence perspective". In Cooper, Ch. R.; Greenbaum, S. (eds.). *Studying writing: linguistic approaches*. Beverly Hills: Sage, 40-71.
- Firbas, J. 1989. "Interpreting Psalm 91 from the point of view of functional sentence perspective". In Breivik, L. E. et al. (eds.). *Essays on the English language in honour of Bettil Sundby*. Oslo: Novus Forlag, 107-116.
- Firbas, J. 1992. *Functional sentence perspective in written and spoken communication*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Firbas, J. 1995. "On the thematic and the rhematic layers of a text". In Wårwik, B.; Tanskanen, S.-K.; Hiltunen, R. (eds.). *Organization in discourse: proceedings from the Turku Conference. Anglicana Turkuensia 14*. Turku: University of Turku, 59-72.
- Firbas, J. 1996. "A case study in linear modification: on translating Apo. 21.6b". *Brno Studies in English* 22, 23-48.
- Halliday, M. A. K.; Hasan, R. 1989. *Language, context and text: aspects of language in a social-semiotic perspective*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Kintsch, W. 1974. *The representation of meaning in memory*. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.

-
- Kohlenberger, J. R. (ed.). 1997. *The contemporary parallel New Testament*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- de Saussure, F. 1993. *Course in general linguistics*. [ed. by Bally, Ch.; Sechehaye, A. 1915]. New York: Pergamon Press.
- Svoboda, A. 1983. "Thematic elements". *Brno Studies in English* 15, 49-85.
- Svoboda, A. 1989. *Kapitoly z funkční syntaxe [Chapters from functional syntax]*. Prague: Státní pedagogické nakladatelství.
- van Dijk, T. A. 1977. *Text and context. Explorations in the semantics and pragmatics of discourse*. London: Longman.
- van Dijk, T. A. 1981. *Studies in the pragmatics of discourse*. The Hague: Mouton.
- van Dijk, T. A. 1985. *Handbook of discourse analysis*. London: Academic Press.

English words in Irish texts – a view on cooking recipes

*Theresa-Susanna Illés, Vienna**

0. Introduction

Modern Irish is a language that has no monolingual speakers, hence a great amount of borrowing and code switching must be reckoned with. In the course of its history Irish has come under the influence of a variety of other languages, such as Latin, British Celtic, Scandinavian, Anglo-Norman/French, and English in its various stages.

The grammatical and phonemic system of Irish is quite different from that of the donating languages, which means that quite a substantial amount of adaptation has been necessary in order to facilitate the integration of foreign elements. On the other hand, Irish has been in such close contact with (especially) English over so long a period that consequently English is not considered as “foreign” by most speakers, a tendency which is further strengthened by the very fact that there are, as mentioned above, no Irish monolinguals. People who actually use Irish in their everyday lives fall into two categories: those who use the language because they are used to speaking it, and a – growing – number of speakers who make a conscious effort to use it. The latter tend to pay much more attention to such phenomena as loanwords, and are therefore most likely to avoid them. In their cases one also comes across popular errors concerning the origin of some words, when the origin of some words is mistaken and the wrongly perceived foreignness of a given lexeme is seen as a reason for rejecting it.¹

* The author can be contacted under theresa.illes@univie.ac.at.

¹ A popular example is the word *carr* ‘car’, considered by many to be a loan from English, while in fact being a native Irish word. The English *car*, on the other hand, is a loan from Celtic (via Latin). *Cúinne* ‘corner’, in contrast is a loan from Romance but is frequently believed to be of Irish origin. In this context it may be interesting to note that many speakers use *coirnéal* to describe a corner pointing outward, whereas *cúinne* is used for ‘nook’. That is, you may walk around a *coirnéal* but hide in a *cúinne*. Ó Dónaill (1977) does not differentiate this. Both words are loans, but only the *coirnéal* is usually regarded as one.

In standard usage and for official purposes, loanwords are generally avoided wherever possible and replaced by new coinings in Irish. In theory it is the *Coiste Téarmaíochta*, the Committee on Terminology, that is responsible for this, and a list of new terms are regularly published in various magazines such as *Comhar* (n.a. 2004) as well as (not so regularly, of course) in a series of specialised dictionaries (e.g. *An Gúm* [1978], 1983, [1993], *Oifig an tSoláthair* 1978). In practice, however, the need for new terms often arises so spontaneously that a government committee is not likely and, indeed, not able to fulfil all the demands. So speakers are left to their own devices. It is especially the daily newspaper *An Lá* and the weekly *Foinse* that regularly come up with such much needed terminology, which may or may not be taken up by others afterwards.² Failing that, of course, speakers and writers of Irish are likely to resort to loanwords after all, particularly in the more exclusive or specialised registers.

One of the biggest problems that arise when integrating foreign elements is that the Irish phonemic system has two sets of consonants, generally referred to as *broad* and *slender* (or *leathan* and *caol*) respectively: slender consonants are palatal or palatalised, broad consonants are velarised, dental, rounded or otherwise non-palatal, their actual quality depending on their place and manner of articulation. This system, of course, has some effect on orthography and mutation is also partly conditioned by it.

In any dictionary foreign elements that have been “officially” integrated into the Irish language are given the right shape to fit in, i.e. the spelling is changed in order to make a non-avoidable loanword that cannot be avoided at least “look Irish”. Examples are words like *cartún* /kartu:n/ ‘cartoon’ or *poirceallán* /por’k’alla:n/ ‘porcelain’.

In this paper the question how English words behave when they appear in an otherwise Irish text will be addressed and particular attention will be paid to whether they undergo mutation or not. The texts chosen for this study are a collection of cooking recipes as are fairly regularly published in *Foinse*. This text type is of a quite restricted nature, especially when it comes to the range of vocabulary. The rather specialised register and style (lists of ingredients, brief instructions) would lead one to expect a great number of loans in a very limited number of grammatical constructions, among which constructions with numerals are expected to play a much greater role than in other texts.

² Thus, it was in *Foinse* that terms like *saighdiúirí coise* ‘ground troops’ (lit. ‘soldiers of foot’) and *déghnéasachas* ‘bisexuality’ (‘bi’ + ‘sexual’ + abstract noun ending) were first coined (Alex Hijmans of *Foinse*, personal communication).

The questions raised are whether there is any regularity in the use of English loans, and if there is, whether grammatical rules are consistently applied. The present paper is a supplement to my MA-thesis (Illés 2001), which investigated the use of mutation on loanwords in general articles, but in which I had to disregard cooking recipes since they had no equivalent in *An Lá*, the other paper under investigation and the one that the treatment of loans in *Foinse* was being compared to.

1. Initial mutations

Before going into detail, I shall give an overview of the way initial mutation works in Irish, since the phenomenon is fairly unusual among the Indo-European languages – at least to such a marked degree.

Irish initial mutation is a kind of umlaut phenomenon that affects only word initial sounds and never transgresses phrase boundaries; that is, whereas mutation may occur within a phrase (such as a noun phrase – (clitic) article/noun/adjective, or a verb phrase – verbal particle/verb), a verb, on the other hand, will not mutate a following subject.³

The rules governing this phenomenon are extremely complex and allow for all sorts of exceptions and, furthermore, may differ in the various dialects. Thus all I can give here is a very brief summary. The mutational patterns may be summarised as follows:

radical	<p>	<t>	<c>		<d>	<g>	<m>	<s>	<f>
	/p; p ^w / ⁴	/t; t ^w /	/k; k ^w /	/b; b ^w /	/d; d ^w /	/g; g ^w /	/m; m ^w /	/s; s ^w /	/f; f ^w /
IPA	p ^w ; p ^j	t; t ^j	k; k ^j	b ^w ; b ^j	d; d ^j	g; g ^j	m ^w ; m ^j	s; ɟ	ɸ; f ^j
lenited	<ph>	<th>	<ch>	<bh>	<dh>	<gh>	<mh>	<sh>*	<fh>
	/f; f ^w /	/h; (h ^w)/	/x; x ^w /	/w; w ^w /	/ɣ; ɣ ^w /	/ɣ; ɣ ^w /	/w; w ^w /	/h; (h ^w)/	∅
IPA	ɸ; f ^j	h; h ^j (ç)	x; ç	w; v	ɣ; j	ɣ; j	w; v	h; h ^j (ç)	---

* exceptions: no mutation of *sp-*, *st-*, *sc-*, *sm-*, *sf-*.

Table 1: Lenition (aspiration)⁵ affecting consonants only

³ The object does not constitute part of the verbal (or predicate) phrase, since the basic sentence structure of Irish (as in all modern Celtic languages) is VSO. Thus the verbal form is never directly followed by the object, unless the verbal form is inflected rather than consisting of the stem followed by a personal pronoun, as is so often the case in Irish. Even in the latter case, however, the object is not affected by any mutation triggered by a verbal form. In Welsh, on the other hand, the object of the inflected, personal (i.e. non-passive) form of a verb does undergo *treigladd meddal* ('soft mutation'; cf. Lewis [1999]: 76).

⁴ The second line below the radical forms gives the transcription used for Irish, in which the apostrophe replaces a superscript *j* to denote the slender or palatal quality.

radical	<p>	<t>	<c>		<d>	<g>	<f>	<V>
	/p; p'/	/t; t'/	/k; k'/	/b; b'/	/d; d'/	/g; g'/	/m; m'/	/V/
IPA	p ^w ; p ^j	t; t ^j	k; k ^j	b ^w ; b ^j	d; d ^j	g; g ^j	m ^w ; m ^j	
nasalised	<bp>	<dt>	<gc>	<mb>	<nd>	<ng>	<bhf>	<nV; n-V>
	/b; b'/	/d; d'/	/g; g'/	/m; m'/	/n; n'/	/ŋ; ŋ'/	/w; w'/	/nV; n'V'/
IPA	b ^w ; b ^j	d; d ^j	g; g ^j	m ^w ; m ^j	n; ɲ	ŋ; ŋ ^j	w; v	

Table 2: Nasalisation (eclipsis) affecting vowels and consonants

In the tables above, *radical* refers to the unmutated value of the grapheme/phoneme in question. The mutated forms (lenited or nasalised), their spellings and values, are given in the second part of each table.

radical	V	radical	V	s
aspiration	<h-V>; <hV>	t-prefix	<tV>; <t-V>	<ts>*
(vowels only)	/hV; (h'V')/	(vowels and s-)	/tV; t'V'/	/t; t'/

* exceptions: no mutation of *sp-*, *st-*, *sc-*, *sm-*, *sf-*.

Table 3: Aspiration (*h*-prefix); *t*-prefix

As indicated by the exceptions (*) added to the tables, not all consonant clusters are subject to mutation: sonority reversals including *s-* are not. In the case of lenition there is also one general exception, the so-called rule of homorganic delenition: lenition of *t-*, *d-* and *s-* is not possible after *n-* (at least; occasionally it does not occur after *r-*, *l-*, *d-*, *t-*, *s-* either). This usually applies to elements following the article and to second elements in compounds. On the other hand and in spite of this rule, adjectives are lenited after feminine singular nouns in all cases except the genitive, even if the noun ends in /n/ and the adjective begins with a /d/, for example: *an tine dheas* ‘the nice fire’ (*tine*, f. ‘fire’), vs. *an bhean dheas* ‘the nice woman’ (*bean*, f. ‘woman’), where final *-n* does not prevent the lenition of initial *d-*. Homorganics do not affect

⁵ The term used for this phenomenon is *lenition* in by far the greatest part of the literature (e.g. Ó Dónaill, É. 2005, Ó Siadhail [1991], Ó Dónaill, N. 1977); occasionally, however, *aspiration* is used, especially in the older literature (e.g. The Christian Brothers [1997], a reprint from the 1960ies). This can create misunderstandings, since *aspiration* is now sometimes (e.g. Stifter 2006) used to describe the *h*-prefix (cf. table 3). Following the tradition of the Indo-European/Celtic Studies department in Vienna, I will use the term *lenition* in this case, and *aspiration* to refer to the *h*-prefix. For the same reason, the term *nasalisation* is used instead of *eclipsis*: *nasalisation* refers to the fact that in Old Irish this mutation was originally triggered by a preceding nasal auslaut, and was orthographically represented only if it in fact resulted in a nasal (cf. Stifter 2006: 32-3). In order not to confuse the students it was decided that *nasalisation* be generally used for Modern Irish as well.

the process of nasalisation, except when an article precedes a preposition (see below).

The following inventory lists the most important cases in which mutation applies; it is neither exhaustive nor perfectly accurate, and takes only those cases into consideration that are relevant to the present study.

1.1 The singular articles cause the following mutations: *an* as the masculine article in the nominative singular causes *t*-prefix before vowels, while in the genitive singular it causes lenition and *t*-prefix before *s*-. *An* as the feminine article in the nominative singular causes lenition and *t*-prefix before *s*-; the genitive singular form of the feminine article is *na*, which causes aspiration.

Examples:

<i>an t-úll</i> (nom. sg. m.) ‘the apple’: <i>t</i> -prefix before vowel	<i>an úill</i> (gen. sg. m.): no mutation
<i>an aontacht</i> (nom. sg. f.) ‘the unity’: no <i>t</i> -prefix before vowel	<i>na haontachta</i> (gen. sg. f.): <i>h</i> -prefix
<i>an fear</i> (nom. sg. m.) ‘the man’: no lenition	<i>an fhir</i> (gen. sg. m.): lenition
<i>an bhileog</i> (nom. sg. f.) ‘the leaf’: lenition	<i>na bileoige</i> (gen. sg. f.): no mut. of cons.
<i>an solas</i> (nom. sg. m.) ‘the light’: no <i>t</i> -prefix before <i>s</i> -	<i>an tsolais</i> (gen. sg. m.): <i>t</i> -prefix
<i>an tsoilse</i> (nom. sg. f.) ‘the brightness’: <i>t</i> -prefix before <i>s</i> -	<i>na soilse</i> (gen. sg. f.): no mut. of cons.

There is only one article of each gender for the singular nominative, dative and accusative cases. The latter two are usually subsumed under the heading *common case*. Apart from a few exceptions (which are mostly to do with prepositions, see 1.3 below) there is not much difference between *common case* on the one and *nominative case* on the other hand. The *t*-prefix only ever occurs after a singular article.

The plural article *na* causes aspiration if it represents the nominative. For the genitive it causes nasalisation: *na húlla* ‘the apples’; *na n-úll* ‘of the apples’;

Examples from the data include *an ghairleog* (nom. sg. f.) ‘the garlic’, *an tsíoróip mhailpe* (gen. sg. f.) ‘the maple syrup’ and *na hoinniúin* (nom. pl.) ‘the onions’.

1.2 Genitives are lenited if they follow a noun in the plural that ends in a slender consonant (*fir bhaile* ‘men of a town’), or a feminine noun in any case in the singular except the genitive (*bean bhaile* ‘a woman of a town’ vs. *na mná baile* ‘of the woman of a town’). In most cases of successive genitives, however, it is usually the last item only that is put into the genitive case; all preceding nouns are in the nominative (though functionally in the genitive), and are lenited: *eochair dhoras theach an mhúinteora* ‘the key of the door (lenited nom.!) of the house (lenited nom.!) of the teacher (gen. + article)’.

1.3 Constructions consisting of the common case singular article plus a preposition are a special case. Originally, the preposition had an effect on the

mutational pattern triggered by the article only insofar as it determined the case the article had to be in (mostly dative or accusative). Generally, the dative article would cause lenition, the accusative article would cause nasalisation. In the course of time the two cases merged, which resulted in the free choice of either lenition or nasalisation in these constructions. Today the various dialects opt for different patterns: in the North, the tendency is to lenite, in the West and South nasalisation mostly follows this construction. Hence the fact that articles preceded by a preposition cause mutational patterns different from the patterns they affect when they are used without a preposition is a Modern Irish irregularity.

In Standard Irish, the following rules apply: if the noun following such a construction begins with *s-*, there is (usually) no mutation if it is masculine; if it is feminine, the *t-*prefix replaces lenition (for more examples cf. Ó Siadhail [1991]: 127-30):

Examples:

den < *de* 'of' + article; *fear* 'man', m.

North: *den fhear* 'of the man'

West: *den fhear*

South: *den fhear*; *den bhfear*

Standard: *den fhear*

sa < *i* 'in' + article; *solas* 'light', m.

North: *sa solas* (= no mut.), but also : *sa tsolas*

West: *sa solas* (= nasalisation)

South: *sa solas* (= nasalisation), but also: *sa tsolas*

Standard: *sa solas* (= no mutation)

faoin < *faoi* 'under, about' + article; *soilse* 'brightness', f.

North: *faoin tsoilse*

West: *faoin soilse*; but also: *faoin tsoilse*

South: *faoin soilse*

Standard: *faoin tsoilse*

ón < *ó* 'from' + article; *capall* 'horse', m.

North: *ón chapall*

West: *ón gcapall*

South: *ón gcapall*

Standard: *ón gcapall*

as 'out (of)' + article; *béal* 'mouth', m.

North: *as an bhéal*

West: *as an mbéal*

South: *as an mbéal*

Standard: *as an mbéal*

Some instances contained in the data include *ar an phiorra* 'on the pear', *leis an phesto* 'with the pesto' and *as an phota* 'out of the pot'.

1.4 Irish names are treated exactly like ordinary Irish words but they must be lenited whenever they are genitival in function, regardless of the phonemic or morphological form of the preceding element: *teach Dhiarmada* 'Diarmad's house'; cf. *ó shiopa Mhitchell* 'from Mitchell's shop' in the data.

1.5 In those cases where a preposition demands the ordinary nominative as opposed to the common case (which is fairly rare) or the genitive case (which is quite frequent), the usual rules concerning articles apply.

1.6 Prepositions may cause lenition, nasalisation, aspiration, or no mutation at all; in some cases, a particular preposition may demand more than one of these patterns, depending on the construction or idiom it is used in. Thus *ar* ‘on’ lenites the following noun (*ar dhíon* ‘on a roof’), except in references of a more general nature, such as *ar cíos* ‘rented; lit. on rent’, *ar muir* ‘on sea’, *ar cosa in airde* ‘galloping; lit. on feet high up’. The data does contain a number of examples as well, e.g. *ó shiopa* (ó ‘from’ + Len.) ‘from a shop’, *ar phláta* (*ar* ‘on’ + Len.) ‘on a plate’, *i bpota* (*i* ‘in’ + Nas.) ‘in a pot’.

1.7 Numbers are a rather complex field, and are quite important in the case of cooking recipes. To put it briefly, the numbers from 1 to 6 cause lenition, 7 to 10 cause nasalisation; all are used with the nominative singular. In some cases, especially with mass nouns or certain words that indicate larger quantities, the numbers 1 and 2 cause lenition, 3 to 6 cause no mutation at all, and 7 to 10 nasalise. In these cases, then, 1 and 2 are used with the nominative singular, and 3 to 10 with a special counting plural identical to either the ordinary plural or the genitive singular.⁶

Examples:

general nouns

aon, dhá bhíleog ‘1, 2 leaf/leaves’

trí, ceithre, cúig, sé bhíleog ‘3, ... 6 leaves’

seacht, ocht, naoi, deich mbíleog ‘7, ... 10 leaves’

mass nouns/ quantities:

aon, dhá bhliain ‘1, 2 year(s)’

trí, ceithre, cúig, sé bliana ‘3, ... 6 years’

seacht, ocht, naoi, deich mbliana ‘7, ... 10 years’

Some examples from the data are 2 *bhosca* ‘two boxes’, 8 *n-unsá* ‘eight ounces’, 1 *channa* ‘one can’, 4 *phíosá* ‘four pieces’, 2 *phunt* ‘two pounds’.

Numbers above ten are composed of the numerals 1 to 9 plus ‘teen’, ‘twenty’, ‘thirty’, etc. added after the noun. The decades 20+ do not cause mutation. Adjectives following numerals from 2 to 19 plus noun are always in the plural and lenited.

All ordinal numbers, except *céad* (first) and *dara* (second), end in *-ú*, which causes aspiration. So does *dara*. *Céad* causes lenition (and is itself always lenited when following whatever article).

1.8 Adjectives do not cause mutation, and the way they are themselves affected by mutation depends on both their morphological and phonemic environments. Roughly, they are lenited if they follow a feminine noun in the

⁶ Matters are slightly different again when counting people, but this does not concern us here.

nominative or common singular, a masculine noun in the genitive singular, or a noun in the nominative plural if the latter's (weak)⁷ plural ends in a palatal consonant (the one phonemic trigger). If a masculine noun is lenited after the combination of article and preposition so is usually the adjective; if, for whatever reason, the noun is not, neither is the adjective. Adjectives following feminine nouns, however, are always lenited in such constructions. If an adjective follows a (singular) noun qualified by a numeral from 2 to 19, the adjective itself must be in the plural and lenited (even if the noun itself is nasalised by the numeral). Attributive adjectives are never nasalised, nor do they receive *h-* or *t-* prefixes. Predicative adjectives may, however, be aspirated if directly following certain particles; thus they are always aspirated after the adverbial particle *go* (e.g. *álainn* 'beautiful' and *go hálainn* 'beautifully') and lenited when following the past/conditional form of the copula.

Examples:

feminine noun, nom. sg. f.	<i>an bhean bheag</i> 'the small woman'
masculine noun, gen. sg. f.	<i>an fhir bhig</i> 'of the small man'
noun, nom. pl. (weak), palatal auslaut	<i>na fir bheaga</i> 'the small men'
prep. + article, masculine noun lenited	<i>leis an fhear bheag</i> 'with the small man'
prep. + article, masculine noun unlenited	<i>leis an bhfear beag</i> 'with the small man'
prep. + article, masculine noun not mutable	<i>leis an leabhar beag</i> 'with the small book'
prep. + article, feminine noun unlenited	<i>leis an mbean bheag</i> 'with the small woman'
numeral + noun + adjective, noun lenited	<i>trí theach bheaga</i> 'three small houses'
numeral + noun + adjective, noun nasalised	<i>naoi dteach bheaga</i> 'nine small houses'
past form of copula + adjective	<i>ba mhaith</i> 'it would be good'

1.9 Possessive adjectives adhere to the following pattern: their plural forms always cause nasalisation. In the singular, the first, the second and the masculine third person cause lenition, the feminine third person causes aspiration.

1.10 In compounds the second element is always lenited (unless in the case of homorganic delenition, see above): *an-mhaith* 'very good', *dátheangach* 'bilingual' (*dá* 'two' + *teanga* 'language' + adjectival ending); the data contained instances like *gnáthphlúir* 'ordinary flour' and *réamhchúrsa* 'starter, lit. pre-course'.

1.11 As far as the mutation of verbal forms is concerned, there are a number of constructions where the verb must either be lenited, nasalised or aspirated. In general, lenition occurs after the interrogative particle *ar*, the negative

⁷ To put it briefly, *weak plurals* are plurals with different forms for the nominative/common and the genitive. *Strong plurals*, on the other hand, are usually formed by suffixes which are the same for all cases, including the marginal vocative. *Strong plurals* do not cause mutation.

particles *ní*, *níor*, *nár*, *cha*, *char* (the latter two are dialectal) as well as after the relative particles *a* (direct) and *ar*, and the conjunction *gur*. Nasalisation applies after the interrogative particle *an*, the negative particle *nach*, the relative particle *a* (indirect) and the conjunction *go*. Verbs in the past, imperfect and conditional are lenited throughout; in the latter two cases, lenition is overruled by nasalisation after nasalising particles. Verbs in the autonomous form of the past tense are never lenited. Verbs are aspirated after the negative particle *ná*.

Examples:

interrogative particle <i>ar</i>	<i>ar chuir tú?</i> ‘did you put’ (<i>ar</i> + past of <i>cuir</i> ‘put’ + pers. pron. 2sg.)
negative particle <i>ní</i>	<i>ní chuirim</i> ‘I do not put’ (<i>ní</i> + inflected 1sg. pres. of <i>cuir</i>)
negative particle <i>níor</i>	<i>níor chuir mé</i> ‘I did not put’ (<i>níor</i> + past of <i>cuir</i> + pers. pron. 1sg.)
direct relative <i>a</i>	<i>an rud a chuirim</i> ‘the thing that I put’ (pres.)
conjunction <i>gur</i>	<i>deirim gur chuir mé</i> ‘I say that I put’ (past)
interrogative particle <i>an</i>	<i>an gcuireann tú?</i> ‘do you put’ (<i>an</i> + pres. of <i>cuir</i> + pers. pron. 2sg.)
indirect relative <i>a</i>	<i>an bord ar a gcuirim é</i> ‘the table I put it on’ (pres. + object pronoun <i>é</i> ‘it’)
conjunction <i>go</i>	<i>deirim go gcuirim</i> ‘I say that I put’ (pres.)
past tense, lenited throughout	<i>chuir mé</i> ‘I put’ (past) BUT: <i>cuireadh</i> ‘it was put’ (autonomous form, no lenition)
negative <i>ná</i>	<i>ná hól é!</i> ‘don’t drink it!’ (<i>ná</i> + <i>ól</i> ‘drink’ (imper. 2sg.))

In spite of the complexity of the system, mutations are still fairly productive; Already a cursory glancing at a newspaper page suggests that even foreign words undergo mutation to a very great extent. The present study will analyse whether mutations are applied regularly in recipes or whether they are applied arbitrarily, i.e. whenever the author feels like it or happens to think of it.

2. Foinse

The data for the present analysis was taken from the weekly tabloid *Foinse*, which is based in An Ceathrú Rua/Carraroe, Co. Galway and printed in Tralee, Co. Kerry by *The Kerryman*. The paper appears every Saturday and the circulation is between 4,000 and 4,300 per issue, most of them being sold in Ireland and the United Kingdom. The politically independent *Foinse* is heavily funded, but has managed to steadily increase its readership since it was first published in October 1996. The currently 40 pages (originally 24) cover a wide variety of topics, from politics, Gaeltacht matters and Irish interest, economy and literature to sports and the media. Six columns are published regularly, among them the cooking recipes. The paper thus caters for a broad public, including native as well as second-language speakers. During the Irish school year a special supplement is published, *Foinse sa Rang*, which is primarily aimed at students at Leaving Cert level, but also at people with a moderate command of the language. Officially, the *Caighdeán*

(Standard Irish) is used throughout the paper, with local accents here and there. The author of the cooking column is Brian Ó Domhnaill, a speaker of Ulster Irish (which is sometimes reflected in the Irish used in his columns and may occasionally explain the way loanwords are spelt).

The language policy employed in *Foinse* is described in the following way: “One of the papers [sic] objectives is to provide high quality Irish language journalism in a manner that is enjoyable to read” (*Foinse* homepage, link: *eolas - Foinse*). Their policy is that Irish is to be used throughout; hence, as already indicated, one would expect loanwords or other foreign elements to be avoided as far as possible. This, of course, is extremely hard to keep up in practice.

2.1 The data

In this study, the following issues of *Foinse* were investigated:

year:	issues:
1998	Aug. 30 = 2(45), Sept. 6 = 2(46), Sept. 13 = 2(47), Sept. 20 = 2(48), Sept. 27 = 2(49), Oct. 4 = 2(50), Oct. 11 = 2(51)
1999	Feb. 14 = 3(19), Feb. 21 = 3(20)
2001	June 10 = 5(140)
2002	June 16 = 6(294), June 30 = 6(296)
2003	July 6 = 7(349)

Table 4: Issues of *Foinse* – numbers and dates of publication

The choice of issues was dictated both by their availability and the fact that not all issues contain recipes.

It should be mentioned at this point that most of the recipes tend to be reprinted after a year or so. As a result the same texts are re-published in yearly or biennial cycles – often under slightly different headings, and, in some cases, containing altered structures. In the material under scrutiny here there was only one such repetition: the column of the June 10, 2001 issue was reprinted for July 6, 2003.

3. The analysis.

3.1 Preliminaries

Since it is sometimes very difficult to determine whether a given loan was taken over from English or French (i.e. Anglo-Norman), or, for that matter, when it entered the Irish language,⁸ I included all words that may have come from either source, regardless of the time of borrowing and regardless of whether they are attested in a dictionary. Furthermore, impromptu loans from languages other than English (and AN) were also included. They were mostly adopted from Modern French, German and Italian, as well as some Asian languages, and it is reasonable to assume them to have been borrowed from English usage rather than directly from the individual languages themselves. That is to say, they are probably used in an Irish text because they would be used in an English one as well. The aim of this study is to investigate the application of mutational patterns in current usage, and thus I decided to include all loans that may be reasonably expected to be recognised as such by a modern speaker, even if the actual borrowing happened a good few hundred years ago, as in the case of *dinnéar* ‘dinner’ or *buidéal* ‘bottle’ (cf. also fn. 1).

Personal names, place names, and the like were treated separately in the account, since they cannot be considered as loans proper. Furthermore, one would expect them to appear mostly in the independent nominative singular form in the data, usually in lists of vines and their places of origin. We will see how this assumption is borne out by the data. In this case, and since the number of names occurring in the data is fairly low, I did not distinguish between different donating languages (mostly English, but also Modern French).

Borrowed abbreviations are comparatively rare and of no great variety. They will briefly be dealt with in an extra section.

One further problem, however, was somewhat more difficult to resolve: the question of whether “household terms”, such as *Riesling*, *cheddar*, *bolognaise*, etc. should be considered as names or common nouns. It was

⁸ Especially so, since there is no etymological dictionary of the Irish language to date. However, etymological notes are given by a number of dictionaries, such as the *DIL* (Royal Irish Academy [1999], and de Bhaldraithe 1981) and Dineen [1996], or McBain’s online dictionary (www.ceantar.org/Dicts/MB2/index.html), even though the last is mainly concerned with Scottish Gaelic. Other literature includes Risk 1970-1971, 1974, or Vendryes 1959-1978.

decided to treat them as ordinary loans; more fancy names of wines and the like, on the other hand, were counted as names.

3.2 Mutations

3.2.1 Mutating the loanword

First of all we will look at the total number of loans and their treatment with regard to mutation in the texts. There, the following pattern emerged:

description	number	percentage
a. total number of loans (token)	977	100%
total number of loans (type)	220	100%
b. loans with mutable initial (token)	810	82.91%
loans with mutable initial (type)	177	80.45%
c. loans in mutating position (token)	199	20.37% of total
		24.57% of mutable initial
d. loans actually mutated (token)	167	17.09% of total
		20.62% of mutable initial
		83.92% of mutating position

Table 5: English loanwords in cooking recipes.

In table 5, the total number of loans (separated by type and token) is held against the number of loans with mutable anlaut, that is, loans that can at all be mutated in the first place (b.), and loans used in a structure demanding the application of mutations (c.). Finally, the number of the loans that actually underwent mutations is given. The numbers clearly show that, as expected, only very few loanwords actually appear in positions where they may undergo mutation. But whenever they are in mutating position, the great majority (more than eighty percent) of loanwords does in fact mutate. This may seem surprising, but the finds here by and large match the results obtained for loanwords in articles on general topics in mostly the same issues (Illés 2001: 128-30).

When splitting up these results by individual mutations, the picture given in table 6 emerges. This table is to be read as follows. The first three columns refer to the loanwords containing mutable initials. These are followed by the results for the individual mutational patterns: aspiration (i.e. *h*-prefix), lenition, nasalisation and *t*-prefix. The column marked 'Len./Nas.' refers to those cases where either nasalisation or lenition may apply, that is, the cases where the loanword in question is preceded by a combination of preposition and singular common case article. The numbers to the right of oblique strokes

give the total number of potentially mutated forms, the number to the left is the number of actual occurrences: for example, in the data, *c-* is lenited in 13 out of 20 possible cases.

Initial	Number (token)	% of total	Aspiration	Lenition	Nasalis.	Len./Nas.	<i>t</i> -prefix	Mutation total
a	22	2.4	4/4		--		--	4/4
e	2	0.22	--		--		1/1	1/1
i	--		--		--		--	--
o	34	3.72	8/8		--		2/2	10/10
u	23	2.51	1/1		14/12		--	13/15
b	51	5.57		7/7	4/4	--		11/11
c	158	17.27		13/20	2/2	2/3 L=1,N=1		17/25
d	13	1.42		0/1	--			0/1
f	27	2.95		3/6	1/1	--		4/7
g	65	7.10		10/12	--	10/10 L=9,N=1		20/22
m	27	2.95		10/14		1/1 (L)		11/15
p	186	20.33		28/32	16/16	16/18 L=15,N=1		60/66
s	99	10.82		7/10		0/2 →	1/1 (1/3)	7/10 (+1/3)
t	41	4.48		8/9	--			9/8
total	748	81.75	13/13	86/111	37/35	29/32 (+0/2)	3/3 (+1/1)	166/196 (+1/3)

Table 6: English loanwords in cooking recipes. Frequency of initials and mutation

With regard to initial *s-*, matters are further complicated by the fact that *s* in Len./Nas. position will undergo neither; lenition in these cases is replaced by the *t*-prefix. This is indicated by the arrow under ‘Len./Nas.’. Thus, 2 *s-* are in L/N-position, none of which undergoes *t*-prefixation. The column marked ‘*t*-prefix’, then, gives the number of prefixations in other environments (such as feminine nominative singular, or masculine genitive singular). The total number of *t*-prefixes (L/N-position plus other environments) is given in brackets underneath.

It is interesting to note the consistency in the mutating of vowels. The number of types of initial vowels is very low (thus there are only two in the case of *u-*: *unsa* ‘ounce’ and *usáid* ‘use’), but if a vowel can be mutated, it almost invariably is. This is especially remarkable since one would expect consonants to be far more likely to undergo mutation. A good example in this context is the consistent and correct mutation of *unsa* after numerals: 12 out of 14 occurrences of *unsa* in nasalising positions are in fact nasalised (the only occurrence of the nasalisation of *u-* in this subset of the data). This amounts to around 87%. For *c-* the rate is 68%, even though, of course, the number of types is much higher (36). Furthermore, even among consonants

there are great differences in the rates of “correctly” applied mutation. While *f*-⁹ is only lenited in 50% of the cases, the rates for *c*- are remarkably low, whereas *p*- and *t*- undergo mutation in most instances.

3.2.2 Loanwords causing mutation

description	number	percentage
a. total number of loans (token)	1011	100%
b. loans followed by mutable initial (token)	275	27.2%
c. loans in position to mutate (token)	54	5.34% of total 19.64% of mutable initial following
d. loans actually mutating (token)	41	4.06% of total 14.91% of mutable initial following 75.94% of mutating position

Table 7: Mutation caused by loanwords

As table 7 shows, mutation triggered by loanwords is by far the rarer phenomenon, for the simple reason that the number of instances where a loanword is in a position to mutate a following element is much lower. There are basically two possibilities: a loanword followed by a genitive and a loanword followed by an adjective. Only 275 of 1011 foreign elements (loans, names and abbreviations; token) are to be found in a structure where they might at all exert a mutating influence on a following element (mutable initial preceded by the loanword, name or abbreviation within a phrase); of those only 54 are in actual mutation positions. On the other hand, this number yields a percentage comparatively close to that of the mutation of loanwords (19.64% against 24.57% in table 6). Of the 54 cases just mentioned, 41 are in fact mutated, that is 75.94%. Although a little lower, this is not substantially different from the results obtained for loanwords (83.92%).

As already explained above (see 1.8), the only mutation attributive adjectives may undergo is lenition, and the same is true for genitives following another noun. Hence all instances of mutation caused by loanwords in the data are instances of leniting.

⁹ This is to be expected because even in Irish words /f/ is liable to escape mutation, probably because it disappears altogether in this case, and apparently this is increasingly felt to distort the original element beyond recognition.

3.2.3 Mutating names

description	number	percentage
a. total number of loans (token)	71	100%
total number of loans (type)	57	100%
b. loans with mutable initial (token)	57	80.28%
loans with mutable initial (type)	45	78.95%
c. loans in mutating position (token)	28	39.45% of total
		49.12% of mutable initial
d. loans actually mutated (token)	7	9.86% of total
		12.28% of mutable initial
		25% of mutating position

Table 8: Proper names in cooking recipes

There are some interesting differences to “ordinary” loanwords, even though the fact that the number of foreign names is far lower than that of real loans renders a comparison somewhat difficult.

First of all, the percentage of items in mutating position is a little higher for proper names than for loanwords; this partly contradicts our original supposition that names would appear mainly as nominatives. There is a small number appearing as nominatives of course, but an unexpectedly high number appears in the genitive, and, as already mentioned in 1.4, names must be lenited in this case. The frequency of actual mutation in mutating positions, however, is significantly lower than in the case of common loanwords (25% vs. close to 84%).

Let us now take a look at the distribution of mutational patterns:

Initial	Number (token)	% of total	Aspiration	Lenition	Nasalis.	Len./Nas.	t-Prefix	Mutation total
a	5	7.04	--		--		0/1	0/1
e	--	--	--		--		--	--
i	--	--	--		--		--	--
o	--	--	--		--		--	--
u	--	--	--		--		--	--
b	13	18.31		1/9	--	--		1/9
c	3	4.25		0/2	--	--		0/2
d	1	1.41		0/1	--			0/1
f	3	4.23		--	--	--		--
g	5	7.04		0/4	--	--		0/4
m	8	11.27		1/3		--		1/3
p	13	18.31		5/8	--	--		5/8
s	6	8.45		--		--	--	--
t	--	--		--	--			--
total	57	80.28	--	7/27	--	--	0/1	7/28

Table 9: Names in cooking recipes. Frequency of initials and mutation

In the data under examination there was no instance of a name appearing in either a nasalising or an aspirating context. There are, however, a few cases

where lenition could have applied, but in the majority of cases it was not put into operation. An even lower percentage of actual mutations occurred among names in *Foinse* articles in general: lenition occurred in 26 out of 177 cases (Illés 2001: 134f.). It seems that foreign, even English, names are a lot less likely to be integrated into Irish texts than ordinary words are. This might be explained in several ways. Either they are considered more alien in an Irish text than loans as such and are therefore left unchanged, or, on the other hand, mutating them seems inappropriate since their original “look” is felt to be destroyed by adding or inserting extra letters.

3.2.4 Mutation of loan abbreviations

Abbreviations of loanwords hardly play a role in the recipes under investigation. There are only three types to be identified in the texts, viz. *pt.* = *pionta* ‘pint’, *sp.* = *spúnóg* ‘spoon(ful)’ and *s.* = *sampla* ‘sample, example’. The latter occurs only once, in the form *msh* = *mar shampla* ‘for example’, with correctly applied lenition after *mar*. This, however, is not surprising, since *mar shampla* is already a widely used standard phrase. *Pt.* appears six times, in all cases correctly lenited after numerals ‘one’ and ‘two’ respectively: *1 pht.*, *2 pht.* Finally, *spúnóg* is irrelevant in this case, since it is impossible to mutate initial *sp-*.

Even though the number of occurrences is far too low to allow for any comparisons, let it be noted here that for *Foinse* articles in general the rate of actually applied mutation is around 9% (Illés 2001: 147).

3.2.5 Mutation and English orthography

As could be expected, there is no instance of mutation among loanwords with non-Irish initial graphemes: *an jab* ‘the job’, *i wok* ‘in a wok’, *an kebab*. It would have been interesting to see whether an English grapheme representing a mutable consonant would in fact be mutated (such as the genitive of *kebab* after an article), but the data contained no such items.

Loanwords with English (or other) spellings may or may not be mutated. Thus the data includes for instance *ar an cous cous* ‘on(to) the cous cous’, *den paté* ‘from the paté’ and *as an pasta dubh* ‘from the black pasta’; but on the other hand forms like *den mhustard garbh* ‘of the hot mustard’ and *cáis pharmesan* ‘parmesan cheese’, alongside *leis an phesto* ‘with the pesto’ and *don phasta dubh* ‘to the black pasta’ are attested as well. It seems that in these cases mutation is a matter of the author’s whim rather than the result of a consciously and systematically applied process.

3.3 Varia

There are some further phenomena worth taking note of. First of all, there are a few instances where the (correct) singular form of the loanword after a numeral is followed by a misplaced singular form of the (native) adjective: 8 *chilí glasa* (pl.) ‘8 green chillies’ as opposed to 4 *chilí dearg* (sg.) ‘4 red chillies’. In constructions of numerals from 2 to 19 + noun + adjective the adjective should be in the plural rather than, as is the case here, in the singular, in spite of the noun itself being in the singular.¹⁰ Other cases of this kind are 2 *spúnóg bheag* ‘two small spoonful’ instead of 2 *spúnóg bheaga*, and 4 *unsa fliuch* lit. ‘two fluid ounces’ instead of 4 *unsa fhliucha*.¹¹

It would have been interesting to see whether words that are graphically marked as English or otherwise foreign (e.g. through italics or quotation marks) would in fact be subjected to mutation. Unfortunately the data contained no instance of a loan that was thus marked, appeared in a construction where mutation applies, and contained a mutable initial. A few examples of italicised loans do, however, appear in the same texts as their unmarked versions, usually within the space of a few lines.

Another exciting feature is the variation in the spelling of already Gaelicised forms. Thus *cucumber* appears as either *cúcumbar* or *cúcamar*, *gas* as either *gas* or *gás*, *grill* (noun) as *grille* or *greille*; *maple syrup* is rendered as *sioróip mailpe*, *sioróip mhailpe*, or simply *maple syrup*, *cheddar* as both *siodar* and *cheddar*, and the forms for *coriander* vary from *coriander* to *coiriandar* and *cóiriandar*.

In a number of instances, Irish “official” terminology is accompanied by a gloss in English, e.g. *ola cnó gallda* (*walnut*).¹² *Lus na mara* (*rosemary*) appears twice in this form. It is interesting to note that in a paper published by Irish speakers for Irish speakers the need appears to be felt to give explanations of or gloss unusual words – a fairly revealing sign of the state and status of the Irish language in its competition with English, even among fluent speakers. One striking example is to be found in issue 2(49), in which the column is devoted to barbecue recipes. Two expressions used in the text are explicitly translated (p. 16): “Nótaigh: Meascán maois = marinade;

¹⁰ Note also the lacking lenition in both *glasa* and *dearg* (see above, 1.8).

¹¹ That is, provided the abbreviated *fl.* does indeed stand for *fliuch* ‘wet’ rather than for *fluid* as an element borrowed from English.

¹² *Ola cnó gallda* = ‘walnut oil’ (lit. ‘oil of foreign nut’). In this and similar cases only the one element considered to cause difficulties was translated.

meascán bealaithe = basting mix”. Other cases in point include *duilleoga labhrais* (bay), *cnag beag luáiste* (lovage) ‘one tuft of lovage’, *lus searbháin* (dandelion), *ola olóige* (olive) ‘olive oil’, *ola cnó coill* (hazelnut) ‘hazelnut oil’, *dragan nó taragon* ‘dragan or taragon’, and even *an blastán* (dressing).

Finally, there are some cases where the morphological structure of an integrated loan is not consistent. Thus for *slis* ‘slice’ two different plural forms are given, *slisíní* and *sliseanna*, and both versions appear within the same article (6(294), p. 22). Similarly, loanwords often do not appear in the genitive, particularly not, of course, when they are rendered in English orthography. *Cous cous* is never changed regardless of its function in the sentence, but neither is the Gaelicised *curai* ‘curry’ (as in *cupán cous cous* ‘a cup of cous cous’ and *púdar curai* ‘curry powder’). On the other hand, however, *coiriander* (in its Irish spelling) has a genitive *cóiriandair*, as in *2 chnag cóiriandair* ‘two tufts of coriander’. Verbal morphology does not offer any surprises here, as, due to the nature of the texts, most verbs are in the imperative.

4. Summary

As we have seen, mutation of loanwords in the Irish language is still alive and kicking, even though there is a certain trend to avoid it, especially in names. On the other hand, the data did not contain a single instance of mutation applied where it should not have been, that is, it seems that the inaccuracies are the result of a tendency to lose mutation rather than misapply it. This is not surprising when such a specialised phenomenon is applied to loans from a donating language that so clearly dominates the recipient language, especially when there are no monolingual speakers of the dominated language. Whereas loanwords of earlier periods (from Latin or Norse) were fully integrated both grammatically and orthographically, English words in particular tend to be treated differently from the native stock. Proper names, then, are dealt with in a way that differs from the handling of loanwords. Proper names are not integrated orthographically, and they tend to resist grammatical integration, most importantly mutation, as well. Finally, borrowed abbreviations proved to be of minor importance, but they did follow mutational patterns where applicable. As far as the orthographical integration of foreign elements is concerned, it is highly interesting to observe the amount of variation and inconsistency that appears in one single text or in several texts written by one and the same author.

Mutation of loanwords, thus, is possible and this aspect of grammatical integration, at least, is apparently still considered important. If it were known how strongly native speakers are aware of the age of some loanwords and differentiate between recent and earlier loans in their treatment of them further insights into the degeneration or perseverance of so extraordinary a phenomenon as Irish initial mutation could be gained.

References

- n.a. 2004. "Glac téarmaí ón gCoiste Téarmaíochta". *Comhar* 64/4, 27-28.
- An Gúm. 1968 [1978]. *Foclóir bitheolaíochta/Dictionary of biology*. (2nd ed.). Dublin: An Gúm.
- , 1983. *Foclóir déiríochta/Dictionary of dairying*. Dublin: An Gúm.
- , 1986 [1993]. *Foclóir póca. English-Irish/Irish-English dictionary*. Dublin: An Gúm.
- Christian Brothers. ? [1997]. *New Irish grammar*. Dublin: Fallons.
- Christian Brothers. 1960 [1999]. *Graiméar Gaeilge*. Dublin: An Gúm.
- de Bhaldraithe, Tomás. 1981. *Innéacs Nua-Ghaeilge don Dictionary of the Irish Language*. Dublin: RIA.
- Dinneen, Patrick S. 1927 [1996]. *Foclóir Gaedhilge agus Béarla*. (rev. ed.). Dublin: Irish Text Society.
- Illés, Theresa-Susanna. 2001. *Standard Irish in the written media: loanwords and initial mutation*. Unpublished MA thesis, University of Vienna.
- Lewis, D. Geraint. 1993 [1999]. *Y treigludur*. Llandysul: Gomer.
- McBain, Alexander. 1896 [1982]. *An etymological dictionary of the Gaelic language*. Glasgow: Gairm Publications. <http://www.ceantar.org/Dicts/MB2/index.html>. (19 December 2006)
- Ó Dónaill, Éamonn. 2005. *Teach yourself Irish grammar*. London: Hodder and Stoughton.
- Ó Dónaill, Niall (ed.). 1977. *Foclóir Gaeilge-Béarla*. Dublin: An Gúm.
- Oifig an tSoláthair. 1978. *Ainmneacha plandaí agus ainmhithe/Flora and fauna nomenclature*. Dublin: Oifig an tSoláthair.
- Ó Siadhail, Mícheál. 1989 [1991]. *Modern Irish. Grammatical structure and dialectal variation*. Cambridge: CUP.
- Risk, Henry. 1970-1971. "French loan-words in Irish". *Études Celtiques* 12, 585-655.
- Risk, Henry. 1974. "French loan-words in Irish, part III". *Études Celtiques* 14, 67-98.
- Royal Irish Academy (RIA). (ed.). 1983 [1999]. *Dictionary of the Irish language. Based mainly on Middle Irish materials*. (compact ed.). Dublin: RIA.
- Stifter, David. 2006. *Sengoídelc. Old Irish for beginners*. New York: Syracuse.
- Vendryes, J. 1959-1978. *Lexique étymologique de l'Irlandais ancien*. Dublin: DIAS.

Information on **Foinse** on the internet:

Foinse homepage:

www.foinse.ie (19 December 2006)

Irish media statistics:

www.medialive.ie/Magazines/General_interest/foinse.html (19 December 2006)

ABC Regional Newspapers:

www.abc.org.uk (quicksearch *Foinse*, PDF file; 19 December 2006)

www.abc.org.uk/cgi-bin/gen5?runprog=nav/abc&noc=y (quicksearch *Foinse*; 19 December 2006)

A cognitive linguistic view of the 'conceptual glorification' of 9/11

*Ronald Kemsies, Vienna**

1. Introduction

The terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001 altered the conceptual system of the American population. This crucial change produced a conceptual incoherence and accordingly triggered the need for linguistic compensation, thus, the redefinition of the conceptual system. This process was meant to ideally classify, integrate and possibly outweigh the conceptual repercussions of the attacks. In practice, the compensational process took place, above all, by means of public speeches by politicians and powerful images. Due to their medial presence, they were capable of providing the required redundancy in order to establish new perspectives on the conceptual level.

In the course of this contribution, I will show how linguistic compensation operates in terms of a 'conceptual glorification' of 9/11. I will analyze political rhetoric from a cognitive linguistic perspective. The arisen paralysis after 9/11 rendered the population particularly susceptible to specific conceptual structures that served as what will be called 'linguistic compensation'. My hypothesis asserts that the modification of the conceptual system eventually culminates in a general feeling of inferiority. The need for compensation of the latter becomes compelling within such a setting, according to specific psychological premises. As a consequence, social authorities seemingly attempt to redefine the conceptual framework in order to cope with 9/11 and to generally assign a certain meaning as well as a particular quality to the external phenomena. The conscious rearrangement of the conceptual system with regard to the events primarily aims at establishing stability afresh and at mitigating the repercussions of the previous shock. The only way to communicate compensational elements on the conceptual level is via language and images since both function as carrier codes for conceptual structures. In order to commence the compensational process, ideally, an entire population has to be exposed to a particular way of 'framing'. The

* The author can be contacted under ronald.kemsies@gmx.at.

medial coverage of 9/11 delivered numerous conceptual frames to virtually every household and equally permitted deliberate addresses to a vast public. Therefore, the analysis of the speech of social authorities plays a crucial role in the discovery of compensational mechanisms on the conceptual level. I particularly analyzed public speeches given by George W. Bush since he represents one of the major opinion leaders in the 9/11 context. Alongside the major impact of images on the conceptual system, I also cite other politicians whose public utterances seemed useful for my inquiries. As the language material was chosen with regard to practicability and contents, no particular time frame was set for the subsequent analysis. It turns out, however, that many of the cited statements cover the time span from September 11th, 2001 to the year 2002. Most of the material was available through online resources as well as through the additional secondary literature used for this analysis.

Linguistic compensation comprises several conceptual spheres: above all, it provides neutralizing structures. It also targets the introduction and utilization of conceptual metaphors which yield guidance. Hand in hand with this capacity, the explanatory power of conceptual mappings comes into play, which equally entails a dimension of linguistic categorization or classification. Motivating the population and mitigating negative emotions through particular framings constitute another important aspect, followed by the notion of a moral justification for a particular way of reasoning about the external impact, as well as for congruous follow-up actions. Finally, unification represents a pool of strengthening conceptual structures, which also serve motivational purposes. A detailed account of all these compensational groups and of their constituents will be provided in the concluding section. It is these groups that I seek to identify within my analysis.¹

2. Linguistic Compensation

According to Zimbardo and Gerrig (1999: 533), the notion of ‘compensation’ primarily occurs within the Freudian theory of repression and defense. Alongside various other strategies of protection, compensation represents an efficient defense mechanism in order to ward off external conflicts. The need

¹ The following analysis is based on my MA thesis (Kemsies 2006). This thesis was written at the Department of English at the University of Vienna under the supervision of Prof. Arthur Mettinger.

for compensation is indispensable with regard to an inherent fear that others could potentially recognize one's inferiority and take advantage of it, which would eventually cause harm to the affected individual (Brühlmeier 1995). Compensation is thus generally comprehended as

a psychological mechanism by which feelings of inferiority, frustration, or failure in one field are counterbalanced by achievement in another. (URL: <http://www.m-w.com/dictionary/compensation>)

As regards the above depiction of the term, a domain-shift is presupposed when compensation is performed, i.e. usually the neutralization of inferiority does not take place within the same field where the inferiority occurred. Linguistic compensation, however, digresses from this definition since a conscious field-shift is not necessarily required in the process, as shall be seen later.

3. Basic terminology and theory in cognitive linguistics²

3.1. Concepts and cognitive gestalts

Above all, the notion of 'concepts' represents a crucial component in the theory of cognitive linguistics, as will be illustrated below. People's categorization of the world around them translates into mental entities which are referred to as concepts or categories. They are fixed constituents of the mind and form the so-called conceptual system of humans. Concepts or categories may be perceived as cognitive pools containing various members. For instance, the concept FURNITURE comprises *chair, sofa, couch, table, dresser*, etc. Furthermore, these category members can also be regarded as basic level categories (i.e. CHAIR, SOFA, COUCH, etc.) relative to the superordinate concept FURNITURE. Correspondingly, the concept CHAIR would contain different notions of chairs, in various forms and shapes. In general, concepts interact on various levels. This circumstance already leads one to anticipate the complexity of conceptual relations as such. For instance, the inherent structures of concepts are strongly dependent on the context they are

² For reasons of better legibility, the required distinction between the notions of 'concept', 'conceptual metaphors', 'frames' and 'linguistic expressions' translate into specific typographical conventions: as suggested by Ungerer and Schmid (1996: vii), concepts will be represented in SMALL CAPS, conceptual metaphors within + signs and SMALL CAPS (e.g. +ARGUMENT IS WAR+), linguistic expressions in *italics* and frames in SMALL CAPS and brackets (e.g. [FREEDOM]).

presented in, boundaries between categories are anything but clear-cut and concepts evoke certain attributes which are capable of activating further concepts, only to mention some of the dynamics involved (Ungerer & Schmid 1996: 2-20). However, for the sake of brevity, a thorough discussion of these features is deliberately omitted.

Nonetheless, we have to bear in mind one more trait inherent to cognitive categories, namely the notion of 'gestalt'. Lakoff and Johnson (1980: 71) define the term as the holistically perceived structure of a concept when "the complex of properties occurring together is more basic to our experience than their separate occurrence". For instance, the category CONVERSATION blatantly consists of a number of complex structures which concur in the very process of conversing. Yet, we conceive the sum of all these elements as more basic than the single category-constituents themselves. We rather perceive the concept CONVERSATION as a "structured whole", thus as an experiential gestalt (Lakoff & Johnson 1980: 80-83).

3.2. The centrality of metaphorical thought

According to the classical theory, metaphor is frequently comprehended as a mere literary device that operates on the language level only. With regard to the contemporary perception of metaphor within cognitive linguistics, it cannot solely be contemplated in a literary sense. Metaphors are foremost conceptual structures influencing thought and action. The following section provides a basic survey of selected conceptual metaphors and elucidates the way in which they operate in our minds. A complete presentation of the entire theory of conceptual metaphors is deliberately omitted for the sake of brevity and clarity (cf. Lakoff & Johnson 1980, Lakoff 1993 for a more detailed account).

3.2.1. Conceptual metaphor

In cognitive linguistics, metaphors are regarded as instances of thought. The conceptual domains involved are conventionally fixed in our minds. The cognitive view on metaphor negates the notion of its being a mere instance of poetic language. Instead, metaphors equally operate on the level of everyday language. They denote "the way we conceptualize one mental domain in terms of another" (Lakoff 1993: 203). Accordingly, Mark Johnson and George Lakoff summarize this notion as follows:

Metaphor is pervasive in everyday life, not just in language but in thought and action. Our ordinary conceptual system, in terms of which we both think and act, is fundamentally metaphorical in nature. [...] Our concepts structure what we perceive, how we get around in the world, and how we relate to other people. (Lakoff & Johnson 1980: 3)

Lakoff (1993: 203-215) also advocates the contemplation of metaphor as a so-called “cross-domain-mapping in the conceptual system”. Probably the most well-known example in this context is “ARGUMENT IS WAR” (Lakoff & Johnson 1980: 4). This metaphor is also referred to as a ‘mapping’. This term particularly stresses the specific set of correspondences entailed, i.e. particular ontological relations between two different mental domains. In particular, mappings are essential to establish the conceptual linkage between two different domains. What is more, they are conventional in nature, i.e. they also entail concrete linguistic expressions as well as inference patterns, and thus represent fixed constituents of the conceptual system. Returning to the example +ARGUMENT IS WAR+, a so-called ‘source domain’ as well as a ‘target domain’ can be discerned. WAR would be the source domain which is mapped onto the target domain ARGUMENT. This cross-domain-mapping produces numerous linguistic realizations in order to reason about and describe arguments in general:

Your claims are *indefensible*.
 He *attacked every weak point* in my argument.
 His criticisms were *right on target*.
 I *demolished* his argument.
 I've never *won* an argument with him.
 You disagree? Ok, *shoot!*
 If you use that *strategy*, he'll *wipe you out*.
 He *shot down* all of my arguments.
 (Lakoff & Johnson 1980: 4)

Furthermore, Lakoff and Johnson (1980: 4-5) go on to claim that people equally act according to conceptual metaphors. Within that context, it is not surprising that talking at a louder volume in fervid discussions, starting disputes or, in the worst case, fights are actions attributed to a widely known behavior pattern in debates. As a consequence, it may be generally asserted that the conceptual mapping +ARGUMENT IS WAR+ may entail a rather aggressive behavior when contrary arguments are presented in the course of a dispute. Lakoff and Johnson repeatedly substantiate this notion:

[T]he ARGUMENT IS WAR metaphor is one that we live by in this culture; it structures the actions we perform in arguing. (Lakoff & Johnson 1980: 4)

Since mappings are fixed parts within our conceptual system, the language community can instantaneously comprehend new utilizations of mappings as well. This flexibility may pertain to the fact that metaphors usually operate on a superordinate level in the mind, i.e. one would rather find the domain VEHICLE in a mapping instead of the corresponding basic level categories such as CAR, BOAT etc. (Lakoff 1993: 212).

In addition, the terms ‘set of correspondences’ and ‘inference patterns’ need to be explored in more detail by means of another example. Generally, love is conceptualized as a journey in the English language, which accordingly results in the mapping +LOVE IS A JOURNEY+. Based on this notion, Lakoff (1993: 208) outlines the manner in which certain features of the JOURNEY domain are mapped onto LOVE, and why this mapping is comprehensible to the language community. To begin with, he starts from the expression *We’re stuck*. Typically, this phrase belongs to the source domain JOURNEY. It implies some sort of VEHICLE that is impeded by an OBSTACLE and, thus, the TRAVELERS cannot pursue their original COURSE. On the basis of the expression *We’re stuck*, the mapping +LOVE IS A JOURNEY+ correspondingly projects the JOURNEY domain onto LOVE and produces a set of correspondences, which looks as follows:

THE LOVE-AS-JOURNEY MAPPING

-The lovers correspond to travelers.

-The love relationship corresponds to the vehicle.

-The lovers’ common goals correspond to their common destinations on the journey.

-Difficulties in the relationship correspond to impediments to travel.

(Lakoff 1993: 208)

Starting from this mapping, Lakoff devises a metaphorical scenario. Naturally, general conceptions of JOURNEY may vary individually within the speech community. Nonetheless, a similar setting may be evoked:

Two TRAVELERS are in a VEHICLE TRAVELING WITH COMMON DESTINATIONS. The VEHICLE encounters some IMPEDIMENT and gets stuck, that is, makes it non-functional. If they do nothing, they will not REACH THEIR DESTINATIONS. (Lakoff 1993: 208)

Taking account of the set of correspondences above, the analogous inference pattern within the LOVE domain would appropriately assume the subsequent form:

Two LOVERS are in a LOVE RELATIONSHIP, PURSUING COMMON LIFE GOALS. The RELATIONSHIP encounters some DIFFICULTY, which makes it non-functional. If they do nothing, they will not be able to ACHIEVE THEIR LIFE GOALS. (Lakoff 1993: 208)

Conspicuously, one way of categorizing a relationship within LOVE is via the inference pattern of JOURNEY, which is furthermore evidenced by the meaningfulness of the resulting linguistic expressions. If the conceptual metaphor +LOVE IS A JOURNEY+ did not exist, expressions such as *We're stuck* – in order to refer to a love-relationship – would be unintelligible to the language community.

3.2.2. The experiential basis of metaphor

This sort of conceptual metaphor is deeply rooted in human experience. Intrinsically, experience might constitute the general foundation of every metaphor, as Lakoff and Johnson state:

In actuality we feel that no metaphor can ever be comprehended or even adequately represented independently of its experiential basis. (Lakoff & Johnson 1980: 19)

The origins of this specific group of metaphors usually link to palpable physical experiences which have resulted in implicit conceptual mappings, and, thus, in various linguistic manifestations as well. To illustrate this with an example by Lakoff (1993: 240), one has to consider the metaphors “MORE IS UP” as opposed to “LESS IS DOWN”. Apparently, people conceptualize a rise in quantity as a rise in height; hence, they establish “a correspondence between the conceptual domain of quantity and the conceptual domain of verticality”. Correspondingly, a basic experience underlying these metaphors could have been the observation of the rise of the surface level when some liquid is poured into a container. In the same line, adding more elements to a pile, for instance, makes it naturally rise in height. Experiential metaphors may also exceed the boundaries of real experience and assume abstract forms as well. For instance, the expression *prices rose* neither corresponds to the dimension of verticality, nor to quantity in practice, since a price is not palpable; it does not dispose of a surface level and cannot be piled up. Nonetheless, *prices rose* works metaphorically and represents a comprehensible phrase for the language community.

3.3. Frames

Alongside several different conceptions and denotations of linguistic ‘frames’ within cognitive linguistics, Lakoff’s version appears to be the most practicable one, which he exemplifies with the expression *elephant*:

A frame is a conceptual structure used in thinking. The word elephant evokes a frame with an image of an elephant and certain knowledge: an elephant is a large animal (a mammal) with large floppy ears, a trunk that functions like both a nose and a hand, large stump-like legs, and so on. (Lakoff 2006)

Lakoff (2006) goes on to claim that words are defined relative to their frames, hence a single word may evoke its corresponding frame, as in “*Sam picked up the peanut with his **trunk***” (my emphasis), for instance. The expression *trunk* evokes the corresponding [ELEPHANT] frame, which leads to the logical conclusion on the receiver’s part that *Sam* must be the name of an elephant. Frames equally influence the way we act and think as well as the way we reason about things and how common values are defined. Whenever a word is perceived, the corresponding frame is activated in our minds. In addition, negating a frame also evokes it. Once a frame is activated it becomes strengthened at the same time. What sounds rather theoretical here has concrete physical repercussions too: Lakoff describes frames as actual physical realizations pertaining to cerebral, neural circuitry.

Before we turn to the analytical part of this article, I need to discuss a terminological problem within cognitive theory. The definitional borders between the terms ‘concept’, ‘frame’ and ‘gestalt’ as well as their relation to ‘conceptual metaphor’ appear somewhat fuzzy. According to my understanding, every concept represents a cognitive category which accommodates certain category members. When we talk about concepts or categories, the focus is mainly on whether certain items are in or out of the category, or within the border area of several adjacent categories. In short, the term concept is primarily linked to linguistic categorization (cf. Lakoff 1987, Taylor 2003 for a more detailed account). At the same time, concepts are capable of evoking frames which may be roughly described as stereotypical, idealized cognitive scenarios everyone is familiar with. Furthermore, the notion of gestalt is very similar to the frame-idea as it structures a category in a fashion which we basically conceive as a scenario. Nonetheless, the difference between these terms might be found in their cognitive scope. Whereas gestalts are cognitively restricted to the semantic level of a concept, a frame may transgress the borders of meaning and include various related scenarios in an associative fashion. Since a conceptual metaphor maps a concept onto another one, it is also capable of projecting a specific way of framing onto another domain. The idea is that we literally think about the target domain in terms of the frame originating from the source domain. In the following sections, the above terms are comprehended in this manner. The subsequent cognitive analysis examines mainly linguistic utterances by

influential politicians who served as opinion leaders within the 9/11 context. As already mentioned in the introduction, the statements cited below cover the time span of September 11th, 2001 to the year 2002. The examples were merely chosen on the basis of their relevance for my hypothesis: within the language material, I set out to identify several compensational groups composed of specific linguistic expressions which furthermore pool corresponding cognitive mechanisms.

4. A cognitive analysis of the political rhetoric concerning 9/11

The term ‘conceptual glorification’ refers to the conscious evocation of frames which mainly exhibit glorious connotations. Various politicians utilized this strategy to repeatedly mitigate the common uneasiness and fear among the population. Seemingly, there was a tendency of reflecting on inherent values of the American culture in public addresses, which instantly activated [AMERICA] and all its associative frames, such as [PATRIOTISM], [UNITY], etc. By virtue of America’s history, such frames usually trigger strong emotions among the population. The most frequent metaphors and frames used to stabilize and motivate a new sense of national identity based on moral values such as strength and courage will be the concern of the subsequent section. Above all, political discourse with regard to the 9/11 context comes to the fore: speeches by George W. Bush, which were selected by virtue of their practicability for my hypothesis, represent a major part of the language material analyzed. Moreover, I also included frame-establishing imagery. With regard to the methodological approach of this analysis, I attempted to detect specific linguistic expressions within the material which blatantly mirror the cognitive mechanisms of linguistic compensation. The resulting groups comprise compensational elements of neutralization, motivation and mitigation, classification and explanation, guidance, justification as well as unification. Most of the examples below are available through online resources, particularly through the official website of the White House (<http://www.whitehouse.gov>).

4.1. Everyday heroes

In the aftermath of September 11, the term *hero* definitely represented the most salient and also most controversial constituent of numerous public addresses. George W. Bush repeatedly serves as the main source of influence, i.e. many of his cohorts adopted his framing strategies.

To begin with, an idealized HERO frame has to be roughly outlined: heroes are people who are essentially good in nature. They are usually strong – physically as well as psychologically – and ready to sacrifice their lives for the lives of others. Their deeds are commonly courageous and may require self-discipline on their part. Usually they are successful in their undertakings. Heroes are ideally modest role models for others as well as highly moral since they can normally tell good from evil and right from wrong. Their actions follow the lines of a commonly shared conception of morality. This scenario culminates in the subsequent entailments:

- Heroes are good.
- Heroes are strong.
- Heroic deeds are glorious.
- Heroes are glorious.
- Heroes are moral.
- +HEROES ARE WINNERS+ (e.g. *the invincible hero*)
- Heroes are courageous.
- Being a hero requires self-sacrifice.

These conclusions refer to some major stereotype qualities of heroes, which are widely acknowledged. In particular, the notion of a hero's moral qualities repeatedly ties in with Lakoff's (2002) 'Strict Father Morality'. In particular, the dimension of moral essence proves specifically prominent in this context since people usually define heroes by virtue of their accomplishments in the past. Furthermore, most of the acclaim paid to heroes is based on the notion of their moral integrity. Accordingly, categorizing rescue workers as *heroes* in the 9/11 context served a strong compensational purpose on the level of morality: the willingness to sacrifice one's own life for the benefit of others is undoubtedly considered to be highly moral. Throughout the entire 9/11 aftermath, a strong emphasis on America's national identity could also be observed. Since the *heroes* referred to were usually Americans working for prestigious American institutions, such as the fire and the police department, the [HERO] frame became explicitly affiliated to [AMERICA] in that context.

Consequently, AMERICANS were metaphorically turned into HEROES, so that the resulting mapping +AMERICANS ARE HEROES+ produced analogous entailments with regard to the basic conception of HERO illustrated above:

- Americans are good.
- Americans are strong.
- American deeds are glorious.
- America is glorious.
- Americans are moral.
- +AMERICANS ARE WINNERS+
- Americans are courageous.
- Being American requires self-sacrifice.

This set of implications may have helped to create the notion of ‘everyday heroes’. More precisely, the combination of these entailments may have manipulated the population and even generated illusions. The deceptive metaphor +AMERICANS ARE WINNERS+, for instance, was clearly evidenced through various statements by the former mayor of New York, Rudy Giuliani, who also attained hero-status in the aftermath of the attacks. Accordingly, journalist Eric Pooley quoted Churchill biographer Roy Jenkins who commented on Giuliani’s impact in this respect and particularly pointed out the illusory aspect of his way of framing:

*What Giuliani succeeded in doing is what Churchill succeeded in doing in the dreadful summer of 1940: he managed to **create an illusion** that we were bound to win. (Pooley 2001, my emphasis)*

The evocation of the [HERO] frame thus stresses the alleged power that lies within the population. In that sense, framing rescue workers and others as *heroes* functions as an encouraging idea with a high compensational potential for a disillusioned populace. Silberstein (2002: 97) also confirms that “[t]his sense of everyday heroes was a fundamental part of the post-9/11 rebuilding”. Moreover, these *heroes* administrate aid and remove the rubble and debris from the World Trade Center site, so that they equally may have become symbols of progress and of starting over afresh. In short, the [HERO] frame generally contributes to the re-establishment of trust and faith in American society, which was believed lost after the attacks.

However, there also seems to be a tendency to overuse the [HERO] frame as a compensational device as it successfully neutralizes the [VICTIM] frame, which, at first, may have dominated the minds of many Americans. Apparently, [HERO] effectively represses [VICTIM], which makes it easier for

the population to cope with created feelings of inferiority. Whereas the term *hero* was originally reserved for rescue workers and the passengers on Flight 93³, it was equally applied to many others later on. Silberstein observes similar dynamics:

[T]here was a resistance to feeling victimized. Over and over again, families of employees lost in the World Trade Center reported that their loved ones would have died characteristically helping others. (Silberstein 2002: 94)

Framing the victims as *heroes* may have helped people to accept the futility of their loved ones' death. *Hero* naturally triggers recognition by the community, which repeatedly fortifies the notion that the individuals who perished in the buildings did not die in vain. Hence, this framing strategy imparts a new meaning in life and re-establishes self-confidence among the populace. Related to these conceptual mechanisms, even the bereaved families were unexpectedly referred to as *heroes*:

*And we look at the **quiet heroes** of this crisis. The fathers and mothers, the husbands and wives, the sons and daughters of those who have lost their loved ones, the innocent victims. We are **inspired with their strength**, with their faith and the **courage** they have shown [...] (Pataki 2001, quoted in Silberstein 2002: 95, original emphasis)*

However, it is doubtful whether the application of *hero* is at all appropriate within certain fields, despite its tremendous compensational function for society. Certainly, this particular manner of framing was and is not exclusively popular. For instance, many rescue workers in the 9/11 clean-up efforts felt uneasy about being classified as *heroes*. Representing the opinion of many of their colleagues, some fire fighters unmistakably insisted:

I'm not a hero [...] I don't go to work to get a pat on the back. I don't feel like a hero. Most guys you talk to are uncomfortable with the term. We're just doing our jobs. (McKeown & Meyer 2002)

Time Magazine also commented on the topic with a similar statement and described the entire hero-affair merely as a

redemptive fairy tale spun by Americans to make some rough sense of Sept. 11. The good guys [...] saved the day, the evil ones were blotted out. (Morse 2001)

³ The Boeing of Flight 93 was one of four planes hijacked by terrorists. It was the only one that did not reach its target, but crashed into a field instead. From what is known through phone calls and other sources, the passengers had attempted to overpower the hijackers who eventually crashed the plane as a last resort. (URL: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_Airlines_Flight_93)

4.2. The war on terror as a just war

The notion of a ‘just war’ is fairly common within Western culture. Following a classical idealization of warfare, the bellicose conflict

is conducted between armies who recognize the legitimacy of targeting their uniformed enemies, but endeavor to limit violence against civilians and, more generally, to keep their use of force proportionate to the ends in question. (Carruthers 2000: 163)

The supposed metaphor +THE WAR ON TERROR IS A JUST WAR+ also entails an inference pattern, which is crucial with regard to compensation, and is poignantly summarized by Lakoff, who repeatedly integrates the notions of hero and glory in his devised metaphorical scenario:

A crime is committed by the villain against an innocent victim (typically an assault, theft, or kidnapping). The offense occurs due to an imbalance of power and creates a moral imbalance. The hero either gathers helpers or decides to go it alone. The hero makes sacrifices; he undergoes difficulties, typically making an arduous heroic journey, sometimes across the sea to a treacherous terrain. The villain is inherently evil, perhaps even a monster, and thus reasoning with him is out of the question. The hero is left with no choice but to engage the villain in battle. The hero defeats the villain and rescues the victim. The moral balance is restored. Victory is achieved. The hero, who always acts honorably, has proved his manhood and achieved glory. The sacrifice was worthwhile. The hero receives acclaim, along with the gratitude of the victim and the community. (Lakoff 1992: 466-467)

The application of this metaphorical plot to the present situation overtly facilitates the justification of a potential war on moral grounds. By means of identifying the victim, the villain, the hero, the crime as well as the victory, two different scenarios gradually crystallize. First of all, as it was already sketched by Lakoff (1992: 467) with regard to the Gulf war, a self-defense scenario comes to mind, in which the Osama bin Laden corresponds to the villain and the United States to the victim as well as to the hero. Typically, the crime committed is a death threat, which translates into a menace to economic health, caused by the 9/11 attacks. Certainly, the villainy of Bin Laden is highly subjective since “he is villain to one audience, but hero to another” (Beer & Boynton 2003). However, from a Western point of view, the focus is undoubtedly on his viciousness. Secondly, on the basis of Lakoff’s (1992: 467) metaphorical scenarios within the just war context, the war in Iraq can also be regarded as a so-called ‘rescue-scenario’: the *victimized* Iraqi population is to be *liberated* from a major *evildoer* manifested through Saddam Hussein, who equally takes on the role of the villain. In particular,

the rescue-scenario serves a major compensational purpose as it provides “a moral justification for going to war” (Lakoff 1992: 467).

Despite this conceptual perception of the war on terror, Denton (2004: 6) repeatedly stresses that terrorism does not qualify as a form of just war at all, as it avails itself of “extra-normal” violence during peacetimes, hence, exceeding the lines of convention. With regard to the above mentioned just-war-scenario, an inherent asymmetry crystallizes as well:

The hero is moral and courageous, while the villain is amoral and vicious. The hero is rational, but though the villain may be cunning and calculating, he cannot be reasoned with. Heroes thus cannot negotiate with villains; they must defeat them. The enemy-as-demon metaphor arises as a consequence of the fact that we understand what a just war is in terms of this fairy tale. (Lakoff 1992: 467)

The compensational value of the just-war-scenario only lies in its future fulfillment: the roles are clearly distributed and the metaphorical plot has to progress to its foreseen ending in order to complete the compensational process. The compensational repercussions of a successful mission in the war against terror are tremendous. Accordingly, this also suggests that this war has to be waged until the desirable outcome is reached, otherwise compensation turns into failure.

4.3. A modern-day Iwo Jima

Within the field of cognitive linguistics, images bear the same communicative power as language does and are hence capable of evoking frames. This section describes an instance of the image level of communication and attempts to illustrate how effective imagery is able to create conceptual metaphors and convey compensation. The scene portrayed in the image below was accredited crucial meaning by external sources, which makes it even more an object of particular interest. Figure 1 shows fire fighters raising the U.S. flag on the World Trade Center site in the midst of the rubble and debris.




Figure 1: Ground Zero Spirit

(URL: <http://www.dovertwppolice.com/NYPD-NYFD/fdny%20raise%20flag.jpg>)

An advertisement propagating 9/11 merchandise describes this image as “the September 11, 2001 image that defined America’s new spirit, and redefined courage” (URL: <http://www.september11news.com/AftermathImages.htm>). This may also be due to the evocation of the frame [THE STAR-SPANGLED BANNER], which is affiliated to numerous other frames exhibiting glorious connotations, such as [PATRIOTISM]. In particular, the national anthem comes to mind as a definite constituent of the [THE STAR-SPANGLED BANNER] frame. Especially, the first stanza displays expressions related to the entirety of activated frames:

*O say, can you see, by the dawn’s early light,
What so **proudly we hail’d** at the twilight’s last gleaming?
Whose broad **stripes** and bright **stars**, thro’ the perilous **fight**,*

*O'er the ramparts we watch'd, were so gallantly streaming?
And the rockets' red glare, the bombs bursting in air,
Gave proof thro' the night that our flag was still there.
O say, does that star-spangled banner yet wave
O'er the land of the free and the home of the brave?
(Key 1814, my emphasis)*

Within the subsequent stanzas it becomes all the more obvious that waving the American flag in a war context is a symbol of triumph. This notion repeatedly ties in with the dimension of moral strength and moral wholeness: the raising of the flag signifies that America *withstood* an *evil force*, which was not able to *tear* the country *apart*. Alongside the symbolism of the flag, another frame is evoked by Figure 2 below, which the majority of Americans is also familiar with, namely the battle of [IWO JIMA] of 1945. Joe Rosenthal took a photograph of American soldiers raising the flag on the top of Mount Suribachi, which also became an icon for bravery and valor within the American value system (URL: <http://www.iwojima.com/raising/raisingb.htm>).



Figure 2: The Flag Raising
(URL: <http://www.iwojima.com/raising/lflage.gif>)

Naturally, a strong analogy is salient between both images by virtue of men raising the flag. First, the juxtaposition of both illustrations produces +9/11 IS IWO JIMA+, which repeatedly evokes the [WAR] frame. More importantly, this conceptual relation culminates in the overall metaphor +THE WTC SITE IS A SCENE OF WAR+. In the eyes of the American population, this metaphor together with [THE STAR-SPANGLED BANNER] frame may exhibit the following entailments:

- The attacks were an act of war.
- America is at war.
- The attacks are comparable to World War II.
- America was not defeated.
- America will triumph.

To sum up, the juxtaposition of these images provides contextual information by framing 9/11 as an act of war. At the same time, however, it suggests that America is capable of prevailing in this war. The compensational elements in this setup appear to be fairly blatant and, hence, do not require any further discussion.

4.4. Unity, strength and patriotism

Another metaphor represents a prevailing mental entity within the framework of linguistic compensation, namely +UNITY IS STRENGTH+. Its experiential nature may be derived from the plausible physical basis that several human beings are physically stronger than a single individual, thus, a group is naturally stronger than one person. The metaphor highlights the strength of a populace once it is applied in public addresses. Correspondingly, Bush frequently exhibits this strategy within his speeches:

*America and our **friends and allies join** with all those who want peace and security in the world, and we **stand together to win** the war against terrorism. [...] This is a day **when all Americans from every walk of life unite** in our resolve for justice and peace. (Bush 2001, my emphasis)*

In the same manner, Billy Graham utilized the +UNITY IS STRENGTH+ metaphor as well as +SOCIETY IS A FAMILY+ in order to describe the ‘positive’ repercussions of the catastrophe, when he stated in the National Cathedral:

*A tragedy like this could have torn our country apart, but instead it has **united** us and we **have become a family**. (Silberstein 2002: 105, my emphasis)*

In addition, Rudy Giuliani availed himself of the +SURVIVAL IS STRENGTH+ metaphor in his addresses to the public in order to repeatedly focus on the

innate strength of the nation, “What **could have destroyed us made us stronger**” (Silberstein 2002: 103, my emphasis). The experiential basis of this metaphor is presumably grounded in brute fight behavior. When the human race was still in a primitive state, a serious fight between two humans was definitely a fight for life or death. Naturally, the one who survived was considered to be physically stronger than his opponent. On the basis of this notion, one could equally devise the metaphor +SURVIVAL IS VICTORY+, which is in fact manifested through expressions such as *to conquer death, he will defeat death, stroke survivors beat death*, etc. Owing to the metaphorical linkage of concepts or frames, respectively, [SURVIVAL] may at the same time evoke [VICTORY], which bears a tremendous compensational value. It suggests that the United States is stronger than the terrorists, which is furthermore substantiated by the [HERO] frame. America’s conceptual victory is defined by the circumstance that society has not collapsed after the attacks.

In order to clarify the interaction of some of the afore-mentioned metaphors as well as their repercussions in practice, the following scenario might be devised as it is frequently conveyed to the population in a similar fashion. Moreover, the subsequent plot neatly ties in with Strict Father Morality as well. 9/11 was roughly framed as follows: an *evil force* attacked society. However, society *survived* this attack since the *evil force* did not succeed in *making* society *evil*. As society *withstood* the *evil force*, it follows that society must be *strong* (+SURVIVAL IS STRENGTH+), hence, it could *not be defeated* (+SURVIVAL IS VICTORY+). What is more, with regard to the Flight 93 context, apparently, there are moral *heroes* (+A HERO IS MORAL+) who prevented the *evil force* from achieving its purpose. The *evil force* could be *averted* by virtue of the help of numerous people, also with regard to the cleaning efforts. As a consequence, the *strength* of society obviously lies in its *unity* (+UNITY IS STRENGTH+). In order to *defeat* the *evil force*, society has to be *united*. As a reaction to these conceptual dynamics, symbols are required to demonstrate unity and strength. Seemingly, people found this symbolism, among various other sources, in the Star Spangled Banner. The flag evoked the [PATRIOTISM] frame which may be one possible explanation for the immense patriotic devotion which followed 9/11: the U.S. flag was displayed ubiquitously; corresponding frames such as [HOMELAND], [COMMITMENT], [AMERICAN], etc. moved in the spotlight and triggered a strong emotional reaction in patriotic terms.

5. Conclusion

Within this concluding section I will assign the phenomenon of conceptual glorification to the adequate compensational groups enlisted below. Naturally, conceptual glorification pertains to these fields only to a certain extent, i.e. it may be more relevant to one dimension than to another one. The list below arose from the results of the entirety of compensational phenomena that could be identified in my thesis. By means of these groups I attempt to reveal general tendencies of the entire compensational process. With regard to the general notion of linguistic compensation, the subsequent fields crystallized:

- Neutralization
- Motivation and mitigation
- Classification and explanation
- Guidance
- Justification
- Unification

These groups have to be comprehended as tendencies that took shape by virtue of the analysis of the language material available. However, the assignment of the compensational mechanisms presented naturally remains a rather subjective undertaking as some of the metaphors and frames definitely match more than merely one dimension. As a consequence, I always attempted to pool the most blatant examples, notwithstanding the fact that other potential items were omitted or simply missing in the discussion. In the following abstracts, some of the afore-mentioned groups will be explored, with regard to the concrete impact of conceptual glorification on the compensational process.

Neutralization: the [HERO] frame in general comprises various compensational elements. It is closely connected with affiliated frames such as [GLORY], [PATRIOTISM] and [WAR] and furthermore capable of evoking them. Basically, the notion of hero substantiated the inherent potential of the United States. According to the common conception of the term, striking back and re-conquering freedom are perceived as acts of glory that deserve particular acclaim by the populace. In respect thereof, the *war on terror* becomes a virtuous endeavor and must be pursued by all means. The [HERO] frame furthermore neutralizes feelings of victimization. In addition, it also

outweighs the futility of many useless deaths since framing the lost ones as *heroes* basically conveys the notion that they did not die in vain.

Motivation and mitigation: the [IWO JIMA] frame, which was generated through the similarity of an image showing firemen raising the American flag in the midst of the debris and the famous Iwo Jima photography as well as [THE STAR-SPANGLED BANNER], substantiated the reassurance of a future victory in the war on terror. Moreover, the conceptual interplay discussed may also fortify the resolve of prevailing in the conflict.

Classification and explanation: the strong dichotomy between ‘us and them’ inherent to the war metaphor furthermore shows in the juxtaposition of +TERRORISM IS WAR+ as well as +FREEDOM IS WAR+. Together with the [IWO JIMA] frame, the famous image of the firemen raising the flag in the midst of the debris on the World Trade Center site evoked the metaphor +THE WORLD TRADE CENTER IS A SCENE OF WAR+, which appears highly relevant with regard to its explanatory power. This particular notion furthermore contributes to the establishment of the [WAR] frame and also substantiates it.

Unification: the unification process turned out to be one of the most crucial activities in the course of linguistic compensation since the notion of unity forms the basis of many derived metaphors. For instance, +UNITY IS STRENGTH+ represents an indispensable mapping which furthermore evokes the [STRENGTH] as well as the [PATRIOTISM] frame. Moreover, the dimension of moral wholeness pertains to unity too, as it appears essential to maintain the homogeneous structure of constituents within a moral entirety: contrary to the +9/11 IS DIVISION+ metaphor, the American population withstood the blow of fate by virtue of its unity. A sense of unification dwells within the [WAR ON TERROR] frame and the payback dimension since people *grow united* in their cause in order to *defeat* an external threat. In addition, a more blatant example for unification is certainly the mapping +SOCIETY IS A FAMILY+ which clearly suggests mutual help and support.

Although my findings certainly remain incomplete, the phenomenon of conceptual glorification could at least be illustrated to a certain extent. As this contribution has mainly an interpretative character, some of my discoveries may certainly be challenged as regards their validity. However, in order to receive reliable findings in this field, an empirical study of a vast amount of oral and written material would be required, which appears to be a fairly

inexhaustible activity as the linguistic compensation of 9/11, in general, continues to proceed and, above all, to change.

References

- Beer, Francis A.; Boynton, G. R. 2003. "Globalizing political action: building Bin Laden and getting ready for 9/11". *APSA 2003 Bin Laden*. <http://myweb.uiowa.edu/gboynton/binladen/> (20 February 2006)
- Brühlmeier, Arthur. 1995. "Die Individualpsychologie von Alfred Adler". *Arthur Brühlmeier, Website für Erziehungswissenschaft, Pädagogik, Psychologie, Schule und Familie*. <http://www.bruehlmeier.info/adler.htm> (30 January 2006)
- Bush, George W. 2001. "Statement by the president in his address to the nation". *The White House*. <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010911-16.html> (30 January 2006)
- Carruthers, Susan. 2000. *The media at war*. New York: St. Martin's Press.
- Denton, Robert E. (ed.). 2004. *Language, symbols, and the media: communication in the aftermath of the World Trade Center attack*. New Brunswick/NJ: Transaction Publications.
- Kemsies, Ronald. 2006. *The need for linguistic compensation as an attempt of finding 'closure' after September 11, 2001. An analysis based on the theoretical framework of conceptual metaphors*. Unpublished MA thesis, University of Vienna.
- Key, Francis Scott. 1814. "The star-spangled banner". *Information please, Pearson Education*. <http://www.infoplease.com/ipa/A0194015.html> (20 February 2006)
- Lakoff, George. 1987. *Women, fire and dangerous things*. Chicago/Illinois: University of Chicago Press.
- Lakoff, George. 1992. "Metaphor and war: the metaphorical system used to justify war in the gulf". In Pütz, Martin (ed.). *Thirty years of linguistic evolution*. Amsterdam: John Benjamins, 463-481.
- Lakoff, George. 1993. "The contemporary theory of metaphor". In Ortony, Andrew (ed.). *Metaphor and thought*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 202-251.
- Lakoff, George. 2002. *Moral politics: what conservatives know that liberals don't*. Chicago/Illinois: University of Chicago Press.
- Lakoff, George. 2006. "Simple framing – an introduction to framing and its uses in politics". *Rockridge Institute*. http://www.rockridgeinstitute.org/projects/strategic/simple_framing (20 February 2006)
- Lakoff, George; Johnson, Mark. 1980. *Metaphors we live by*. Chicago/Illinois: University of Chicago Press.
- McKeown, Bill; Meyer, Jeremy. 2002. "All in a day's work – many firefighters say they're not heroes". *The Gazette*. <http://www.firehouse.com/lodd/2002services/iaff/0920.html> (3 June 2006)
- Morse, Jodie. 2001. "Glory in the glare". *Time Magazine*. <http://www.time.com/time/poy2001/sofireman.html> (13 December 2006)
- Pataki, George. Statement in *The concert for New York City* (DVD, October 2001)
- Pooley, Eric. 2001. "Mayor of the world". *Time Magazine*. <http://www.time.com/time/poy2001/poyprofile.html> (2 March 2006)

- Silberstein, Sandra. 2002. *War of words: language, politics, and 9/11*. London: Routledge.
- Taylor, John R. 2003. *Linguistic categorization*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Ungerer, Friedrich; Schmid, Hans-Jörg. 1996. *An introduction to cognitive linguistics*. Essex: Longman.
- URL: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_Airlines_Flight_93 (13 November 2006)
- URL: <http://www.dovertwppolice.com/NYPD-NYFD/fdny%20raise%20flag.jpg> (20 February 2006)
- URL: <http://www.iwojima.com/raising/lflage.gif> (20 February 2006)
- URL: <http://www.iwojima.com/raising/raisingb.htm> (20 February 2006)
- URL: <http://www.m-w.com/dictionary/compensation> (20 February 2006)
- URL: <http://www.whitehouse.gov/> (13 December 2006)
- Zimbardo, Phillip G.; Gerrig, Richard J. 1999. *Psychologie*. (7th edition). Berlin: Springer Verlag.

“You are very good” – establishing rapport in English as a Lingua Franca: the case of agreement tokens

*Kathrin Kordon, Vienna**

1. Introduction

The following exchange is an extract of a conversation carried out between two Austrian women (A1 and A3) and a Vietnamese woman (V1) in a small riverside town in central Vietnam. It is preceded by an episode in which S1 and S3 express their surprise about the fact that people are dressed in white at funeral processions in Vietnam, which gives rise to a comparison of dressing conventions in Vietnam and in Austria:¹

Extract 1:

- 1 A1: yeah if if someone's dying people all wear black
- 2 V1: aha
- 3 A1: mhm (.) it's different @@
- 4 V1: yeah different very different <1> because </1> here (is) boy girlfriend not sleep together after
- 5 (they) gets married <2> sleep together </2> <3> not same </3> for tourists boyfriend erm <4>
- 6 girlfriend </4> sleep together here is not.
- 7 A1: <1> mhm </1>
- 8 A1: <2> oh aha </2>
- 9 A2: <3> aha </3>
- 10 A1: <4> yeah </4>
- 11 A1: yes
- 12 A2: and is it is it a problem?
- 13 V1: yeah big problem=
- 14 A2: =@=
- 15 V1: =because sleep together have children first so many people don't like.
- 16 A1: <6> yeah </6>
- 17 A2: <6> aha </6> (.) so erm you don't sleep together because you gets children or is it because of

* The author can be contacted under kathrin.kordon@univie.ac.at.

¹ All extracts in the present contribution generally conform to the VOICE Transcription Conventions [2.0] and to the VOICE Spelling Conventions [2.0], available at <http://www.univie.ac.at/voice>. The following changes to the computer-readable transcription key are made in order to make the transcriptions easily accessible for readers: instead of numbering the speakers in the order they first speak, the two Austrian speakers are given the speaker ID A1 and A2 while the Vietnamese speakers can be identified with V1, V2, V3, etc.; in order to make the analysis easily comprehensible, agreement tokens are often written in bold; black font is consistently used.

- 18 religion?
 19 V1: yeah very difficult because boyfriend girlfriend if they gets marry <un> xx </un> gets marry
 20 okay sleep together no problem <7> because </7> boyfriend girlfriend <1> <un> xx </un> </1>
 21 together.
 22 A1: <7> yah </7>
 23 A1: <1> yah </1>
 24 A2: but but you kiss and
 25 V1: yeah kiss okay no problem <2> yeah </2> because they don't leave a baby <3> @@@@
 26 </3>
 27 A2: <2> aha </2>
 28 A1: <3> @@@@ </3>
 29 A2: <3> @@@@ </3> yeah we we do it differently.
 30 V1: yeah very different because <un> xx </un> tourists
 31 A2: <@> yeah </@>

Most readers would probably suggest that something is wrong with this stretch of talk. They might find it amusing or consider it bizarre. They might be struck by the speakers' grammatical deficiencies. They might wonder about the abrupt topic change in the first lines. What do dressing conventions at funerals in Austria have to do with marital and sexual customs in Vietnam?

What we have here is an exchange in English as a lingua franca (ELF), i.e. "interactions between members of two or more different linguacultures in English, for none of whom English is the mother tongue" (House 1999: 74). Despite their different cultural backgrounds and levels of linguistic proficiency, the participants manage to carry out a conversation without obvious indications of communicative problems or misunderstandings.

But there is much more to say about the stretch of ELF talk above. At a superficial level, the conversation looks like a 'transactional' conversation², as the participants exchange facts about the social customs of their home countries. On closer examination, however, it becomes evident that this is not a pure exchange of factual information. Rather, the interaction appears to be a typical example of what Malinowski (1923 [1972]) calls 'phatic communion'. It seems as if the conversationalists were driven by the desire to establish rapport with their interlocutors by talking to 'commune' about whatever

² The original binary contrast between *transactional* and *interactional* speech goes back to Gillian Brown (1978, echoed in Brown & Yule 1983). According to her distinction, transactional speech occurs when "language [...] is used to convey 'factual or propositional information'" (Brown & Yule 1983: 2) while the interactional use of language serves to satisfy the human need to "establish and maintain social relationships" (Brown & Yule 1983: 3). Brown's terms will be used throughout this paper for the differentiation of speech functions, not only because I can rely on the familiarity of the transactional-interactional dichotomy among linguists but also because I prefer a binary contrast to multiple oppositions for the present study.

subject. Thus, it may well be that the information they get as an outcome of their conversation is not of primary significance to them.

The exchange above is a typical instance of phatic ELF talk, which constitutes the analytic focus of this paper.³ Although ELF has started to attract academic attention,⁴ its interactional function has so far been underrepresented in linguistic research. ELF is often represented as a language use which is primarily transactional in function in that it serves as a means for the ‘utilitarian’ exchange of information. Those scholars who investigate the informal uses of ELF conversations (e.g. Meierkord 2000) do not explicitly address the notion of creating rapport. So far, substantial research on phatic communion has focused on the examination of interactions which are carried out among speakers who share their first languages (e.g. Aston 1988, Schneider 1988, Züger 1998).

The present paper focuses on this interactional dimension of ELF. It discusses Malinowski’s concept of phatic communion and briefly illustrates a number of different functional approaches to interactional speech. These theoretical considerations will lead to a working definition of the functions of phatic talk for the subsequent examination of agreement tokens (such as *yes*, *yeah*, *yah*, *mhm* in extract 1 above) in informal ELF conversations among Vietnamese and Austrian speakers.

2. The Austrian-Vietnamese mini-corpus

The extracts analysed in this paper come from a small-scale corpus which contains six fully transcribed conversations of approximately 130 minutes in total (equalling about 25000 transcribed words) of spoken informal ELF interactions between Austrian and Vietnamese speakers. All interactions were recorded during a one-month stay in Vietnam in February 2002.⁵

Most of the recorded conversations were carried out among my female friend and me and one or two Vietnamese speakers. The methodology used

³ The present contribution presents a selective portion of issues discussed in my MA thesis *Phatic Communion in English as a Lingua Franca*, which was written in 2003 at the Department of English and American Studies of Vienna University under the supervision of Prof. Barbara Seidlhofer.

⁴ A comprehensive overview of the descriptive work undertaken in this field can be found in Seidlhofer 2004, Seidlhofer 2005, Seidlhofer *et al.* 2006.

⁵ Apart from my general research interest in the use of English as a lingua franca, the backdrop of my data collection was also given by my intention to contribute to the compilation of the Vienna-Oxford International Corpus of English (VOICE), a current research initiative at the English Department of Vienna University under the direction of Prof. Seidlhofer (cf. www.univie.ac.at/voice).

for my data collection can thus be considered ‘complete participant observation’ (Duranti 1997: 99). Therefore, the ‘Observer’s Paradox’ (Labov 1972) by and large certainly remains an insoluble problem. The fact that I started the data collection without a clearly defined research question, however, mitigates my influence as a researcher on the present study: I was not able to inform the participants about what aspects of their talk I was planning to focus on. The participants, thus, carried out their interaction without focusing on particular linguistic features. The lack of a pre-fabricated research question also prevented me from ‘manipulating’ the interactions in such a way that they corresponded to my desired results. The compiled conversations can thus be viewed as naturally occurring conversations, characterised by a high degree of spontaneity and informality.

According to Aston’s (1988: 214ff.) differentiation between *symmetrical* and *complementary*, *positional* and *personal* and *mutually known* and *unknown* roles, the interactants’ relationships can be defined as follows: the relationship between the two Austrian speakers can be classified as *symmetrical* (they are both travellers), *personal* (they participate as individuals) and *mutually known* (they are close friends). For the sake of simplicity, the Austrian speakers on the one hand and the Vietnamese speakers on the other hand are viewed as an entity in the description of the role relationships. The participants’ roles between the Vietnamese and the Austrian speakers can be accordingly defined as *complementary* (e.g. buyers – sellers, travellers – tour guides, etc.), *positional* (e.g. tourists – street vendors, tourists – tour guides, etc.) and *mutually unknown*.

As briefly illustrated with the extract in the introduction, my data is characterised by different levels of linguistic proficiencies of the participants. We will see in the course of the analysis that the Austrian speakers are generally more proficient in English than the Vietnamese speakers. It has to be emphasised, however, that in accordance with the widely-acknowledged self-regulating nature of ELF (cf. e.g. Seidlhofer 2002) the diverse levels of linguistic competence do not seem to be an impediment for interactionally successful communication in my corpus.

3. The social function of language

Starting from a critical discussion of Malinowski’s notion of phatic communion, this section will shed light on some approaches to the social function of language proposed by a number of linguists. The insights

presented on the following pages will then enable me to establish a functional definition of phatic speech as the basis for the analysis of my data.

3.1. Rethinking ‘phatic communion’

The British anthropologist Malinowski is often cited as the pioneer of the study of the social function of speech (e.g. Coupland 2000: xv, Schneider 1988: 23). Based on his observations of a “group of savages” (Malinowski 1923 [1972]: 146) during his fieldwork in Papua New Guinea, he created the term ‘phatic’ for the purpose of defining a language usage which he identifies as “the use of language in pure social intercourse” (Malinowski 1923 [1972]: 149):

There can be no doubt that we have here a new type of linguistic use – phatic communion I am tempted to call it – a type of speech in which ties of union are created by a mere exchange of words. [...] [It] serves to establish bonds of personal union between people brought together by the mere need of companionship and does not serve any purpose of communicating ideas (Malinowski 1923 [1972]: 151).

Malinowski’s functional approach to language was certainly pioneering and a number of his concepts have found universal acceptance: his work serves as a valuable tool for the examination of sociability through discourse and has paved the way for work examining small talk, gossip, casual conversation, chat, chit-chat, banter, informal prattle, etc. The analysis of the empirical data in the present paper offers some evidence for Malinowski’s widely acknowledged assumption that the “emphasis of affirmation and consent” (Malinowski 1923 [1972]: 150) in phatic communion helps to create interpersonal bonds. His recognition of the preference for affirmation and consent in phatic communion is complemented by the fact that agreement is “mixed perhaps with incidental disagreement which creates the bonds of antipathy” (Malinowski 1923 [1972]: 150). Thus, he hints at negative aspects of phatic speech, which tend to be largely ignored by scholars. Phatic communion is predominantly explored in terms of its positive outcome, i.e. it is viewed as a speech function which allows creating positive rapport or good social relations. Quite clearly it can also display control, dominance, superiority, power, etc. (cf. Aston 1988: 21 and 371ff., Holmes 2000: 51ff.). Malinowski’s notion of so-called ‘safe’ topics of phatic talk, such as “inquiries about health, comments on weather, affirmations of some supremely obvious state of things [...] [and] personal accounts of the speaker’s views and life history” (Malinowski 1923 [1972]: 149-150) has also gained universal acceptance.

However, the drawbacks of Malinowski's work must not be ignored. Let me point out some inconsistencies in his line of argument and some disputable concepts, which need to be revisited with reference to more recent work on the interactional function of speech.

I consider Malinowski's suggestion that in phatic communion the meaning of words is completely irrelevant one of the major drawbacks of his work:

Are words in phatic communion used primarily to convey meaning, the meaning which is symbolically theirs? Certainly not! They fulfil a social function and that is their principal aim [...] (Malinowski 1923 [1972]: 151).

There is, of course, indisputable evidence that words in phatic talk are predominantly socially relevant, but we certainly must not underestimate or even deny the semantic meaning of words. Züger quite rightly notes that, if the meaning of words was irrelevant, it would be sufficient to produce arbitrary sounds (Züger 1998: 247), supporting Bublitz's suggestion that "one always talks *about* something" (Bublitz 1988: 19) and that "everyday conversations are not just instances of 'social noise'" (Bublitz 1988: 262f.). Malinowski's claim is also refuted by Laver when he argues that "the semantic meaning of the tokens selected in phatic communion is indeed relevant to the nature of the interaction" (Laver 1975: 222). What I seek to demonstrate here, however, is that the central paradox lies in Malinowski's argumentation itself: he attributes a high degree of "emphasis of affirmation and consent" (Malinowski 1923 [1972]: 150) to phatic interactions while, at the same time, he denies the semantic meaning of phatic utterances. How can we possibly negotiate agreement by producing utterances which are completely meaningless?

Furthermore, Malinowski's description of phatic talk contains a number of derogatory expressions which echo his negative attitude towards this kind of communication even though he stresses the importance of phatic communion as a direct reflection of humans' need to create social bonds (Malinowski 1923 [1972]: 151). He describes phatic talk as a "language used in free, *aimless*, social intercourse" (Malinowski 1923 [1972]: 149, my emphasis), as a "situation when a number of people *aimlessly* gossip together" (Malinowski 1923 [1972]: 151, my emphasis). Phatic communion displays "the function of speech in *mere* sociabilities" (Malinowski 1923 [1972]: 150, my emphasis) and contains "*purposeless* expressions of preference or aversion, accounts of *irrelevant* happenings, comments on what is perfectly obvious" (Malinowski 1923 [1972]: 150, my emphasis). The notion of 'mereness' is further stressed by his belief that phatic talk primarily serves to avoid taciturnity (Malinowski 1923 [1972]: 150). Malinowski considers

silence a threat to face-to-face interactions and he believes that the avoidance of silence is one of the central goals of social actors engaging in phatic talk. Phatic communion is thus functional in defusing the threat of taciturnity. It can therefore be inferred that “phatic talk is space-filling talk, a minimalist fulfilment of a basic communicative requirement” (Coupland 2000: 2), which locates it at the very periphery of human communication and reduces it to a minor, unimportant mode of talk. This might have prepared the ground for the longstanding negative connotations of phatic talk (cf. e.g. Wolfson 1981, Leech 1974, Turner 1973) and, subsequently, to the scarcity of analytic attention in this field.⁶

The third drawback of Malinowski’s work is that – by stating that phatic communion “serves to establish bonds of personal union between people brought together by the mere need of companionship and does not serve any purpose of communicating ideas” and that “language [phatic communion] does not function [...] as a means of transmission of thought” (Malinowski 1923 [1972]: 151) – he treats interactional and transactional functions of speech as mutually exclusive. The analysis of the interactions compiled for my own research purposes brings to light that phatic talk is not always completely deprived of its transactional function, but that the two speech functions co-exist. This observation coincides with the findings of a number of functional approaches to language by various scholars:⁷ Lyons agrees with Bühler that “few, if any utterances, have one function to the exclusion of the others” (Lyons 1977: 52). Jakobson also explicitly stresses what Malinowski failed to acknowledge:

Although we distinguish six basic aspects of language, we could, however, hardly find verbal messages that would fulfil only one function. The diversity lies not in a monopoly of some one of these several functions but in a different hierarchical order of function. (Jakobson 1960 [1978]: 353)

Halliday follows the same argumentative line: with reference to his distinction between the ‘ideational’, ‘interpersonal’ and ‘textual’ functions of language he states that “[a]ny one clause is built up of a combination of structures

⁶ The central findings of ethnomethodology and Conversation Analysis (CA) have certainly paved the way for a thorough investigation of interactional speech. Based on the ethnomethodological belief that human beings constantly create their own world through their everyday activities, Conversational Analysts argue that everyday interaction is a determining element of the social world which deserves analytic attention (cf. e.g. Garfinkel 1967, Hutchby & Wooffitt 1998).

⁷ For a detailed discussion of the functional approaches to language referred to in this contribution consult Kordon (2003: 14-20).

deriving from these three functions” (Halliday 1970: 144). These observations coincide with Brown and Yule’s hypothesis of the co-existence of transactional and interactional speech: “[i]t would be unlikely that, on any occasion, a natural language utterance would be used to fulfil only one function, to the total exclusion of the other” (Brown & Yule 1983: 1).

3.2. The two central functions of phatic discourse

Although Malinowski briefly touches upon the observation that phatic communion serves to remove the threat of taciturnity, he clearly highlights the establishment and maintenance of positive interpersonal relationships. It is the former function, however, which deserves equal attention with regard to the analysis of the interactions compiled in the Austrian-Vietnamese corpus. Let us therefore supplement Malinowski’s notion of phatic communion with more recent functional approaches to interactional speech.

Jakobson (1960 [1978]) neglects the notion of rapport in phatic discourse. His phatic function is restricted to utterances which serve to open, maintain or end a conversation. It thus focuses on the ‘contact’, i.e. “physical channel and psychological connection between the addresser and the addressee” (Jakobson 1960 [1978]: 353). Jakobson elaborates on this function by exemplifying it with a few utterances that speakers use in order to check whether the channel works, e.g. *Hello, do you hear me?*, *Are you listening?*, etc. (cf. Jakobson 1960 [1978]: 355). He also suggests that participants make use of signals which confirm that the channel is still open, as for example *um-hum* (ibid.). He claims that these phatic utterances are prevalently exchanged in the form of ritualized formulae out of which entire dialogues can develop. According to him, exchanges of this kind fulfil the mere purpose of maintaining the flow of the conversation.

Züger’s differentiation between four different types of phatic talk – namely between signal, initial, terminal and social phaticity (Züger 1998: 98ff.) – combines the notion of both rapport and contact.

Signal phaticity refers to the channel in Jakobson’s sense, i.e. the establishment and the maintenance of the physical channel between the speakers. Apart from non-verbal or paralinguistic signals, the maintenance of the channel is commonly ensured by backchannelling behaviour. This can be linguistically realised in a number of different forms. We will see in the actual analysis of the data that agreement tokens are, for instance, a means of signalling that the channel is open. A lack of backchannelling behaviour certainly causes disruptions of the flow of the conversation and, therefore,

often has a negative impact on the interpersonal relationships between the participants.

Initial phaticity commonly arises when conversations are initiated in a ritualised way. The function of the ‘opening phase’, as Laver calls it, is

to lubricate the transition from noninteraction to interaction, and to ease the potentially awkward tension of the earlier moments of the encounter, ‘breaking the ice’, so to speak, before the main business of the encounter is embarked upon in the medial phase (Laver 1975: 218).

Similar to conversational openings, interactions are commonly ended with a ritualised formula, which Züger terms terminal phaticity. The following illustrates a closing phase of the Austrian-Vietnamese corpus between the Austrian tourists (A1 and A2) and a street vendor (V2):

Extract 2:

- 1 V2: nice to meet you <1> have a good time see you yeah </1>
- 2 A2: <1> nice to meet you bye bye </1>
- 3 A1: bye bye
- 4 V2: you are very good
- 5 A1: @@

Exchanges of this kind are interpersonally highly relevant. Laver (1975: 227) argues that the final phase of a conversation serves the consolidation of the relationships between the participants. He argues that “the linguistic tokens used in phatic communion in the closing phase [...] mostly make explicit reference to psychological and social aspects of the two participants” (Laver 1975: 229). This can be done retrospectively through a positive evaluation of the encounter, as for example the utterances *nice to meet you* in lines 1 and 2. Similarly, with the positive evaluation *you are very good* in line 4, V2 apparently voices his appreciation of A1’s and A2’s willingness to spend money on his goods. Having witnessed the conversation myself, I consider this utterance also as an expression of gratitude towards the tourists A1 and A2, as they actually dedicated some time to a personal and friendly exchange with V2 before purchasing his goods. A typically prospective formula refers to perspectives on future contacts, such as *see you* in line 1.

For Züger social phaticity starts where initial phaticity ends (cf. Züger 1998: 119). This transition is marked by the fact that the predominantly ritualised speech behaviour changes into less ritualised discourse. For her, social phaticity is the speakers’ attempt to stay in contact, to exchange kind words, to show that they value care and attention, etc. She describes it as a mode of speech which does not necessarily have a conversational topic and which does not primarily serve the purpose of exchanging information (cf. Züger 1998: 119).

Considering these different approaches to phaticity, we can infer that there are two possible functions of phatic talk. Phatic utterances can be defined as utterances which serve:

- the establishment and the maintenance of the psychological contact between the speakers, or/and
- the initiation, the maintenance or the termination of the physical contact between the speakers.

For the sake of terminological clarity, I propose the following two types of functions of phaticity for the present study:

1. a rapport-establishing and -maintaining-function, and
2. a flow-maintaining-function.⁸

Although this subdivision provides a useful basis for the analysis of my empirical data, I believe that a clear-cut categorisation of this kind is rather difficult to operationalise. Rather, my data shows that the boundaries between the two functions are fuzzy and the two types of phatic speech are often strongly intertwined. In fact, it often occurs that the speakers' attempt to maintain the flow of the conversation serves the function of establishing and maintaining rapport. In many cases the speakers' effort to keep the physical channel open seems to be a crucial prerequisite for the creation of interpersonal bonds.

Let me support this point by a stretch of talk occurring in my small-scale corpus. The following extract is taken from a conversation that I (A2) carried out with a Vietnamese English teacher (V3). We met by chance in front of the college where V3 teaches. The exchange is preceded by purely transactional talk, in which V3 provides me with directions to a language school in Hanoi. This transactional exchange ends with my acknowledgement in line 1:

Extract 3:

- 1 A2: thank you very much.
 2 V3: @@ and are you student?
 3 A2: well still i have got one year left at home=
 4 V3: =aha=
 5 A2: =and then i will finish my studies and i will become probably a teacher as well or i see <1> you
 6 know i see </1> but at the moment i write write my on my masters=
 7 V3: <1> ah teacher as well i see </1>
 8 V3: =a:h masters=
 9 A2: =i write my final paper=
 10 V3: =a:h final paper=

⁸ For the sake of terminological simplicity the functions will henceforth be labelled *rapport-function* and *flow-function*.

- 11 A2: =i write it on maybe on you know intercultural communication or english=
 12 V3: =o:h okay=
 13 A2: =english as a lingua franca do you know what this means? you english as the language that in
 14 which you know most of the people around the world can communicate?=
 15 V3: =o:h o:h yeah=
 16 A2: =and that's why i do my <2> research here also and maybe i </2> try and get into touch erm
 17 with you know vietnamese <3> universities and so on </3> do you you have an email address or
 18 anything?
 19 V3: <2> okay yeah yeah a:h yeah yeah i see </2>
 20 V3: <3> vietnamese students yeah university </3>

At first sight, this extract is likely to be considered transactional, as the interactants exchange biographical facts. A close analysis, however, reveals that it contains a number of phatic elements. This is clearly indicative of the close interrelation between transactional and interactional speech, which was elaborated on above (cf. 3.1.).

It was for a good reason that I pointed out that line 1 signals the end of a purely transactional exchange. The fact that A2 utters her acknowledgement with falling intonation clearly signals the termination of a semantic unit. Considering the widespread agreement that pauses and silence are commonly avoided in phatic communication, it can be assumed that V3 inserts her inquiry about A2's profession in order to avoid silence and to keep the conversation going. If interpreted in this way, her question fulfils the flow-function, or to put it in other words, it keeps the channel open. It is, however, equally justified to argue that V3 attempts to establish rapport with her interlocutor by showing interest in her personal circumstances. According to this interpretation she clearly makes use of a rapport-establishing device.

It cannot be told on the basis of this transcription alone whether the transition from purely transactional to interactional talk was initiated in order to avoid communicative silence or in order to establish positive interpersonal relations. In support of the argument that the two functions are closely interrelated, it can also be argued that V3's utterance serves the two functions simultaneously. Silence is avoided as it might arouse a feeling of unease in the participants and, consequently, threatens the interactants' personal relationship.

The laughter at the beginning of V3's utterance in line 2 equally offers two different ways of interpretation. As laughing commonly signals the interlocutors' willingness to create a positive atmosphere and displays their friendliness, it can be assumed that it serves to establish rapport. It is also conceivable, however, that V3 uses laughter as a filler, which allows her to think about what to say next.

In the same manner in which A2's move in line 1 cannot be explicitly allocated to a single function, there is a number of different ways of

interpreting the backchannelling behaviour in this extract. It is noteworthy that V3 makes extensive use of agreement tokens (often in combination with repetition), which will represent the analytic focus of the subsequent analysis. V3 continuously inserts them during short breaks of A2's report or even utters them simultaneously to A2's turns. It can be argued that V3's *aha* in line 4, her *o:h okay* in line 12, her *o:h o:h yeah* in line 15 and the extensive iteration of agreement tokens in line 19 stress her great interest in A2's profession, thus enhancing their interpersonal relationship. Likewise, they may also serve as a means of indicating V3's listenership, representing the flow-function. These two possible interpretations also hold true for V3's extensive repetition of A2's utterances.

I hope to have made clear the close interrelation between the two functions of phatic talk with the analysis of this extract and that "the relation of form and function is not one-to-one but many-to-many" (Cameron 2002: 73), which I consider essential for the subsequent examination of how phaticity is formally realized in the interactions of my database.

4. An analysis of agreement tokens in phatic ELF talk

As briefly mentioned in the analysis of the preceding extract, both the 'rapport-function' and the 'flow-function' in ELF discourse can, among other linguistic features, be formally realised by agreement tokens.⁹ In the following analysis of a number of extracts of my database this observation will be further pursued.

Due to the scarcity of empirical work on phatic discourse between non-native speakers of English, my methodology is predominantly based on research into phatic interactions carried out between native speakers of English. I will rely on Schneider's technical definition of agreement as "a positive reaction to statements, usually statements of opinion" (Schneider 1988: 160) and on his extension of this notion of agreement to other types of positive reactions: he also regards reactions to factual statements and backchannel behaviour as agreement. Schneider (1988: 160) also suggests a distinction between 3 types of agreement tokens:

⁹ Kordon (2003) also looks at repetition as a means to achieve establish rapport in ELF talk. Due to the limited scope of this paper, this certainly very interesting feature cannot be taken into consideration.

- weak agreement tokens: e.g. *mhm*, *hm*, *mm*, etc.
- neutral agreement tokens: e.g. *yes*, *no*, and its derivatives *yeah*, *yah*, etc.
- strong agreement tokens: e.g. *exactly*, *right*, *absolutely*, etc.

Although I am rather sceptical about a clear-cut distinction of this kind, I do consider Schneider's labels as a useful operating set of terms and I will, therefore, structure the following analysis according to his categories.

In the ensuing discussion special characteristics of phatic ELF talk will be highlighted. After having tackled the 3 types of agreement tokens listed above individually, deviations from standard native norms as regards the usage of agreement tokens will be presented with reference to findings of recent empirical investigations into ELF. I will examine to which extent departures from native-speaker norms influence the interpersonal relationships of the participants. Thus, methodologically, the description of my ELF data can be classified as what Seidlhofer *et al.* (2006: 9) call 'exonormative' approach.

4.1. Weak agreement tokens

It is noteworthy that weak agreement tokens are extensively used in the Austrian-Vietnamese corpus, especially as backchannel tokens during longer stretches of narrative talk, as in the following conversation between a Vietnamese tour guide (V4) and the two Austrian travellers:

Extract 4:¹⁰

- 1 A2: yeah. but you can still see the area where battles took place and=
 2 V4: =yeah=
 3 A2: =were the fighting <1> was basically </1>
 4 V4: <1> erm </1> (.) first erm if you erm take to <un> x </un> you <un> x </un> start from one
 5 tunnel (.) one tunnel near the temporar- temporary erm temporary boarder between the v- the north
 6 and the south <un> xx </un> tunnel it's the place were <un> xx xxx </un> =
 7 A2: =mhm=
 8 V4: =they <un> x </un> <@> <un> xxxx <un> </@>=
 9 A1: =<@> mhm </@>=
 10 V4: =is the <un> xxxxxx </un> yeah (.) this erm this is the river {V4 shows an imaginative map
 11 on the table} <2> and now </2> this path is very difficult to cross erm to cross the erm river
 12 A2: <2> mhm </2>
 13 A2: mhm (3)

They seem to serve the interlocutors both to signal listenership without claiming the floor and to maintain the flow of the conversation. It can thus be

¹⁰ The large number of unintelligible passages in this extract is primarily due to loud background noises.

inferred that *mhm* is a linguistic feature which unites both the interpersonal function of creating rapport and the purpose of keeping the channel open.

4.2. Neutral agreement tokens

As in native-native discourse, *yes* “expresses agreement in a neutral way” (cf. Schneider 1988: 163) in my data. The token *yes* occurs much less frequently than its derivatives *yeah*, *yah*, etc.

The most relevant function of *yes* and *no* and their colloquial variants for the examination of interpersonal aspects of speech is when they occur as stronger variants of feedback tokens, as in the following example:

Extract 5:

- 1 A2: halong bay and then we go down the south.
2 V4: **yeah**

Here *yeah* is not used as affirmation, but its major function is to signal emphatic attention towards S1.

The corpus gives evidence of a further function of *yes* and its variants when it is integrated in a turn, either at the beginning, the end or in the middle of a turn. Let me illustrate this by the following example:

Extract 6:

- 1 V3: but erm in a class of literature? usually girls more than <1> boys? </1>
2 A2: <1> mhm </1> it's like <@> us </@> <2> @@@ </2> <@> i think that's <3> girls
3 thing </3> </@>
4 V3: <2> yeah @ </2>
5 V3: <3> okay yeah yeah </3> <4> **okay yeah** </4> (.) now you see is erm people in our country
6 tend to learn english (.) **yes** because i think is a kind of means **yes** to help them to communicate
7 with other people from other <5> countries </5>
8 A2: <4> <@>i see i see </@> </4>
9 V3: <5> you think </5> english is the most important language

This extract is preceded by an exchange about the ratio of women and men in the college where the Vietnamese speaker V3 is teaching English. A2 uses the information that more girls attend literature courses than boys (line 1) as a basis to establish common ground by stating that this phenomenon also applies to her culture. This statement of fact is then agreed on by a weak agreement token in combination with laughter (line 4). A2 then states her personal opinion on the tendency that girls are generally more interested in literature than boys, which gives rise to a series of combined agreement tokens (line 5). After having agreed with a combination of a neutral and a strong token (line 5), V3 introduces a topic change. Consequently, the two neutral tokens *yes* in line 6 carry a different function than to show assent to A2's preceding utterances. They can be interpreted as a means to introduce

V3's own statements. Another possible interpretation is that a turn-medial *yes* can be glossed as *you see, you know, well, etc.*, in which case it allows the interactant to fill a communicative break and gain time for the formulation of the rest of the utterance without interrupting the flow of the conversation. It could thus fulfil the 'flow-function', i.e. a means to avoid longer pauses or even silence, which might threaten the positive interpersonal rapport.

Extract 6 is also indicative of a deviation from Schneider's (1988) observation. It is also noteworthy that Schneider claims that agreement tokens occur in the following positions (cf. Schneider 1988: 160): in isolation (turnsize), as simultaneous speech or integrated in a turn's speech (turn-initial, turn-final). He thus only found agreement tokens which are integrated in a turn either in final or in initial position. My corpus, however, displays a number of instances in which a token is situated in the middle of a turn, which renders it necessary to include the notion of turn-medial in the category of turn-integrated tokens. Extract 6 above thus gives rise to the assumption that the token *yes* and its variants can also be used as space-filling devices when integrated in a turn in ELF conversations.

4.3. Strong agreement tokens

Based on Schneider's (1988: 160) list, the interactions in my data comprise the following strong agreement tokens: *of course, right, all right, okay, exactly, sure, true, fine, definitely, absolutely*, which suggests that the speakers of my data tend to have a rather closed set of strong agreement tokens at their disposal. Moreover, there are perceivable differences as regards the choice of tokens between the individual speakers. The individual recordings show that speakers make use of a few strong agreement tokens which they then use over and over again. This observation is supportive of Meierkord's (1996) finding that ELF speakers have a markedly reduced repertoire of tokens at their disposal.

Schneider (1988: 164) claims that the analysis of the usage of *of course* is problematic, as it does not only express agreement. He points out that it is often used in a defensive way, substituting phrases like, "Don't think I don't know that", or "That's obvious I didn't think it was worth mentioning" (Schneider 1988: 164). There is only one instance in the Vietnamese-Austrian corpus which might be said to carry this negative connotation of the token:

Extract 7:

- 1 A2: yeah but there is many peop- erm many people speak french here also
 2 V4: yeah (.) because erm you know (.) nearly one century <1> french <un> x </un> </1> in
 3 vietnam (.) so <2> erm the </2> especially the old old people (2)
 4 A1: <1> yeah french </1>
 5 A1: <2> **of course** yeah </2>

In line 4 the Austrian speaker A1 might be interpreted to imply with the agreement token *of course* that she was perfectly aware of the fact that Vietnam was under French rule for almost a century but unlike the Vietnamese tour guide V4 did not think it was worth mentioning. As a participant of the conversation, I think that interpreting the strong agreement token as indirect criticism towards V4 is not appropriate. In fact, in the course of the same transaction A1 acts as a very cooperative participant. The corpus does not contain any other instances which could serve as evidence of this negative connotation of *of course*. It can thus be assumed that the strong agreement token *of course* is a perfectly accepted backchannel item in ELF talk. Apart from it being predominantly a means of expressing strong agreement, there is evidence in my database that *of course* has two more functions which serve to establish positive rapport in speech, i.e. it serves to emphatically express understanding and compassion in troubles-telling and it is used as a substitute for the idioms *you are welcome*, *don't mention it*, etc.

Scholars agree on the fact that one way of interpreting *right* and *okay* uttered in isolation is that the speakers signal their wish to close the interaction or even the whole transaction (cf. e.g. Schneider 1988, Edmondson 1981). It is noteworthy that the Vietnamese-Austrian corpus does not contain any instances in which *right* or *okay* function as boundary markers.

A possible explanation for the lack of boundary markers (cf. also Lesznyák 2004) might be that conversationalists in phatic discourse tend to avoid items which clearly mark their intent to finish the interaction and, thus, introduce silence. This observation coincides with the widely acknowledged assumption that ELF speakers hardly use any gambits surrounding turn change, which is brought to light in House's (1999: 85) observation that ELF interactants have been described as lacking

pragmatic fluency, i.e. a marked non-smoothness of turn-taking machinery and conversational mismanagement occasioned by a failure to employ mitigating and lubricating gambits and discourse strategies.

Apart from *all right* appearing as a full variant of *right* in my data, my corpus provides evidence that *all right* is often used to express emphatic feedback to factual or personal information with a slight notion of surprise, which can be glossed as *I see!*:

Extract 9:

- 1 V3: i am teaching english @@@
 2 A2: **all right** because i was you know i was what i was most interested in was to go into a
 3 class and see how english is taught here

The same function is displayed by the combinations *o:h okay* or *aha okay*, as the following example shows:

Extract 10:

- 1 A2: you know i have got a boyfriend back home so i can't get married here
 2 V5: **aha okay**

Definitely, *sure* and *absolutely* occur in the corpus as important phatic devices, particularly in sales talk. The following example shows how the Vietnamese travel agent V6 assures the quality of his offer by an extensive use of strong agreement tokens:

Extract 11:

- 1 A2: so we don't have to go to back to saigon because we we can we we yes is one
 2 direction to go back <1> that' s perfect </1> because because it saves it saves us traveling
 3 time again if we go this direction anyway i mean that won- take too long from here to here?
 4 V6: <1> no no </1>
 5 V6: **sure**
 6 A2: <2> can bu- ca- </2>
 7 A1: <2> and we can take </2> a bus from here to here or-
 8 V6: **definitely definitely absolutely**

In this extract V6 responds to the Austrian tourists' inquiries about possible travel arrangements with (an iteration of) strong agreement tokens (line 8) to demonstrate his professional competence and the feasibility of their travelling plans. This observation fits in with Aston's claim that "in certain circumstances, even 'reasonable competency' [in the sense of the quotation below] may be a major element in establishing positive rapport" (Aston 1988: 286). The desire to display one's personal aptitudes might be intrinsically human, as Goffman (1971: 198) puts it:

[...] the individual constantly acts to provide information that he is of sound character and reasonable competency. When, for whatever reason, the scene around him ceases to provide this information about him, he is likely to feel compelled to act to control the undesired impression of himself he has made. (Goffman 1971: 198)

Extract 11 is also indicative of a phenomenon which seems to be characteristic of ELF talk. Line 3 contains an utterance with negative polarity, which demands a negative agreement token, such as *no* or *not at all*, according to native-speaker standards. The example shows that the positive token *sure* in line 3 is perfectly accepted as a strong agreement token in ELF talk, even though it might be 'incorrect' in first language use. As the

examination of deviations from standard norms of this sort is highly interesting for the analysis of interactional aspects, this will be the focus of the next section.

4.4. Linguistic deviations from standard norms

As illustrated with extract 11 above, my data provides evidence that the interactants do not display reactions to semantic, syntactic, lexical or morphological deviations from standard norms. In many cases, it is likely that they do so in order to reduce the threat of disagreement and conflict and to avoid embarrassment on the part of the interlocutors, i.e. in order not to threaten their interpersonal relationships.

This observation is linked to what Firth (1996) has termed the ‘let-it-pass principle’. The ‘let-it-pass principle’ stands out as one of the prime characteristics of ELF talk (cf. e.g. Wagner and Firth 1997). By reference to Meierkord (1996) and Wagner and Firth (1997), House describes the ‘let-it-pass’ principle as follows:

[...] ELF interactants [...] ‘normalize’ potential trouble sources, rather than attending to them explicitly, via for example, repair, reformulation, or other negotiating behaviours. As long as participants-to-the-talk achieve a certain threshold of understanding sufficient for their current conversational purpose, they seem to adopt a ‘Let-it-Pass’ principle governing the way they handle ambiguously or overtly deficient utterances. (House 1999: 75)

The analysis of strong agreement tokens, as in extract 11 above, brings to light that deviations from standard native norms do not have a disturbing influence on the conversation in ELF. It seems that as long as the speakers *do* use the tokens, positive interpersonal relationships are maintained and the interaction is communicatively successful.

Another extract shows that this finding also holds true for the usage of neutral agreement tokens. Despite the usage of *yeah* as a reaction to an utterance with negative polarity, the conversation is carried on without any significant disruption or indications of pragma-semantic problems:

Extract 12:

- 1 A2: girls don't smoke'
- 2 V7: **yeah** many girl no smoking many girl vietnamese (.) very little erm girl vietnam
- 3 erm smoking @
- 4 A2: it's good <1> it's good </1>
- 5 A1: <1> yeah yeah </1>

The data also contain instances in which agreement is expressed to utterances which formally deviate from standard native-speaker use. From the following

example we can infer that semantic problems in utterances are simply ignored:

Extract 13:

- 1 A2: yeah and i think that the **viennese** people are ar- as you said in the cave also that they are nice
- 2 and friendly and and and and are **welcome and open you in a very very open way also.** (3)
- 3 V4: **yeah** (3) i think erm vietnamese people they are really friendly=
- 4 A1: =yeah very

This is preceded by a conversation about the growing tourism industry in Vietnam. Taking into account this wider conversational context, we can see that line 1 contains a slip of the tongue, namely A2 talks about *Viennese* people although she obviously wants to refer to *Vietnamese* people. This slip of the tongue is probably due to the phonological similarities between the two words. A2's turn contains another lexico-grammatical problem in line 2, i.e. *[they] are welcome and open you*. The constituents *welcome* and *open* need to be exchanged in order to produce a perfectly comprehensible utterance. Neither of the 'incorrect' utterances is corrected by A2. However, V4 agrees with A2 with the neutral agreement token *yeah* despite these linguistic ambiguities. It can be argued, of course, that the confusion of the lexical items *Viennese* and *Vietnamese* is not noticed by V4 S2 due to their close phonological similarities and that A2's attempt to praise the openness of the Vietnamese people is understood by V4 out of the communicative context. The pause of three seconds between A2's and V4's turn (line 3) might, however, be an indication of a slight problem in comprehension on the part of V4.

There is also evidence in the corpus that ELF speakers react with positive agreement to utterances which are grammatically problematic as they do not correspond to the grammatical rules of native speakers. This phenomenon can be illustrated with the example below:

Extract 14:

- 1 V8: i can read english well but **not really good**
- 2 A1: **mhm**

The extract contains an 'incorrect' use of the adjective *good*. A1 signals her understanding by the weak agreement token *mhm*, even though V8's utterance does grammatically not correspond to standard native speaker norms, because it contains a semantic contradiction. It can be assumed that A1 is aware of V8's attempt to modify his claims about his good reading competence by the collocation of the intensifier *really* and the adjective *good* and thus reacts with assent. It is also possible that A1, as a non-native speaker herself, is not aware of this grammatical deviation.

My data further contains stretches of talk in which the interactants use agreement tokens as reaction to factual statements, even though it can be assumed that they have not understood the information provided. Let me illustrate this phenomenon by the following extract:

Extract 15:

- 1 A1: we are tourists <1> we </1> are tourists and we stay for for for one month
 2 V9: <1> a:h </1> but i don't know so many foreigner students foreigner from america
 3 they come here this (month)
 4 A1: **yeah** we are from europe <2> we </2> are from austria <3> do </3> you know austria?
 5 V9: <2> **a:h** </2> <3> **ah** </3> (australia) **yeah** i know australian i know <4> (it's it's) </4> **yeah** i
 6 no not australia
 7 A1: <4> it's not australia </4>
 8 A2:: it's near italy
 9 V9: **yeah** i know' (.) so many (erm but) i today i meet two person the same (.) maybe you try to
 10 buy one one me?

By inserting agreement tokens in line 4, 5 and 9, V9 (a Vietnamese street vendor), obviously pretends to understand A1's attempts to refute his assumptions about her American or Australian¹¹ origins. The assumption that A1's information is not understood by V9 is supported by the fact that in the course of the same transaction, V9 frequently addresses the tourists A1 and A2 as Americans. It is likely that V9 lacks knowledge of his interlocutors' home country, which he, probably caused by his fear to threaten their interpersonal relationship, does not want to admit. We have to take into consideration that the maintenance of rapport is of particular importance to V9 as he, as a street vendor, is primarily motivated to get his business done successfully.¹²

The assumption that a positive reaction to factual information, irrespective of whether it was understood or not, is a phenomenon characteristic of phatic ELF talk is further supported by the following exchange about the differences in dressing conventions at funerals in Vietnam and in Austria:

¹¹ There are more instances in the corpus which serve as evidence that the proper names *Austria* and *Australia* are often confused by the ELF speakers of the present database. My suspicion is that this is, as with *Viennese* and *Vietnamese*, due to phonological similarities. It is also likely, of course, that the Vietnamese speakers simply do not know of Austria.

¹² The extract further gives evidence of the function of phatic episodes in sales talk. After the typically phatic exchange about the speakers' origins (line 1–9), V9 inserts the invitation to buy his goods (line 10). It thus serves as evidence of the phenomenon that phatic exchanges are often used to pave the way for successful business transactions. The corpus displays a number of instances in which phaticity may serve to break the ice between the participants and it is an indispensable component of successful sales talks (cf. Kordon 2003).

Extract 16:

- 1 A1: and do- if if someone is dying here is- do people wear white white dress?
 2 V1: yeah.
 3 A1: white dress <1> mhm </1> because in in austria and in europe it's it's black
 4 V1: <1> yeah </1> **yeah** <2> bla- </2>
 5 A1: <2> people </2> were black.
 6 A2: black.
 7 V1: black color?¹³
 8 A1: yeah if if someone's dying people all wear black
 9 V1: aha

Note that V1 reacts with a neutral feedback token in line 4 to the information that Austrian people wear black at funerals. It is, however, only after A1's repetition of this fact in line 5 and an emphasis of A2 in line 6 (note the reduction to the crucial lexical item *black* in S3's turn) that V1 gives vent to her surprise by uttering *black color?* with rising intonation.

5. Conclusion and outlook

It is hoped that this contribution provides evidence that ELF is not only transactional in its use but that it also carries a phatic function, i.e. it also serves to establish and maintain rapport between speakers of all kinds of different cultural backgrounds.

Based on different functional approaches to the social use of language (e.g. Malinowski 1923 [1972], Jakobson 1960 [1978], Züger 1998), I have identified two major functions of phatic talk: the rapport-function and the flow-function. Bearing in mind that a particular linguistic form can carry a whole range of different functional variables, I argued that in phatic ELF talk these two functions are, in most cases, strongly interrelated.

By way of illustration and exemplification the analysis of a small-scale corpus between Austrian and Vietnamese speakers of English focused on agreement tokens as a linguistic manifestation of these two functions. It can be stated that my examination of agreement tokens is highly supportive of generally acknowledged assumptions about the nature of ELF talk.

Most strikingly, my data supports the observation that ELF speakers are overtly consensus-oriented, cooperative and mutually supportive (cf. e.g. Seidlhofer 2001, 2002) and strive for positive interpersonal relationships. I

¹³ Based on recent descriptive work conducted on VOICE data, Seidlhofer points out "certain regularities that at least point to some hypotheses" (Seidlhofer 2004: 220) about linguistic features of ELF which typically tend to be regarded as "errors" while they "appear to be generally unproblematic and no obstacle to communicative success" (ibid.). Her list includes "overdoing explicitness", as in this example: V1 says *black color* rather than just *black*.

illustrated that the speakers of my corpus implicitly or explicitly express their consensus with their interlocutors and signal emphatic attention towards them via extensive backchannelling behaviour. It has been outlined that one principle underlying this notion of consensus and solidarity is the 'let-it-pass principle' (Firth 1996). I have discussed a number of deviations from standard native speaker norms which do not cause communicative problems or have a distracting influence on the establishment of positive interpersonal relationships. It has, for example, been observed that the speakers of the Austrian-Vietnamese corpus react to negative utterances with positive agreement tokens. Furthermore, they also make use of agreement tokens to express their approval of formally 'deficient' and semantically problematic or ambiguous utterances. It may well be that speakers are less consensus-oriented in more transactional ELF interactions. A subtle contrastive examination of transactional and interactional ELF talk on a broader empirical basis might offer a clearer perspective on this issue.

Apart from my attempt to encourage more exploratory inquiry into the forms and functions of phatic ELF talk, I also consider it crucial to raise the question of the relevance of investigations into phatic ELF talk for language pedagogy. Pragmatic deficiencies of ELF speakers have frequently been addressed by linguists. Lauerbach (1982) and Kasper (1978), for instance, complain about the lack of pragmatic competence of German university students of English (cf. Schneider 1988: 288). In her examination of native-/non-native interactions, Kotthoff (1991) finds that these conversations are "determined by pragmatic deficits of the learners and compensatory accommodation by the native speakers" (Meierkord 2001: 9). These scholars, thus, underline the necessity to develop the learners' socio-pragmatic competence.

Given the status of English as *the* global language, we have to be wary of attempts to adjust non-native uses of English to standard native speaker norms. Rather, it has to enter peoples' consciousness that "ELF [is] a use in its own right, and [that] ELF speakers [are] language users in their own right" (Seidlhofer 2001: 137). Thus, instead of 'equipping' learners with the ability to carry out conversations with native speakers without socio-pragmatic problems or misunderstandings, students of English have to be made aware of the cross-cultural dimensions of English. Rather than acquiring a closed set of socio-pragmatic rules, learners should develop socio-pragmatic flexibility which enables them to converse in English with different speakers of different cultural and L1 backgrounds.

The most essential basis for the development of teaching materials, teaching methods, reference books, etc. which include features of this cross-cultural pragmatic competence is the enhancement of empirically based studies of the interactional use of ELF. As the development of teaching materials and reference books is enriched by corpus-based descriptions, the incorporation of casual ELF conversations in computer corpora, such as VOICE, is urgently required.

I hope that this paper has paved the way for a growing interest in the interpersonal aspects of ELF and for the recognition of the importance of phatic communion in international encounters. To put it in Laver's words, I hope that the

skill in managing the behavioural resources of phatic communion [...] becomes not the triviality dismissively referred to as small talk, but a very basic skill essential to a major part of the psychological transactions that make up daily life. (Laver 1975: 223)

References

- Aston, Guy. 1988. *Learning comity*. Bologna: CLUEB.
- Brown, Gillian. 1978. "Understanding spoken language". *TESOL quarterly* 12, 271-283.
- Brown, Gillian; Yule, George. 1983. *Discourse analysis*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Bublitz, Wolfram. 1988. *Fellow-speakers and cooperative conversations*. Amsterdam, Philadelphia: John Benjamins Publishing Company.
- Cameron, Deborah. 2002. *Working with spoken discourse*. London: SAGE Publications.
- Coupland, Justine (ed.). 2000. *Small talk*. Harlow: Longman.
- Duranti, Alessandro. 1997. *Linguistic anthropology*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Edmondson, Willis J. 1981. *Spoken discourse. A model for analysis*. London: Longman.
- Firth, Alan. 1996. "The discursive accomplishment of normality. On 'lingua franca' English and conversation analysis". *Journal of Pragmatics* 26/3, 237-259.
- Garfinkel, Harold. 1967. *Studies in ethnomethodology*. Polity Press: Cambridge.
- Goffman, Erving. 1971. *Relations in public*. London: Penguin.
- Halliday, Michael A. K. 1970. "Language structure and language function". In Lyons, John (ed.). *New horizons in linguistics*. London: Penguin Books, 140-165.
- Holmes, Janet. 2000. "Doing collegiality and keeping control at work: small talk in government departments". In Coupland, Justine (ed.). *Small talk*. Harlow: Longman, 32-61.
- House, Juliane. 1999. "Misunderstanding in intercultural communication: interactions in English as a *lingua franca* and the myth of mutual intelligibility". In Gnutzmann, Claus (ed.). *Teaching and learning English as a global language*. Tübingen: Stauffenberg, 73-89.

- Hutchby, Ian; Wooffitt, Robin. 1998. *Conversation analysis*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Jakobson, Roman. 1960 [1978]. "Concluding statement: linguistics and poetics". In Sebeok, Thomas A. (ed.). *Style in language*. Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 350-377.
- Kasper, Gabriele. 1978. "Pragmatische Defizite im Englischen deutscher Lerner". In Wilss, Wolfram; Siegrist, Leslie. (eds.). *Kongressberichte der 8. Jahrestagung der Gesellschaft für Angewandte Linguistik, Mainz 1977*. Stuttgart: Hochschulverlag, 41-53.
- Kordon, Kathrin. 2003. *Phatic communion in English as a lingua franca*. Unpublished MA thesis, University of Vienna.
- Kotthoff, Helga. 1991. "Lernersprachliche und interkulturelle Ursachen für kommunikative Irritationen". *Linguistische Berichte* 135, 375-397.
- Labov, William. 1972. *Sociolinguistic patterns*. Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press.
- Lauerbach, Gerda. 1982. "Phatic Communion und die pragmatischen Defizite unserer Studenten". In Gnutzmann, Claus; Hellwig, Karlheinz; Jarman, Francis; Köhring, Klaus; Krohn, Dieter; Sierkmann, Manfred (eds.). *Fremdsprachendidaktiker-Kongress, Hannover 1981. Nachpublikation*. Hannover: C.T.-Verlag, 153-165.
- Laver, John. 1975. "Communicative functions of phatic communion". In Kendon, Adam; Harris, Richard M.; Key, Mary R. (eds.). *Organization of behaviour in face-to-face interaction*. The Hague: Mouton, 215-238.
- Leech, Geoffrey. 1974. *Semantics*. Harmondsworth: Penguin.
- Leszyák, Ágnes. 2004. *Communication in English as an international lingua franca*. Norderstedt: Books on Demand.
- Lyons, John. 1977. *Semantics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Malinowski, Bronislaw. 1923 [1972]. "Phatic communion". In Laver, John; Hutcheson, Sandy (ed.). *Communication in face to face interaction*. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books.
- Meierkord, Christiane. 1996. *English als Medium der interkulturellen Kommunikation. Untersuchungen zum non-native/non-native speaker – Diskurs*. Frankfurt/Main: Lang.
- Meierkord, Christiane. 2000. "Interpreting successful lingua franca interaction. An analysis of non – native/non – native small talk conversations in English". *Linguistik online* 5, 1/00. http://viadrina.eu-frankfurt-o.de/~wjournal/1_00/MEIERKOR.HTM. (19 December 2006)
- Schneider, Klaus P. 1988. *Small talk. Analysing phatic discourse*. Marburg: Hitzeroth.
- Seidlhofer, Barbara. 2001. "Closing a conceptual gap: the case for a description of English as a lingua franca". *International Journal of Applied Linguistics* 11, 133-158.
- Seidlhofer, Barbara. 2002. *A concept of international English and related issues: from 'Real English' to 'Realistic English'?*. Strasbourg: Council of Europe.
- Seidlhofer, Barbara. 2004. "Research perspectives on teaching English as a lingua franca". *Annual Review of Applied Linguistics* 24, 209-239.
- Seidlhofer, Barbara. 2005. "Englisch als Lingua Franca und seine Rolle in der internationalen Wissensvermittlung. Ein Aufruf zur Selbstbehauptung". In Braun, Sabine; Kohn, Kurt (eds.). *Sprache(n) in der Wissensgesellschaft. Proceedings der 34. Jahrestagung der Gesellschaft für Angewandte Linguistik*. Frankfurt/Main: Lang, 27-45.
- Seidlhofer, Barbara; Breiteneder, Angelika; Pitzl, Marie-Luise. 2006. "English as a lingua franca in Europe". *Annual Review of Applied Linguistics* 26, 3-34.

Turner, George. 1973. *Sylistics*. Harmondsworth: Penguin.

VOICE homepage: <http://www.univie.ac.at/voice>. (19 December 2006)

Wagner, Johannes; Firth, Alan. 1997. "Communication strategies at work". In Kasper, Gabriele; Kellermann, Eric (eds.). *Communication strategies*. London: Longman, 323-344.

Wolfson, Nessa. 1981. "Invitations, compliments and the competence of the native speaker". *International Journal of Psycholinguistics* 8, 7-22.

Züger, Kathrin. 1998. *Säg öppis! – Phatische Sprachverwendung*. Wien: Lang.

How to contact us:



c/o

**Institut für Anglistik & Amerikanistik der Universität Wien
Universitätscampus AAKH, Spitalgasse 2, Hof 8
A – 1090 Vienna; Austria**

fax (intern.) 43 1 4277 9424
eMail ursula.lutzky@univie.ac.at
W3 <http://www.univie.ac.at/Anglistik/views.htm>
(all issues available online)

IMPRESSUM:

EIGENTÜMER, HERAUSGEBER & VERLEGER: VIEWS, c/o INSTITUT FÜR ANGLISTIK & AMERIKANISTIK DER UNIVERSITÄT WIEN, UNIVERSITÄTSCAMPUS AAKH, SPITALGASSE 2, A - 1090 WIEN, AUSTRIA. **FÜR DEN INHALT VERANTWORTLICH** URSULA LUTZKY **WEBMASTER:** STEPHEN FERGUSON **REDAKTION:** ANGELIKA BREITENEDER, CHRISTIANE DALTON-PUFFER, JULIA HÜTTNER, BRYAN JENNER, GUNTHER KALTENBÖCK, THERESA KLIMPFINGER, JULIA LICHTKOPPLER, URSULA LUTZKY, BARBARA MEHLMAUER-LARCHER, MARIE-LUISE PITZL, ANGELIKA RIEDER-BÜNEMANN, NIKOLAUS RITT, HERBERT SCHENDL, BARBARA SEIDLHOFER, UTE SMIT, H.G. WIDDOWSON. ALLE: c/o INSTITUT FÜR ANGLISTIK & AMERIKANISTIK DER UNIVERSITÄT WIEN, UNIVERSITÄTSCAMPUS AAKH, SPITALGASSE 2, A - 1090 WIEN. **HERSTELLUNG:** VIEWS